State v. McNeil

• Decision Date: 19 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 437A04.,437A04.
• Citation: 617 S.E.2d 271
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Franklin Lee McNEIL.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 271

617 S.E.2d 271

STATE of North Carolina v. Franklin Lee McNEIL.

No. 437A04.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 19, 2005.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 165 N.C.App. 777, 600 S.E.2d 31 (2004), affirming a judgment entered 21 November 2002 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr. in Superior Court, Durham County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and guilty of habitual felon status. Heard in the Supreme Court 7 February 2005.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Thomas J. Pitman, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Sofie W. Hosford, Wilmington, for defendant-appellant.

BRADY, Justice.

The sole issue before the Court is whether the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant, Franklin Lee McNeil, possessed 5.5 grams of crack cocaine, such that the trial court properly denied defendant's motions to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. We determine that the evidence presented by the State during defendant's trial, considered as a whole and taken in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for the trial court to deny defendant's motion to dismiss the charge. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On 4 March 2002, defendant was indicted by a Durham County Grand Jury for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and having attained habitual felon status. Defendant made two separate pre-trial motions to suppress evidence; one to suppress "tangible evidence," which was made on 11 March 2002, and a separate motion made on 21 November 2002 to suppress defendant's statements to Officer Broadwell. Judge Hudson denied both motions in a written order dated 21 November 2002. Defendant's case was then tried at the 21 November 2002 Criminal Session of Durham County Superior Court before Judge Hudson.

The evidence presented by the State at trial established that on the afternoon of 31 August 2001, Officer J.R. Broadwell of the City of Durham Police Department responded to a complaint that drug sales were occurring on the street in front of 1108 Fargo Street in Durham, North Carolina. As Officer Broadwell turned onto Fargo Street, he saw defendant and a companion standing in front of 1108 Fargo Street. According to Officer Broadwell, upon noticing him turn onto Fargo Street both men "immediately started to try to walk away on Fargo Street toward Umstead." However, Officer Broadwell drove his patrol car farther down the street, exited the vehicle, and then asked the men if he could talk with them. The men stopped, and Officer Broadwell began questioning them by asking them where they lived. Officer Broadwell noted that at first, both men "acted nervous" and "really wouldn't answer the questions. They paused, they looked at each other and it was almost like they didn't know what to say like they were confused." However, both men eventually indicated that they lived "on Fargo [S]treet."

Officer Broadwell also observed that defendant's companion "was trying to light a cigarette and he was shaking, visibly shaking so bad that he couldn't even hold his cigarette or the lighter near his mouth long enough to light it." At this point, Officer Broadwell began a weapons frisk of defendant's companion. As he did so, Officer Broadwell saw defendant "immediately shove[] his right hand into his right front pocket." Officer Broadwell "advised [defendant] to take his hands out of his pockets," at which time defendant fled the scene. Officer Broadwell pursued defendant, ordering him to stop several times. However, defendant continued to run until he reached a house at 1201 Fargo Street, an address that did not match the address defendant had provided Officer Broadwell in response to the officer's question regarding defendant's home. The door to the house was "just barely cracked open and [defendant] just threw it open and ran into the house."

Officer Broadwell testified that he chased defendant into a room in the "very back of the house," where defendant "went over the top of the chair with his arm at which time [Officer Broadwell] caught up to him" and attempted to place defendant in custody. Defendant "threw" Officer Broadwell off of him and began to run back through the house. Officer Broadwell "got back up off the floor, grabbed [defendant] and [they] wrestled and fought through several rooms of the house" until they reached the kitchen area, where Officer Broadwell was able to handcuff defendant and place him in custody.

Other officers arrived on the scene and Officer Broadwell "immediately went back to the back room and looked behind the chair" and retrieved twenty-two rocks of crack cocaine, individually wrapped in corners of plastic bags. Once this evidence was collected, Officer Broadwell escorted defendant to his patrol car, which he had left in the area where he originally started chasing defendant. While there, Officer Broadwell found "three more smaller bags with a powdered substance in them laying on the ground." Officer Broadwell picked the bags up and said, "[O]h, look what we have here," to which defendant responded that the crack found in the house was his, but the three bags found on the ground were not.

At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charges, which the trial court denied. Defendant then testified that he and his companion had been on Fargo Street to cut two lawns. According to defendant, when Officer Broadwell approached them, they were taking a break after completing half of the second lawn. Defendant further testified that he ran from Officer Broadwell because he was not sure if his wife had "taken a warrant out" on him as a result of a domestic dispute. Lastly, defendant denied ever having made any statements to Officer Broadwell after being handcuffed. Defendant specifically testified that after Officer Broadwell had led defendant to the car and searched defendant, he put defendant in the car and then entered the vehicle as well. According to defendant, when Officer Broadwell entered the car "he had a bag of something in his hand. And he said oh, this is yours too and I said no. And he said oh, okay, these are not yours but the other is yours." Defendant testified that he simply did not respond to Officer Broadwell's last statement.

At the close of all evidence, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss the charges against him; however, the trial court denied the motion and a Durham County jury found defendant guilty of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and having attained habitual felon status. Judge Hudson then sentenced defendant in the presumptive range to a minimum term of 133 months imprisonment to a maximum term of 169 months.

Defendant gave notice of appeal, and on 17 August 2004, the Court of Appeals found no error in defendant's trial, Judge Elmore dissenting. 165 N.C.App. at 785, 600 S.E.2d at 37. In his dissent, Judge Elmore concluded that there was insufficient evidence that defendant possessed the cocaine because defendant did not have exclusive possession of the house at 1201 Fargo Street and "[w]hile there was some evidence of other incriminating circumstances, that evidence was not substantial." Id. at 789, 600 S.E.2d at 39. Defendant entered notice of appeal based on Judge Elmore's dissent, and this Court heard oral arguments from both parties on 7 February 2005.

ANALYSIS

In addressing defendant's appeal from his conviction for possession with intent to sell or distribute cocaine, we note that "[w]hen a defendant moves to dismiss a charge against him on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine `whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.'" State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412, 597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004) (quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1301, 161 L.Ed.2d 122 (2005); see also State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 161, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004); State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2002).

"`Substantial evidence' is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion." Garcia, 358 N.C. at 412, 597 S.E.2d at 746 (citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 355 N.C. 501, 578-79, 565 S.E.2d 609, 654 (2002) (quoting State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1125, 123 S.Ct. 894, 154 L.Ed.2d 808 (2003), quoted in State v. Armstrong, 345 N.C. 161, 164-65, 478 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1996). Moreover,

[a] "substantial evidence" inquiry examines the sufficiency of the evidence presented but not its weight. The reviewing court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence. Evidentiary "[c]ontradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal."

Garcia, 358 N.C. at 412-13, 597 S.E.2d at 746 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 199 (1995)) (alteration in original). Additionally, "`[i]f there is substantial evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or both—to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.'" Butler, 356 N.C. at 145, 567 S.E.2d at 140 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988)).

In the instant case, in order to establish that defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, the State was required to prove that (1) defendant possessed the crack cocaine and that (2) def...