State v. McKinnon-Andrews
| Decision Date | 30 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2003–234.,2003–234. |
| Citation | 846 A.2d 1198,151 N.H. 19 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Joshua McKINNON–ANDREWS. |
Peter W. Heed, attorney general (Peter K. Odom, attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Landya McCafferty, assistant appellate defender, of Dover, on the brief and Christopher McLaughlin, assistant appellate defender, of Keene, orally, for the defendant.
Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the defendant, Joshua McKinnon–Andrews, was convicted of possession of a narcotic. See RSA 318–B:2 (Supp.2003). On appeal, he argues that the Superior Court (Smukler , J.) erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his car following a motor vehicle stop. We affirm.
The trial court found or the record of the suppression hearing supports the following facts. Late in the afternoon on December 26, 2001, Officer Frank Harris of the New Hampshire Hospital Campus Police, while on duty in his cruiser, observed the defendant fail to stop at a posted stop sign. The officer followed the defendant and activated his blue emergency lights. The defendant stopped his car in a public parking lot, which is adjacent to an area behind the hospital restricted to authorized vehicles. The officer knew that it was "not uncommon for people who know [hospital] patients to try to get contraband to [them]" in this area.
After stopping his car, the defendant got out and approached the officer's cruiser. The officer exited his cruiser and told the defendant to get back into his car. The officer testified that he found it unusual for the defendant to approach him: "I've stopped a lot of cars in my career, and I can say that I just don't recall many people doing that, if any, so that really raised some suspicions in me, and that was unusual, yes."
The officer then approached the defendant's car and asked him to produce his license and registration, which he did. The defendant had a New Hampshire license and a Rhode Island car registration. When asked, the defendant explained that he had borrowed the car. He further explained that he was on his way to the New Hampshire Department of Corrections to pay restitution.
The officer testified that the defendant appeared to have taken a roundabout route to the department. After failing to stop at the stop sign, the defendant headed towards the backside of the hospital, instead of "going straight where normal traffic goes." The officer explained that the defendant could have arrived at the department of corrections by either taking a left or going straight. Instead, he took a right and headed towards the restricted area.
The officer then asked the defendant "if he had anything in his vehicle that [the officer] should be aware of," to which the defendant replied, The officer replied that he would. The defendant immediately exited the car.
Before searching the defendant's car, the officer sought backup and ran a license check. Once his backup arrived, the officer searched the car, from which he retrieved the defendant's large red nylon bag. Upon opening the bag, the officer discovered a cigar box. Inside the cigar box was a digital scale and plastic measuring spoon covered in white powder that later tested positive for cocaine.
The trial court found that there were several articulable objective facts that justified the officer's investigative actions: (1) the defendant appeared to be driving into a restricted area where contraband could be passed to a hospital patient; (2) the defendant got out of his car and approached the officer's cruiser rather than waiting for the officer to approach him; and (3) the defendant's explanation that he was going to the department of corrections was inconsistent with the public parking lot's location.
The trial court ruled that these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to ask the defendant about the contents of the car. This question, the court determined, "was directed at precisely the facts giving rise to the suspicion—driving toward a restricted area where contraband could be passed, the possible attempt to divert attention from the vehicle and a destination explanation inconsistent with the defendant's route." Accordingly, the court ruled that the officer did not exceed the scope of the stop by asking the defendant about his car's contents.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the officer's question impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop and was unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion. He contends that the court's failure to suppress the evidence from the officer's search violated his federal and State constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19.
We first address his claim under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), and cite federal authority for guidance only, id. at 233, 471 A.2d 347. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous. State v. Wallace, 146 N.H. 146, 148, 772 A.2d 892 (2001). Our review of the trial court's legal conclusions, however, is de novo . Id.
It is helpful to begin by outlining the relevant constitutional framework. The essential purpose of the federal and State constitutional prescriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures "is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials ... to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (quotations omitted). We thus judge a particular law enforcement practice by balancing "the governmental interest that allegedly justified it against the extent of the intrusion on protected interests." State v. Boyle, 148 N.H. 306, 308, 807 A.2d 1234 (2002) ; see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391.
At a minimum, the reasonableness standard requires that "the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against an objective standard, whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (quotation omitted). Even where the balance of interests precludes insisting upon individualized suspicion, other safeguards are used to ensure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the officer in the field. Id. at 654–55, 99 S.Ct. 1391; see State v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46, 48–49, 834 A.2d 316 (2003) ().
It is within this framework that we analyze the constitutionality of the officer's actions. In this case, the officer seized the defendant when he pulled the defendant's car over for a traffic violation. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391. A traffic stop is a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Id.
"A temporary detention or a so-called ‘Terry stop,’ is lawful ... if the police have an articulable suspicion that the person detained has committed or is about to commit a crime." State v. Wong, 138 N.H. 56, 62–63, 635 A.2d 470 (1993) (quotations omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
"The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality); see State v. Glaude, 131 N.H. 218, 221, 552 A.2d 85 (1988) ().
To be constitutional, the scope of a Terry stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification" and the stop "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary" to effectuate its purpose.
Wong, 138 N.H. at 63, 635 A.2d 470 (quotation omitted); Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319. Although stops for traffic violations may be supported by probable cause, cf . Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Terry principles have consistently been applied to them. See State v. McBreairty, 142 N.H. 12, 697 A.2d 495 (1997) (stop for speeding); see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107–12, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) ().
The defendant concedes that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him for the traffic violation. The issue posed by this appeal is whether the officer exceeded the scope of the initially valid Terry stop when he asked the defendant about the contents of his car. Put another way, the issue is whether the officer's question turned a reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one under the State and Federal Constitutions.
We have not yet articulated a cohesive theory as to the point at which an officer's question exceeds the scope of an initially valid Terry stop. See State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 531, 503 A.2d 809 (1985) (); State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 595–96, 493 A.2d 1139 (1985) (); Glaude, 131 N.H. at 222, 552 A.2d 85 (); cf . State v. Hight...
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