State v. McHugh, 91-280
Decision Date | 09 November 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 91-280,91-280 |
Citation | 635 A.2d 1200,161 Vt. 574 |
Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Paul M. McHUGH. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
The State charged that defendant Paul McHugh "corruptly endeavored to obstruct ... justice" by picketing the residence of Judge Matthew Katz in an attempt to influence his judicial decisions in pending criminal proceedings involving defendant and others. 13 V.S.A. § 3015. 1 The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling that the statute as applied infringed the First Amendment right to free speech. We affirm.
On April 5, 1990, defendant and several members of Operation Rescue were on the public sidewalk at the residence of Judge Katz protesting his failure to release other members of the group on bail. Defendant carried handbills urging "people of God" to maintain "prayer vigils" at the site until Judge Katz should "repent ... or immediately remove himself from all further rescue trial proceedings." The demonstration was confined to the sidewalk in front of the residence. There was no disorderly conduct, no obscenity, and no trespass.
As a general matter, peaceful picketing and leafletting are protected speech activities. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). Public streets and sidewalks are traditional public fora for purposes of free expression and do not lose that status in residential areas. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). Speech in these areas may be regulated by a content-neutral regulation that is narrowly drawn to serve a significant government interest. Id. at 481, 108 S.Ct. at 2500.
We agree with the trial court that Vermont's obstruction-of-justice statute is content neutral when applied to picketing or leafletting, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) ( ), and that, with respect to picketing, its purpose in protecting the integrity of the judicial system is significant. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562, 85 S.Ct. 476, 479, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) ( ). The issue here is whether the "omnibus clause" of 13 V.S.A. § 3015 is sufficiently narrowly tailored to proscribe the actions of defendant without infringing constitutionally protected speech.
Drawing on case law construing the nearly identical omnibus clause of the federal obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, 2 the State contends that Vermont's statute requires defendant to have both a specific intent to impede or obstruct the administration of justice and also the capacity to obstruct, thus creating a "limited standard of culpability" that narrows the coverage of the statute. United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir.1985). If an actor's conduct is "corrupt," as the statute requires, the conduct cannot be constitutionally protected. Indeed, the State argues that the statute "covers all interferences with the administration of justice regardless of the means employed," even if those means are merely acts of expression.
This reasoning subordinates First Amendment rights to the interests served by the statute. According to the test of narrowness articulated in Frisby, a content-neutral statute that targets speech activity in a public forum must be drafted so as to "eliminate[ ] no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485, 108 S.Ct. at 2503. The problem in this case, as the trial court recognized, is that the "evil" of picketing a judge's residence is not the only speech activity potentially restricted by the State's interpretation of the omnibus clause of 13 V.S.A. § 3015. All speech intended to influence judicial decisionmaking, whether by demonstration, radio call-in, letter, editorial, or otherwise, could run afoul of the standard of culpability the State advocates. The State's application of the statute is, thus, overbroad. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ( ); cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2510, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) ( ).
What is more, the line is not clear between speech...
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