State v. McLaughlin, 637A84

• Decision Date: 08 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 637A84,637A84
• Citation: 462 S.E.2d 1,341 N.C. 426
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Elton Ozell McLAUGHLIN. (3).

Page 1

462 S.E.2d 1

341 N.C. 426

STATE of North Carolina v. Elton Ozell McLAUGHLIN.

No. 637A84(3).

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 8, 1995.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Valerie B. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Sam J. Ervin, IV, Morganton, for defendant-appellant.

MITCHELL, Chief Justice.

Defendant Elton Ozell McLaughlin was convicted in 1984 of the first-degree murders of James Elwell Worley, Shelia Denise Worley, and Psoma Wine Baggett. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murders of Shelia Denise Worley and Psoma Wine Baggett and sentenced to death for the murder of James Worley. This Court found no error in the convictions and affirmed the sentences entered by the trial court. State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 372 S.E.2d 49 (1988). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated defendant's sentence of death for the murder of James Worley and remanded the case to this Court for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990). McLaughlin v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S.Ct. 1463, 108 L.Ed.2d 601 (1990). On remand, this Court determined that McKoy error had occurred and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and remanded the case for a new capital sentencing proceeding. State v. McLaughlin, 330 N.C. 66, 408 S.E.2d 732 (1991). A new capital sentencing proceeding was conducted at the 8 February 1993 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Bladen County, and defendant was again sentenced to death.

A detailed review of the evidence introduced during defendant's original trial is set forth in the prior opinion of this Court, finding no error in that trial. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 372 S.E.2d 49. Further discussion of the evidence introduced during that trial is unnecessary here.

During the new capital sentencing proceeding, the State produced evidence that Shelia Denise Worley solicited defendant McLaughlin to kill her husband, James Elwell Worley. After some initial hesitation, defendant agreed to kill Mr. Worley for $3,000. Defendant asked Eddie Carson Robinson to assist him in killing Mr. Worley. On the night of 25 March 1984, defendant and Robinson, aided by Ms. Worley, entered the house of Mr. Worley and killed him as he slept in his bed. In order to dispose of the body, the two men placed Mr. Worley in his car, drove it to a remote location, and set it on fire. After failing to receive payment for their services and after learning that Ms. Worley had talked to police concerning her husband's death, Robinson and defendant decided to kill Ms. Worley.

On 29 April 1984, while Ms. Worley and her two children were visiting defendant at his mobile home, defendant lured Ms. Worley to a hallway where Robinson struck her with a pipe. The two men dragged her to the bathroom and immersed her in a tub of water. The two men then placed Ms. Worley's body in the trunk of her car. They went back into defendant's mobile home for Ms. Worley's two sleeping children, four-year-old Psoma Wine Baggett and eighteen-month-old Alecia Baggett.

The evidence conflicted as to who suggested that four-year-old Psoma Baggett could identify them and should be killed. After the child asked for her mother, defendant struck her with the pipe. Robinson also struck Psoma with the pipe, while Alecia remained asleep in the car. Robinson drove Ms. Worley's car, containing the bodies of Ms. Worley and Psoma, to a bridge over White Creek. Upon arrival, defendant and Robinson put the car in drive and rolled it into the creek. Then they went down to the creek and put the bodies of Ms. Worley and Psoma in the water, leaving Alecia asleep in Ms. Worley's car. As the two men left to go home, they heard a child crying.

The State also produced evidence that defendant had been previously convicted of manslaughter. In that case, defendant's car was being chased by a car driven by Fred McNeil. After both cars crashed into a ditch, defendant emerged from his car and started shooting at McNeil. He shot McNeil, who fell and said, "Man, you got me." A witness to the incident testified that defendant then started shooting McNeil again, killing him. The State also presented evidence that defendant had two major infractions while incarcerated at Central Prison.

Defendant presented a number of experts who testified that he had a drug and alcohol problem, low intelligence, limited insight, and poor judgment. Defendant also presented witnesses who testified as to his helpful and supportive nature, his honesty, and his job performance. Witnesses also testified about defendant's study of the Bible in prison. Defendant presented evidence that he was employed as a cook in the prison kitchen and had taken a cooking course sponsored by Wake Technical Community College. Finally, a fellow inmate testified that defendant had helped him adjust to prison life.

The jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances and eight mitigating circumstances. As aggravating circumstances, the jury found that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to a person and that defendant committed the murder of James Worley for pecuniary gain. As a statutory mitigating circumstance, the jury found that defendant had aided in the apprehension of another capital felon. As nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the jury found that (1) defendant had cooperated with law enforcement officers at an early stage of their investigation, (2) defendant was of good character and reputation in the community in which he lived and worked, (3) defendant had made substantial efforts to improve himself by participation in religious studies and voluntary training relative to his work in prison, (4) defendant had achieved a desirable position as a cook in prison, (5) defendant had made significant efforts to be of assistance to other inmates, (6) defendant had a desirable prison record of only two infractions, and (7) defendant consistently supported his child financially. The jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court sentenced defendant accordingly. Defendant appealed to this Court as a matter of right.

Defendant first assigns as error the trial court's excusal of two prospective jurors. He contends that the trial court did not give him an adequate opportunity to rehabilitate them during the jury selection process. Prospective juror Otto Lovette stated that although he did not have any moral or religious objections to the death penalty, his religious views would make it hard for him to consider the issue of punishment in this case. Struggling to explain his religious "teachings," Lovette expressed doubt as to whether he could set aside his beliefs and follow the law. He indicated upon questioning by the prosecutor that his beliefs would interfere with his ability to decide whether defendant should live or die. During extensive questioning by defendant, Lovette reiterated his doubt as to his ability to surrender his "teachings."

Defendant argues that prospective juror Lovette's statements merely demonstrated his seriousness in approaching the issue of punishment in this case. Further, defendant contends the trial court prematurely excused Lovette for cause without allowing defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate. We disagree.

In Wainwright v. Witt, the Supreme Court held that a juror may properly be excused for his views on capital punishment if " 'those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 849 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980)). Problems frequently arise because jurors are not privy to the semantics and nuances of this test; therefore, they often fail to state clearly their ability or inability to set aside their beliefs which would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties. This Court has stated that "a prospective juror's bias may not always be 'provable with unmistakable clarity [and,] [i]n such cases, reviewing courts must defer to the trial court's judgment concerning whether the prospective juror would be able to follow the law impartially.' " State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1993) (quoting State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 2587, 110 L.Ed.2d 268 (1990)). The ruling of the trial court in such situations will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 526, 330 S.E.2d 450, 458 (1985)). Nothing in the transcript of the present case tends to indicate that further questioning would have shown that prospective juror Lovette could have set aside his strong religious beliefs in order to apply the law according to the trial court's instructions. Consequently, we must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing prospective juror Lovette.

Defendant also asserts that the excusal of prospective juror Rebecca Dixon was error. Defendant argues that although Dixon initially indicated a general opposition to capital punishment, the trial court prematurely terminated defendant's attempt to rehabilitate her. He contends that this violated the rule established in Brogden that a trial court errs if it prohibits a defendant from any questioning intended to rehabilitate prospective jurors challenged for cause by the prosecution. We do not agree.

Here, prospective juror Dixon clearly and unequivocally stated that she could not temporarily set aside her religious beliefs against the death penalty in deference to the rule of law. Moreover, defendant's attempts to rehabilitate her as a juror had already been fruitless and time-consuming.

In Brogden, we held that a trial court may not prohibit, in a...