State v. McGhee

• Decision Date: 22 February 1988
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Jerome McGHEE, Appellant. 746 S.W.2d 460
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 460

746 S.W.2d 460

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Jerome McGHEE, Appellant.

746 S.W.2d 460

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Nashville.

Feb. 22, 1988.

William P. Purcell, III, Nashville, for appellant.

Kenneth J. Ries, Paul J. Morrow, Jr., Tenn. Ass'n of Crim. Defense Lawyers, Nashville, Tenn., amicus curiae for the Tennessee Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen., Albert L. Partee, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

HARBISON, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and received a sentence of twenty years in the state penitentiary on each count, the sentences to be served consecutively.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Because the case presents a recurring question of criminal procedure, we granted review.

Although appellant has presented a number of other issues, we find that all of them were correctly dealt with by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and we affirm its decision. Appellant was apprehended shortly after 5 a.m. on October 22, 1983, a few minutes after two employees of a fast-food restaurant had been robbed in a parking lot adjacent to their place of employment. Questions of identification were raised, but in our opinion these were properly dealt with by the courts below. There was clearly a jury issue presented, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction.

The procedural question raised in the case involves the efficacy of a motion in limine to preserve issues for subsequent appellate review. Through such a motion appellant objected to the use of a prior conviction on cross-examination if he should elect to take the stand at trial. It is his contention that the overruling of such an objection should be deemed in all cases to preserve the issue for appellate review without the necessity of further objection to the evidence when offered at trial. Indeed, it is the insistence of appellant that he is free to offer the evidence himself on direct examination, if desired, in advance of cross-examination by the state, without waiving the alleged error of the trial judge in overruling the motion in limine. The Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, by amicus curiae brief, has recommended that the Court adopt such a rule of practice.

The Court held in State v. Martin, 642 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn.1982), that a hard and fast rule could not be laid down to require that a preliminary ruling be made in all cases. We are constrained to reach the same result with respect to the issue of requiring further objection when such a ruling is made. In Martin it was urged that an accused was entitled as a matter of right in all circumstances to demand that the trial judge rule on the admissibility of prior convictions before the accused elected to testify. The Court held that no such inflexible rule could be prescribed. The Court concluded that the decision to make a preliminary ruling must rest in the discretion of the trial judge and could not be demanded as a matter of right in every case. The reasons for leaving the issue to the discretion of the trial judge were discussed at length in that case and need not be repeated here. Advance rulings, of course, were not discouraged or prohibited, but the circumstances under which an advance ruling is requested are often so preliminary or tentative that a mandatory rule was not deemed to be practicable.

In the earlier case of Goines v. State, 572 S.W.2d 644 (Tenn.1978), the Court held that the action of a trial judge in overruling a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence was sufficiently clear and definitive under the circumstances of that case that a further objection to the testimony when offered at trial was not necessary. The Court stated that a trial objection would have been preferable but, nevertheless, stated:

"The test must be whether the issue was fairly raised, or phrasing it another way, whether the trial judge was fairly apprised of petitioner's objection or given a reasonable opportunity to consider the matter. [Citation omitted]

"It would be manifestly unjust to apply the waiver rule in this case where the petitioner, in advance of trial, fairly apprised the Court of the substance of his objection to the testimony and where on motion for a new trial the Court was again apprised of the petitioner's contentions.

"Making a motion to suppress or objecting to the testimony after the trial judge had overruled petitioner's motion and held that there was probable cause for the arrest, would have been an idle ceremony and a useless gesture. The courts do not demand that counsel engage in futile efforts. The trial judge had ruled; the question had been resolved; there was nothing left to decide. Further effort would have been argumentative, repetitious and foredoomed to certain failure." 572 S.W.2d at 649.

We adhere to the decision in that case where the record on a pretrial suppression motion or on a motion in limine clearly presents an evidentiary question and where the trial judge has clearly and definitively ruled.

In many instances, however, including the present case, issues are only tentatively suggested or the record only partially and incompletely developed in connection with a motion in limine. Counsel necessarily take some calculated risks in not renewing objections in such cases.

In the instant case the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the motion in limine did not sufficiently preserve the issue, and in our opinion this ruling was clearly correct.

The entire motion in limine was extremely brief. One motion in limine, not at issue here, was denied after oral discussion. The entire proceedings urged to preserve the issue here were as follows:

"THE COURT: All right, any other motions that we have to take up?

"MR. CONNERS: Yes, Your Honor, one more. That--another motion in limine that the defendant, if he decides to testify in this case, that he not be impeached by his prior conviction, which is an armed robbery conviction.

"THE COURT: All right, we will have a Morgan hearing on that issue. I think that that is what Morgan versus State requires, that prior to the defendant being impeached by any prior conviction, it is required that a pre-Morgan hearing be had on his testimony. I suppose since it is an armed robbery conviction, if he is called to testify then we will have a Morgan hearing prior to any testimony being given."

No objection was taken to this action, and in fact a subsequent jury-out hearing...