State v. McGrath
Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
Docket Number | 2019-CA-21 |
Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. MATTHEW WILLIAM MCGRATH Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court Trial Court Case Nos 2019-CRB-001- 0409 and 2019-TRC-001-1357
JESSE J. GREEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0040265, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Darke County Municipal Court, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
REGINA R. RICHARDS, Atty. Reg. No. 0079457, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
{¶ 1} Appellant, Matthew William McGrath, was convicted of being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. McGrath asserts that he was subjected to an unconstitutional stop and that the field sobriety testing which followed was not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was under the influence of alcohol. McGrath additionally asserts that, when taking his no contest plea, the trial court did not comply with the Traf.R. 10(B)(2) requirement that he be advised of the effect of a no contest plea. We conclude that the stop was a constitutional investigative stop and that the field sobriety testing was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of alcohol impairment. But we also conclude that the trial court completely failed to comply with the Traf.R 10(B)(2) requirement that a defendant entering a no contest plea must be advised of the effect of such a plea. The trial court's judgment will be reversed and remanded.
{¶ 2} On June 26, 2019, at approximately 8:45 p.m., Darke County Sheriffs Deputy Greg Armstrong observed a parked automobile in the 1200 block of Imler Drive, Wayne Lakes, Ohio, while on routine patrol. Armstrong initiated a stop of the automobile by activating the cruiser's overhead lights. McGrath was seated in the parked automobile's driver's seat; he exited the vehicle and approached Armstrong. The ensuing encounter resulted in McGrath's arrest for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) under R.C. 4511.191, a first-degree misdemeanor. However, Armstrong testified at a subsequent suppression hearing that the OVI citation was a mistake, because it had been his intent to issue McGrath a citation for having physical control of a vehicle while under the influence (having physical control), in violation of R.C. 4511.194, also a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶ 3} Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress, challenging the constitutionality of the stop, the field sobriety testing, and whether there was probable cause to arrest McGrath. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled the suppression motion, except that the court suppressed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Thereafter, McGrath pleaded no contest to having physical control, and he was sentenced accordingly. This appeal followed.
{¶ 4} McGrath presents two assignments of error:
{¶ 5} At the suppression hearing, during his direct examination, Armstrong testified that he made the traffic stop because he observed McGrath's vehicle "partially on the roadway." Armstrong also testified that on previous occasions at the same location, he had "caught people [who were] unresponsive and overdosing on heroin." During cross-examination, Armstrong expanded upon the facts surrounding the stop as follows:
Suppression Hearing Tr. p. 24-25. Additionally, a photograph was introduced (Exhibit B) which depicted McGrath's vehicle parked on the roadway, albeit slightly.
{¶ 6} Appellate "review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. As the trier of fact, a trial court "is in the best position to weigh * * * evidence * * * and evaluate [the credibility of] witnesses]," so an "appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Graves, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-03-022, 2015-Ohio-3936, ¶ 9, citing State v. Cruz, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2013-10-008, 2014-Ohio-4280, ¶ 12. Accepting the trial court's findings of fact as true, "the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the [trial court's legal] conclusion[s]," whether the "facts satisfy the applicable * * * standard." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing Fanning and State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (3d Dist.1997).
{¶ 7} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also State v. Taylor, 138 Ohio App.3d 139, 145, 740 N.E.2d 704 (2d Dist.2000) ( ). Warrantless searches and seizures violate this prohibition unless conducted pursuant to one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." (Citations omitted.) Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). One of these exceptions "is commonly known as an investigative or Terry stop," which includes the temporary detention of motorists for the enforcement of traffic laws. State v. Dorsey 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-737, 2005-Ohio-2334, ¶ 17, citing Terry.
{¶ 8} The temporary "detention of [persons] during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning" of the Fourth Amendment. (Citations omitted.) Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). An "automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Id. at 810. Generally, a police officer's decision to stop an automobile will comport with this requirement if the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-1105 (9th Cir.2000); State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23.
{¶ 9} Moreover, the constitutionality of a stop supported by a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has been committed is not undermined by an officer's ulterior investigative motive for making the stop. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus.
{¶ 10} Turning to the pending case, R.C. 4511.66(A) states in pertinent part as follows:
Upon any highway outside a business or residence district, no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway if it is practicable to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off the paved or main traveled part of said highway * * *
Armstrong's testimony, which the trial court implicitly found credible, and Exhibit B, a photo of McGrath's vehicle on the roadway (which was referenced in the trial court's decision), lead to the conclusion that the traffic stop was supported by at least a reasonable suspicion that McGrath's vehicle was parked in violation of R.C. 4511.66(A).
{¶ 11} At the suppression hearing, Armstrong testified that, when he activated the cruiser's overhead lights McGrath exited his vehicle and began walking toward the cruiser "pretty rapidly." Armstrong observed that, as McGrath exited his vehicle, "he had some trouble" performing this task, and as McGrath approached the cruiser, he seemed to be having "some trouble" walking. Armstrong ordered McGrath to return to his car, and McGrath complied with this request. Armstrong observed that, as McGrath returned to his car, he continued to have "trouble" walking and had difficulty getting back into his car. Armstrong testified that, overall, McGrath was "just very stumbly [and] staggering."
{¶ 12} Armstrong ultimately approached McGrath's vehicle and...
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