State v. McMullin, 86-1875

• Decision Date: 13 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1875,86-1875
• Citation: 421 N.W.2d 517
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Murl Edward McMULLIN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 517

421 N.W.2d 517

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Murl Edward McMULLIN, Appellant.

No. 86-1875.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 13, 1988.

Rehearing Denied May 6, 1988.

Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, John P. Messina, Asst. Appellate Defender, and Patrick R. Grady, Asst. Co. Public Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Pamela Greenman Dahl, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Denver Dillard, Co. Atty., for appellee.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and SCHULTZ, CARTER, NEUMAN and SNELL, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The issue presented is whether a due process violation occurred because the trial court instructed the jury to consider defendant's insanity defense before it considered whether he was guilty of the offense charged. While the jury should not have been instructed in this manner, we hold that defendant was afforded due process of law and affirm the conviction.

Defendant Murl Edward McMullin was charged with first-degree murder in the strangulation death of his girlfriend. Iowa Code § 707.2(1) (1985). After a jury trial he was convicted as charged. The State presented evidence at trial that defendant had admitted to a friend that he had killed the victim and placed her body in a freezer because she was "messing around." Defendant later told police that he killed the victim because she had asked him to do it.

Prior to trial defendant gave notice of an insanity defense. He presented evidence of a history of chronic child abuse, institutionalization, and treatment for mental illness. He presented expert testimony that he suffered from a developmental disability and a type of mental illness called a "conduct disorder." The expert witness testified that defendant's illness impaired his ability to premeditate and deliberate and that he was incapable of forming an intent to kill. The State presented their own expert witnesses who concluded that defendant could premeditate, deliberate and form an intent to kill.

The trial court instructed the jury that it could return a special verdict of guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or not guilty. The court carefully defined insanity and instructed the jury on what defendant was required to prove to establish an insanity defense. The court also instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree murder and lesser and included offenses and placed the proper burden of proof on the State. Defendant's only objection was to the portion of the insanity instruction that told the jury to consider the insanity defense before it considered defendant's guilt or innocence of the crimes charged. Defendant claims this sequence of consideration denied him due process.

I. Jury Instruction. Before addressing defendant's due process claim, we will examine the court's instruction to the jury to consider the insanity defense first. The trial court submitted Iowa Uniform Instruction 207. While we normally approve the submission of uniform instructions, we conclude that this particular instruction is faulty.

Insanity is an affirmative defense which, if proved, will preclude conviction of a crime. Iowa Code § 701.4. In this case, the court submitted alternate special verdict forms which allowed the jury to find the defendant innocent in one of two different ways: "not guilty by reason of insanity" or "not guilty."

While these two verdicts indicate a defendant's innocence, they do not provide the same right of liberty. A verdict of "not guilty" means that "the defendant must be discharged as soon as the judgment is given." Iowa R.Crim.P. 21(7). When the acquittal is on grounds of insanity, however, the court must commit the defendant to a state mental institution and set a date for hearing on the defendant's present mental condition. Iowa R.Crim.P. 21(8)(b). The court may release the defendant only after it finds that the defendant is not mentally ill and no longer dangerous to himself or to others. Iowa R.Crim.P. 21(8)(e).

It is obvious that a criminal defendant should be given full freedom if the State has not proven the elements of the crime charged. The uniform instruction given by the court presents a risk that a jury, upon finding that a defendant is insane, may return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity without giving proper consideration to whether the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty by reason of the State's failure to prove its case. To avoid this risk, trial judges should instruct juries to consider an insanity defense only after it has determined whether the State has proven the elements of the crime charged. Because the uniform instruction does not do this, we hold that it is not adequate.

Our conclusion that the uniform instruction is flawed does not require reversal of the conviction. Defendant was found guilty of the crime charged. Thus, the risk that the jury failed to consider a not guilty verdict after finding a defendant insane is not involved in this case. Because defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction as given, we will not reverse the conviction on that basis.

II. Due Process. We now turn to defendant's contention that his due process rights were violated. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from depriving any person of their liberty without due process of law. Due process entitles a defendant to certain minimal basic procedural safeguards, including the requirement that the prosecution must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). While due process requires this proof before a person may be convicted of a crime, it is the prerogative of a state's legislative body to define criminal conduct and to create procedures by which the criminal laws will be enforced in the courts, including allocation of the burden of proving defenses. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. ----, ----, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1101, 94 L.Ed.2d 267, 273 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 286-87 (1977). Thus, a state does not violate due process by requiring that the defendant shoulder the burden of proving insanity as a defense to the crime charged....