State v. McKinley, 45537

• Decision Date: 05 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 45537,45537
• Citation: 305 Minn. 297,232 N.W.2d 906
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. L. B. McKINLEY, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 906

232 N.W.2d 906

305 Minn. 297

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. L. B. McKINLEY, Respondent.

No. 45537.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 5, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk or drive away, he has seized that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of Article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota.

2. To justify such an intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant that intrusion.

3. In the instant case the police officers lacked the facts upon which probable cause or reasonable suspicion required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 159 N.W.2d 786 (1968); and State v. Scroggins, 297 Minn. 144, 210 N.W.2d 55 (1973), could be based.

Pierre N. Regnier, City Atty., Thomas R. Hughes and Beryl A. Nord, Asst. City Attys., St. Paul, for appellant.

Mark Reinhardt, Legal Assistance of Ramsey County, Inc., St. Paul, for respondent.

Randall D. B. Tigue, Minneapolis, Barbara Kehrberg, MCLU Volunteer Law Student, Wm. Mitchell College of Law, amicus curiae, for Minn. Civil Liberties Union.

Considered and decided by the court en banc.

SCOTT, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the St. Paul municipal court dismissing a charge against defendant for operating an automobile after cancellation of his driving privileges. The basis of the dismissal was that the court lacked jurisdiction because the seizure of defendant was in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of Article 1, § 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. The city of St. Paul appeals in the name of the state. We affirm.

On April 7, 1974, about 6 p.m., during daylight hours, defendant, L. B. McKinley, was operating an automobile in an alley in the city of St. Paul. The trial court found that he was driving the automobile in a lawful manner and within the 10-miles-perhour alley speed limit prescribed by city ordinance. Officer John Ballis of the St. Paul Police Department was proceeding south with his partner, Officer Jan Pitman. Ballis saw the McKinley car in the alley, stopped his squad car, backed up, and pulled into the alley. McKinley parked his automobile in a parking stall behind an apartment building and got out. Officer Ballis parked his squad car behind McKinley's car and directed McKinley to approach the squad car and display his driver's license. McKinley told the officer that he did not have his driver's license in his possession. Officer Ballis directed McKinley into the rear seat of the squad car. Before getting in, he was subjected to a pat-down for weapons. Officer Pitman then radioed the police dispatcher and requested a check of McKinley's driver's license. The check disclosed that McKinley's license had been canceled and, since no warrants were outstanding for his arrest, McKinley was tagged for driving after cancellation.

The record shows, and the trial court found, that at no time prior to the stop did either officer observe any unlawful or suspicious conduct on the part of McKinley, nor was either aware that McKinley's driver's license had been canceled. Further, the record discloses that defendant was seized and his freedom of movement suspended during the procedure described above. Testimony indicates that the officers would have detained him initially had he disregarded their summons, and that, once inside the squad car, defendant could not open the rear doors because they had no handles.

The issue presented is simply whether or not this seizure of defendant under the circumstances discussed herein constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of Article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota.

A necessary preliminary to the ultimate decision rendered here is a discussion of the state's contention that police officers are authorized by statute to stop a motor vehicle or driver for the purpose of a routine driver's license check. Minn.St. 171.08 provides in pertinent part:

'Every licensee shall have his license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same, upon demand of a justice of the peace, a peace officer, an authorized representative of the department, or by an officer authorized by law to enforce the laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles on public streets and highways; * * *.'

The state would have us conclude, in effect, that the constitutional mandate which the court found had been ignored in the procedures employed by the police officers is subordinate to the regulatory police power of the state. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that existing constitutional guidelines as developed and expanded in recent years support our conclusion that the validity, in application, of the statute depends wholly upon whether such application is consistent with these constitutional standards.

We therefore need not rely upon the narrow factual distinction that defendant was not operating his automobile when summoned by the officers and asked to display his license, so as to bring his conduct within the purview of the statute, but had rather alighted from his vehicle after having been observed by the officers. Any conclusion as to applicability of the statute based only on those facts is clearly of no consequence, for if persons authorized to act under the statute do so in any factual setting the constitutional standards embodied in U.S.Const. Amend. IV and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 10, must prevail and are themselves determinative of the reasonableness and validity of the seizure.

Further, we lend no credence to the suggestion that Minn.St. 171.08 is unconstitutional, for if constitutional requirements are satisfied in its implementation, the statute will clearly both survive the test of constitutionality and accomplish the legislative intent.

In the landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), discussed fully the Fourth Amendment mandates regarding searches and seizures and carefully drew an exception to established principles based upon the practical necessity of a procedure known as a 'stop and frisk.' The court stated:

'* * * We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispell his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.' 392 U.S. 30, 88 S.Ct. 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 911.

A further conclusion by the court was that this limited search and its attendant procedures did constitute a seizure under traditional standards:

'* * * It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the stationhouse and prosecution for crime--'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.' 392 U.S. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 903.

In summary, the court in Terry and its two companion cases, Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (reported as one opinion), concluded that, in order to except the stop and frisk from the constitutional protection of the Fourth Amendment, several preliminary conditions must be present, which include the requirement that the police officer observe unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, (1) that criminal activity may be afoot and (2) that the individual whose suspicious behavior the officer is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. The satisfaction of these conditions will render evidence discovered pursuant to that form of search and seizure referred to as the 'stop and frisk' admissible.

This stop and frisk exception, carefully protected from abuse by the necessary preliminary considerations discussed above, is the sole constitutional exception to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 10, which is of relevance to our determination. A consideration of the procedures employed in the instant case leads to the obvious conclusion that constitutional prerequisites to this limited search and seizure were not present.

Specifically, the court in Terry stated:

'* * * (I)n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.' 392 U.S. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 906.

This doctrine was extended to include other...