State v. McDaniel

• Decision Date: 31 January 1881
• Citation: 84 N.C. 803
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. ALEXANDER MCDANIEL.

84 N.C. 803

STATE

v.ALEXANDER MCDANIEL.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January Term, 1881.

INDICTMENT for slander tried at Fall Term, 1880, of JONES Superior Court, before Gudger, J.

Verdict of guilty, judgment, appeal by defendant.

Attorney General, for the State .

Messrs. @## @Manly, Simmons, & Manly, for defendant

.

RUFFIN, J.

The defendant was indicted, under the act of 1879, ch. 156, for slandering Laura Whaley, an innocent woman, by speaking words concerning her, which amounted to a charge of incontinency; and on the trial in the superior court he admitted having spoken the words charged, and insisted that the same were true. The prosecutrix was introduced as a witness for the state, and declared that she was innocent of the misconduct imputed to her, not only so far as the defendant was concerned, but all other men; and other evidence was given as to her good character. The defendant offered evidence which tended to support the words spoken concerning her.

The judge then charged the jury that in order to convict the defendant, they must find that the prosecutrix was an innocent woman, that is to say, a pure, chaste woman; and that the general rule of law was that all persons are presumed to be innocent until the contrary is shown; so that the defendant having admitted that he used the words which amounted to a charge of incontinency, or if the state had proved the use of such words by the defendant, the burden of proof was upon him to show that he had not slandered an innocent woman. The defendant complains of this charge because he says, it shifted the burden of proof from the state to himself, and withal required him to prove a negative.

The statute under which the defendant is indicted, is in these words: “Any person who may attempt in a wanton and malicious manner to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman by words written or spoken which amount to a charge of incontinency, shall be guilty,” &c. As we construe it, the offence defined consists, not in the slander of a woman by falsely charging her with incontinency, but in the attempt to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman by such means; and by an “innocent woman” is meant a pure woman--one whose character, to use the language of the preamble of the statute, is “““ unsullied.”

The innocency then of the woman who is the subject of the attempt, lies at the very foundation of the offence, and constitutes its most essential element--its very sine qua non, and must of necessity be distinctly averred in the indictment.

If necessary to be averred, then, under the principle declared in the cases of the State v. Woodly, 2 Jones 276, and the State v. Evans, 5 Jones, 250, the burden of proof devolved upon the state even though it involved the necessity of its proving a negative.

It is true that in the case of the State v. Morrison, 3 Dev., 299, an exception to the general rule which requires the state to prove every material averment against the defendant, was admitted by this court; but it is perfectly manifest from what is said in the two cases just cited, that it soon...