State v. McNair
| Decision Date | 10 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30109.,30109. |
| Citation | 108 P.3d 410,141 Idaho 263 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Hugh S. McNAIR, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Wiebe & Fouser, Caldwell, for appellant. Thomas A. Sullivan argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Melissa Nicole Moody, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Melissa Nicole Moody argued.
Appellant Hugh S. McNair was convicted of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. The issues he raises on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the criminal complaint and the jury instructions, require that we determine whether negligence on the part of the defendant is an element of vehicular manslaughter under Idaho Code § 18-4006(3)(c). We hold that it is and therefore vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.
On the evening of February 9, 2001, Hugh S. McNair was driving southbound on Highway 55 between McCall and Boise in wintry conditions. As he started to negotiate a curve, McNair's vehicle crossed into the opposite lane and collided head-on with another vehicle. Injuries from the collision resulted in the death of Reed Ostermeier, the passenger in the other vehicle. McNair was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, I.C. § 18-4006(3)(c).
The second amended complaint, upon which McNair went to trial, alleged:
At trial, the defense theory was that McNair's vehicle hit a patch of ice on the road as he was entering a curve, which caused his vehicle to skid into the other lane despite McNair's exercise of due care. McNair was nevertheless found guilty by the jury.
McNair's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the district court on intermediate appeal. On further appeal to this Court, McNair argues that (1) the criminal complaint was jurisdictionally defective because it did not adequately allege that McNair was negligent; and (2) the magistrate failed to properly instruct the jury that negligence is an element of vehicular manslaughter.1 Both of these issues relate to the State's allegation that McNair caused the victim's death by "sliding his vehicle into the oncoming northbound lane striking the vehicle driven by Heidi Ostermeier...." Neither that portion of the amended complaint nor the related jury instruction expressly incorporated an element of negligence.
Both McNair's claim that the complaint was jurisdictionally defective and his claim of error in the jury instructions require that we determine whether vehicular manslaughter may be a strict liability offense or requires some degree of negligence. Although the State conceded before the district court that negligence is an element of the offense, it now argues to the contrary.
On the date of the accident, vehicular manslaughter was defined in I.C. § 18-4006(3)(c) as follows:
McNair was charged under subpart (c) which, on its face, does not include an element of negligence, but requires only an "unlawful act" that significantly contributes to the cause of death. The State contends that McNair committed an "unlawful act" when his vehicle crossed the center line, and even if it occurred without his negligence, he is guilty of vehicular manslaughter.3 McNair argues that the Idaho courts have interpreted I.C. § 18-4006(3)(c) to include an element of negligence and that, if the statute is interpreted to create a strict liability offense, it would violate the constitutional right of due process.
When a court must engage in statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 154, 75 P.3d 206, 208 (Ct.App.2003). In so doing, we look to the context of the statutory language in question and the public policy behind the statute. Id.; State v. Cudd, 137 Idaho 625, 627, 51 P.3d 439, 441 (Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, we not only focus upon the language of the ambiguous statute, but also look at other statutes relating to the same subject matter and consider them together in order to discern legislative intent. Shanks, 139 Idaho at 154,75 P.3d at 208; State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443, 446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is not ambiguous on its face, "judicial construction might nevertheless be required to harmonize the statute with other legislative enactments on the same subject." Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 106, 785 P.2d 667, 670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are obligated to apply the doctrine of lenity, which requires courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused. State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 124, 58 P.3d 103, 108 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998).
An analysis of the mental element (if any) for vehicular manslaughter under § 18-4006(3)(c) requires consideration of not only the language of that statute, but also of two additional statutes. One of those is the excusable homicide statute, I.C. § 18-4012, which provides:
The other is I.C. § 18-201(3), which provides:
In our view, §§ 18-4012 and 18-201 collectively express a legislative intent that there is no criminal homicide when a death occurs through an accident and entirely without any negligence or other culpable behavior.
Although there are no previous Idaho decisions directly addressing the issue presented here, our interpretation of these statutes draws some support from two prior decisions, State v. Long, 91 Idaho 436, 423 P.2d 858 (1967), and Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 786 P.2d 580 (Ct.App.1990). In Long, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter in the operation of an automobile under then-existing I.C. § 18-4006(2), which was very similar to the present I.C. § 18-4006(3).4 Long challenged the statute as being unconstitutionally vague. In the course of addressing that challenge, and ultimately upholding the validity of the statute, the Supreme Court stated:
The legislature, classified the crime on the basis of whether it was committed "with gross negligence" — a felony, or "without gross negligence" — an indictable misdemeanor.5 Such distinction, considered in harmony with the provisions of I.C. § 18-4012, indicates that the legislature intended that only a degree of negligence less than "gross negligence," but of a degree which would disclose acts, conduct, or omissions not embraced within the excusable homicide state, i.e., "when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, ..." would constitute a misdemeanor.
Long, 91 Idaho at 442, 423 P.2d at 864.
In Haxforth, the defendant had attempted to pass another vehicle, at a time when there was traffic in the oncoming lane. This maneuver, which violated I.C. § 49-634, caused the death of a passenger in an oncoming vehicle. The State charged Haxforth with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, alleging not gross negligence but ordinary negligence. Following his conviction, Haxforth brought a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting, among other things, that I.C. § 18-201 precluded his conviction because even if he was negligent, he was not "culpably negligent." In rejecting that argument, this Court stated:
Idaho Code § 18-201 states that a person is incapable of committing a crime if he "committed the act ... through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable negligence." (Emphasis added.) In State v. Long, 91 Idaho 436, 443, 423 P.2d 858, 865 (1967) our Supreme Court determined that the reference to "culpable negligence" is simply a reiteration of the excusable homicide standard...
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