State v. McGhee
| Decision Date | 27 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 62210,62210 |
| Citation | 280 N.W.2d 436 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Curtis William McGHEE, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Alfredo G. Parrish, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David E. Richter, County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and REES, UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK and McGIVERIN, JJ.
This is an appeal by the defendant, Curtis William McGhee, Jr., from his conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree in violation of §§ 690.1 and 690.2, The Code 1977. We affirm.
The record indicates the defendant, who was 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and two companions entered the lot of an auto dealership in Council Bluffs on the night of July 21, 1977, intending to steal a car. One of the three (not the defendant) was carrying a shotgun. The following morning a security guard at the dealership was found dead of a shotgun wound.
McGhee was taken into custody on December 22, 1977, and the case was transferred to the Juvenile Court the following day. On January 20, 1978, after hearing, jurisdiction over the defendant was transferred to the district court. On February 17, 1978, a county attorney's information was filed charging the defendant with murder.
Following disposition of several preliminary motions, the matter proceeded to trial. A verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree was returned by a jury on May 11, 1978. Following denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, McGhee was sentenced to life imprisonment. On June 29, McGhee filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.
Further elaboration upon the facts of the case will be provided in the discussion of the issues to which they pertain.
The following issues are presented for review:
(1) Was the defendant not indicted within the statutory time period set by § 795.1, The Code 1977, when the county attorney's information was filed less than 30 days after the transfer of the case from the Juvenile Court but more than 30 days following defendant's arrest?
(2) When the minutes of the testimony contained summaries of the expected testimony of certain witnesses as well as a general clause regarding "certain other facts" relating to the offense, should the trial court have sustained the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars requesting specific details concerning such "other facts"?
(3) Does § 781.10, The Code 1977, which permits a defendant to take depositions from prosecution witnesses, grant a criminal defendant the right to obtain answers to interrogatories from the prosecuting attorney?
(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence photographs of the decedent prior to the autopsy due to their alleged prejudicial nature and lack of probative value?
(5) Were the Miranda warnings given the defendant constitutionally inadequate when he was not specifically informed that the interrogation would be terminated upon his request?
(6) When a prisoner with whom the defendant had been incarcerated testified at trial that the defendant had confessed to taking part in the crime with which he was charged, should a new trial have been granted upon motion accompanied by an affidavit, executed by another prisoner who had been incarcerated with the witness, stating that the witness had admitted perjuring himself at trial?
I. Defendant first asserts the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the charges against him due to alleged noncompliance with § 795.1, The Code 1977, which requires that either an indictment be found against an individual within 30 days of the person being "held to answer" for a public offense or the prosecution dismissed, in the absence of good cause for the delay. 1 Here an information was filed 57 days after the defendant was taken into custody, but less than 30 days following the transfer of jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the district court.
Defendant's motion to dismiss was couched in statutory terms and thus does not directly present an issue of constitutional dimensions. Although constitutional considerations are argued by the defendant in support of his position, we will consider them only as an aid in construing the statute and making the determination essential to this issue: is a juvenile "held to answer" for purposes of § 795.1 when he is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and not subject to the jurisdiction of the district court for criminal prosecution?
We have previously examined the "held to answer" language of § 795.1, in relation to juveniles transferred to the district court. In Bergman v. Nelson, 241 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Iowa 1976), and State v. White, 223 N.W.2d 173, 175-76 (Iowa 1974), we held that a child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not "held to answer" within the meaning of § 795.1 until he or she is transferred to the district court for prosecution. We find no compelling reasons to depart from these holdings and thus do not find error in the district court's overruling of McGhee's motion to dismiss.
In State v. White, we said: . Also, a child is not amenable to prosecution under the criminal statutes until the transfer order is entered. In re Interest of Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 47, 48-49 (Iowa 1977).
The purpose of the juvenile proceeding is to determine the disposition of the matter which would best meet the interests of both the child and the State in preventing the recurrence of delinquent activity. It is not subject to all the strictures applicable to adult criminal proceedings, although we note the legislature has recently provided additional procedural safeguards for the rights of juveniles in revising the juvenile justice provisions of the Code. See ch. 232, The Code 1979. An investigation into the particular circumstances of each child is necessary before disposition. To adopt McGhee's proposed construction and find a minor "held to answer" either when he is taken into custody or when the juvenile court finds probable cause the juvenile committed the alleged act of delinquency would be to place unreasonable time constraints on both the juvenile authorities and the prosecutor in any eventual criminal trial, due to the fact that the transfer must occur before a criminal prosecution may be commenced against a minor.
McGhee seeks support from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), where the court held that certain constitutional guarantees applicable to adult criminal prosecutions, such as the right to counsel, right to notice of charges, and right against self incrimination, are also applicable to juvenile proceedings under a due process analysis. In so doing, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a juvenile delinquency proceeding has several criminal characteristics and left for case-by-case determination the applicability of all rights available to adult-defendants. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1980, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 654 (1971). The standard which has evolved from this line of cases is one of whether direct application of the particular right would be consistent with "fair treatment" and would not "risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process", Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1070, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 372 (1970). See also Matter of Tony W., 91 Misc.2d 700, 398 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Fam.Ct.1977); State in Interest of H.M.T., 159 N.J.Super. 104, 387 A.2d 368 (1978); Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan.App.2d 736, 574 P.2d 234 (1977).
To apply § 795.1 in the manner in which McGhee advocates would not only disrupt the potential benefits of the juvenile proceeding, but would be to apply the 30-day period simultaneously to both juvenile and, in the event of a waiver, district court proceedings. Such an application would be beyond the scope of the doctrine of equal treatment underlying Gault and could place unreasonable time constraints on proceedings. We therefore reaffirm our holding in Bergman v. Nelson and State v. White.
II. McGhee next contends the district court erred in not granting certain clauses of his motion for a bill of particulars dealing with the inclusion in the minutes of testimony of language that witnesses would testify to "certain other facts" concerning the alleged offense of which they had knowledge. Because we conclude that the indictment and the minutes of testimony sufficiently informed the defendant of the nature and extent of the charges against him to enable him to prepare his defense, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court requiring reversal.
A motion for a bill of particulars is authorized, for purposes of this appeal, by § 773.6, The Code 1977 (now § 813.2, Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(5), The Code 1979). It is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court will not be reversed unless the discretion is abused. State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Iowa 1976). In State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1976), and State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 1975), we set forth the following principles regarding a bill of particulars:
(1) A bill of particulars is in legal effect a more specific statement of the details of the offense charged.
(2) Its purpose is to give the defendant information which the indictment (or information) and minutes of testimony by reason of their generality do not supply.
(3) A motion for a bill of particulars should be sustained when the court, in its discretion, finds the charge and the minutes do not inform the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.
(4) A motion for bill of particulars cannot be used merely as a devise to obtain the State's evidence...
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