State v. McFadden

• Decision Date: 16 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 66224,66224
• Citation: 320 N.W.2d 608
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Dwayne McFADDEN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 608

320 N.W.2d 608

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Dwayne McFADDEN, Appellant.

No. 66224.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 16, 1982.

Bruce L. Cook and Kermit L. Dunahoo, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Roxann M. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan L. Johnston, Polk County Atty., and D. William Thomas, Asst. Polk County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, HARRIS, McCORMICK, and ALLBEE, JJ.

ALLBEE, Justice.

This case stems from a drag race between defendant Michael Dwayne McFadden and another driver, Matthew Sulgrove, which occurred on a Des Moines city street in April 1980. During the course of the two vehicles' southbound progression, Sulgrove lost control of his automobile and swerved into a lane of oncoming traffic, where he struck a lawfully operated northbound vehicle. This third vehicle contained a six-year-old passenger, Faith Ellis, who was killed in the collision along with Sulgrove. Defendant's automobile did not physically contact either of the two colliding vehicles. Further details concerning the race and the accident will be related as necessary for treatment of the issues raised by defendant.

Defendant was charged with two counts of involuntary manslaughter, a violation of section 707.5(1), The Code 1979. Having waived a jury, defendant was tried to the court and convicted and sentenced on both counts. In this appeal, he challenges the validity of his convictions and the sentences imposed.

I. Theory of liability.

Section 707.5(1) defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:

A person commits a class "D" felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape.

Although not expressly stated in the statute, we have held that the underlying public offense must be committed recklessly in order to convict a person under section 707.5(1). State v. Conner, 292 N.W.2d 682, 686, 689 (Iowa 1980).

Proof at trial here was primarily directed toward the public offenses of reckless driving, § 321.277, The Code 1979, and drag racing, § 321.278, The Code 1979. On appeal, defendant does not argue that the evidence was insufficient for trial court to find that both he and Sulgrove recklessly committed those public offenses prior to the accident. Rather, defendant's main contention is that proof of the causation element of section 707.5(1) was lacking. See Divisions II and III, infra.

Trial court found that defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter under each of three separate theories: (1) that defendant aided and abetted Sulgrove in Sulgrove's commission of involuntary manslaughter, see § 703.1, The Code 1979 (defining aiding and abetting); (2) that defendant was vicariously responsible for Sulgrove's commission of involuntary manslaughter by reason of their joint participation in the public offense of drag racing, see § 703.2, The Code 1979 (defining joint criminal conduct); and (3) that defendant himself committed the crime of involuntary manslaughter by recklessly engaging in a drag race so as to proximately cause the Sulgrove-Ellis collision.

We note that aiding and abetting and joint criminal conduct are theories of vicarious liability, based on Sulgrove's commission of involuntary manslaughter. Although a vicarious liability theory may be sufficient to convict defendant for the death of Faith Ellis, the same is not true with regard to the death of Sulgrove. This is because the involuntary manslaughter statute requires proof that the perpetrator caused the death of "another person." See § 707.5(1). Obviously, Sulgrove could not have committed involuntary manslaughter with respect to his own death. Therefore, a theory under which defendant is only vicariously liable for Sulgrove's crime would be inadequate to convict defendant for Sulgrove's death.

We turn, then, to consideration of the third theory of liability, i.e., that defendant's reckless commission of the public offense of drag racing was a proximate cause of the Sulgrove and Ellis deaths. ¹

II. Causation: legal principles.

As stated earlier, most of the issues raised by defendant on this appeal concern the causation element of section 707.5(1). In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of causation, defendant raises certain issues concerning governing legal principles. We will address those legal questions in this division.

Preliminarily, we note that the fact that defendant's automobile did not physically contact either of the other two vehicles does not, standing alone, preclude his conviction. This rule was established in Iowa in another drag-racing case, State v. Youngblut, 257 Iowa 343, 132 N.W.2d 486 (1965), where a defendant was held to have been properly charged with involuntary manslaughter under similar facts. Having taken initial note of Youngblut, we proceed to address defendant's legal arguments concerning causation.

A. Legal effect of Sulgrove's voluntary participation.

Defendant asserts that because Sulgrove was a competitor in the drag race, he assumed the risk of his own death, and therefore defendant could not be convicted or sentenced for that death. This question was not raised in Youngblut because the only victim there was an innocent third party who had been traveling in a nonracing vehicle.

Defendant's position finds some support in State v. Petersen, 270 Or. 166, 167-68, 526 P.2d 1008, 1009 (1974), a drag-racing case in which the court held that Oregon's involuntary manslaughter statute "should not be interpreted to extend to those cases in which the victim is a knowing and voluntary participant in the course of reckless conduct." Drag-racing cases from other jurisdictions, however, have held defendants liable for manslaughter in the death of a co-participant. State v. Melcher, 15 Ariz.App. 157, 159, 161-62, 487 P.2d 3, 5, 7-8 (1971); Campbell v. State, 285 So.2d 891, 892, 895 (Miss.1973); Commonwealth v. Peak, 12 Pa.D. & C.2d 379, 381-82 (1957). Although Peak appears to have been effectively overruled by Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961), a case we will discuss further below, we find ourselves in agreement with Peak rather than with Root. Therefore, we quote with approval the following discussion from Peak which is pertinent to the issue at hand:

Defendants by participating in the unlawful racing initiated a series of events resulting in the death of Young. Under these circumstances, decedent's own unlawful conduct does not absolve defendants from their guilt. The acts of defendants were contributing and substantial factors in bringing about the death of Young. The acts and omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of an injury and in such case each of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate cause.

12 Pa.D. & C.2d at 382. See also State v. Shimon, 182 N.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Iowa 1970).

We hold that the fact of Sulgrove's voluntary and reckless participation in the drag race does not of itself bar defendant from being convicted of involuntary manslaughter for Sulgrove's death.

B. Standard of causation.

Next, defendant contends trial court erred in applying the civil standard of proximate cause in a criminal prosecution, rather than adopting the more stringent standard of "direct causal connection" used by the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 580, 170 A.2d 310, 314 (1961). In Root, the court held that "the tort liability concept of proximate cause has no proper place in prosecutions for criminal homicide and more direct causal connection is required for conviction." Id. The court cited the facts of another Pennsylvania case as an example of such direct causation:

In [Commonwealth v. Levin, 184 Pa.Super. 436, 135 A.2d 764 (1957) ] two cars were racing on the streets of Philadelphia at speeds estimated at from 85 to 95 miles per hour. The defendant's car, in the left hand lane, was racing alongside of the car in which the deceased was a passenger when the defendant turned his automobile sharply to the right in front of the other car thereby causing the driver of the latter car to lose control and smash into a tree, the passenger being thrown to the road and killed as a result of the impact.... Levin's act of cutting his automobile sharply in front of the car in which the deceased was riding directly forced that car off of the road and into the tree. The defendant's reckless and unlawful maneuver was the direct cause of the crucial fatality.

Id. at 576, 170 A.2d at 312.

We had occasion to consider a similar standard-of-causation issue in State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 584-85 (Iowa 1980), which upheld the involuntary manslaughter conviction of a man who provided an obviously intoxicated, suicidal woman with the means to shoot herself by loading a gun for her and placing it within her reach. As here, the defendant in Marti argued that the trial court "inappropriately adopted the standards of proximate cause applied in civil cases." Id. at 584. Unlike the Pennsylvania court in Root, however, we said in Marti that we were "unwilling to hold as a blanket rule of law that instructions used in civil trials regarding proximate cause are inappropriate for criminal trials." Id. We explained:

One reason for this is the similar functions that the requirement of proximate cause plays in both sorts of trials. The element of proximate cause in criminal prosecutions serves as a requirement that there be a sufficient causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and a proscribed harm to hold him criminally responsible. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, in the law of torts it is the element that requires there to be a sufficient causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's damage to hold the defendant civilly liable. [Citation omitted.]

Id.

We did note in Marti, however, that legal causation (as opposed to...