State v. McDonald, No. COA06-6 (N.C. App. 12/19/2006)
| Decision Date | 19 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. COA06-6,COA06-6 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JUSTIN JAMEL McDONALD, Defendant. |
David Belser for the defendant.
Justin Jamel McDonald (defendant) appeals from a 27 August 2002 judgment consistent with a jury verdict finding him guilty of three counts of first degree murder and two counts of first degree kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to three terms of life without parole for the first degree murder convictions and one term of 133 to 169 months for one of the first degree kidnapping convictions, to run consecutively.
In February 1999, Robin and Kimberly Rhyne and their two-year-old son, Hunter Rhyne, were found murdered near their home in Statesville, North Carolina. Prior to their murders, Robin and Kimberly began smoking crack cocaine. They received their supply from Deek Lackey. Lackey sold crack for defendant and defendant's roommate, Russell McIntosh.
On 18 January 1999, Robin met with defendant, intending to sell defendant Robin's 1988 Porsche. Defendant, Brian McDonald (defendant's cousin) and Lackey drove to Robin's residence. Once there, defendant and Robin got in the Porsche and drove to the location where defendant and McIntosh sold and kept drugs (Mindon Place). Defendant's cousin and Lackey followed in a separate vehicle. While at Mindon Place, defendant was seen walking over to a parked, inoperable vehicle which was identified as a storage place for drugs and firearms. When defendant and Robin left Mindon Place, defendant was seen wearing a black leather jacket that he had borrowed from Lackey two days earlier. Shortly after leaving Mindon Place, defendant was seen operating Robin's Porsche alone. Defendant went to the home of Takesha "Tasha" Reid and gave her a ride in the Porsche. While seated in the Porsche, Tasha saw the black leather jacket on the back seat and asked if she could wear it. However, defendant stated he had "thrown up" on the jacket earlier that evening and did not allow Tasha to wear it. During the early morning hours of 19 January 1999, a family living near Mindon Place testified defendant came to their house, wearing a black leather jacket, and woke them up in order to use their bathroom. The school-aged daughter testified that she observed defendant wash blood off his hands through a crack in the bathroom door. Also on 19 January 1999, Dale Jordan, a friend of the Rhyne family had observed defendant driving Robin's Porsche. In speaking with Kim Rhyne at the Rhyne residence, Jordan learned that Robin had not yet returned after leaving with defendant the previous day. While Jordan was at the Rhyne residence, Kim received a call and demanded the caller tell her where her husband was or she would "tell the police where every crack house in town was." After the phone call, Lackey arrived at the Rhyne residence and Jordan and Lackey left around 10:00 p.m. to search for Robin. When Jordan and Lackey returned to the Rhyne residence, Kim's car was gone and no one was home.
On 15 March 1999 defendant was indicted for two counts of first degree kidnapping, three counts of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery. In November 1999, the trial court declared a mistrial, as the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court also granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for armed robbery. On 11 July 2002, a second trial commenced in Davidson County Superior Court. On 27 August 2002, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder of Robin Rhyne, based on premeditation and deliberation; first degree murder of Kimberly Rhyne, based on premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder rule; first degree murder of Hunter Rhyne based on the felony murder rule; and guilty of two counts of first degree kidnapping of Kimberly and Hunter Rhyne. Defendant appeals.
Defendant raises fourteen issues on appeal summarized as follows: whether the trial court erred in (I) denying defendant's motions to dismiss the first degree murder charges; (II) denying defendant's motions to dismiss the kidnapping charges; (III) giving the jury instruction on acting in concert as to Kim and Hunter Rhyne; (IV) admitting the photographs of Robin's grave; (V) limiting the cross-examination of a jail house informant; (VI) admitting all expert testimony; and (VII) denying the jury's request for a transcript.
Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss first degree murder charges as to Robin, Kim and Hunter Rhyne. When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must "determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense." State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996).
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant and adequate to convince a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion. In considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must analyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State every reasonable inference from the evidence. The trial court must also resolve any contradictions in the evidence in the State's favor. The trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider the evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness' credibility.
State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336-37, 561 S.E.2d 245, 256, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006, 154 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2002). First degree murder is the unlawful killing of another with malice, premeditation and deliberation. State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 113-14, 282 S.E.2d 791, 795-96 (1981). When a killing occurs intentionally and with a deadly weapon, two presumptions arise: (1) the killing was unlawful; and (2) the killing was done with malice. State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 106, 118 S.E.2d 769, 772, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 851, 7 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1961). "[P]remeditation and deliberation are mental processes and ordinarily are not susceptible to proof by direct evidence. Instead, they usually must be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 59, 337 S.E.2d 808, 822-23 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733, overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
Evidence was presented at trial tending to establish that defendant murdered Robin. Robin died from four contact gunshot wounds to the head and he suffered injuries consistent with defensive wounds to the hand/arm. Defendant was the last person seen with Robin in Robin's car. Defendant was driving Robin's car after Robin disappeared. Robin's car was recovered by the police and contained Robin's blood and defendant's bloody palm print. Also found was a black leather jacket worn by defendant with Robin's blood on it. Defendant was observed washing blood off his hands the night Robin was missing. The murder weapon was found at an apartment where defendant lived and the victim's buried body was found at defendant's former residence. While in jail, defendant told jailhouse inmates of his involvement in the murder. Evidence was presented that defendant admitted that he and McIntosh abducted Kimberly and Hunter from their home. They were taken to a remote wooded area where McIntosh had formerly resided and were executed. Kim's body was found wearing only socks and with bruises, scrapes and cuts on her feet, legs and knees. She died from nine gunshot wounds, seven to the head and face. Hunter suffered a single gunshot wound to the back of his head. The Rhyne residence was found disheveled, the phone line had been cut, and a number of personal possessions and items for Hunter remained in the home. Further evidence showed defendant and McIntosh were drug dealers and Kim had threatened to provide the police with information of drug dealing locations. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss and submitting the first degree murder charge as to all victims to the jury. These three assignments of error are overruled.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the kidnapping charges as to Kim and Hunter Rhyne. We disagree.
Kidnapping is the unlawful confinement, restraint, or removal of a person from one place to another for the purpose of: (1) holding that person for a ransom or as a hostage, (2) facilitating the commission of a felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony, (3) doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person, or (4) holding that person in involuntary servitude. N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-39(a) (2005). Kidnapping is in the first degree when the victim is not released in a safe place or is seriously injured or sexually assaulted during the commission of the kidnapping. State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 25, 603 S.E.2d 93, 110 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1052, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (2005).
The State presented evidence that defendant and McIntosh lived together and dealt drugs together, that defendant had murdered Kim's husband and that Kim threatened to inform police about drug dealing in the area unless she found her husband. Witnesses testified to defendant's statements regarding breaking into the Rhyne home, abducting Kim and Hunter, taking them into the woods and shooting them. The murder weapon was discovered in McIntosh's apartment. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was...
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