State v. McTague
| Citation | 216 N.W. 787,173 Minn. 153 |
| Decision Date | 16 December 1927 |
| Docket Number | 26,294 |
| Parties | STATE v. BIERNEY McTAGUE |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
The district court of Todd county, Roeser, J. denied the motion of the defendant to dismiss three indictments against him and certified the question involved to this court for decision. Affirmed.
That accused is in prison not a reason for delaying his trial for another crime.
The fact that a defendant is in prison for one crime is not cause for the state to delay his trial for another crime.
Defendant not entitled to have his motion to dismiss indictment granted.
In the absence of a demand for trial or opposition to postponements a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not in a position to successfully move that the indictment be dismissed upon the ground that he is denied a speedy trial.
Defendant has waived his right to speedy trial.
The defendant's silence, in the face of numerous continuances and long delay, waives the right to a speedy trial.
Criminal Law, 16 C.J. p. 443 n. 49; p. 445 n. 79; p. 448 n. 50, 52.
Good 28 C.J. p. 718 n. 82.
See note in 56 L.R.A. 538; 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 871.
F. M. Ridgway and F. J. Donahue, for defendant.
Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, James E. Markham, Deputy Attorney General, and William M. Wood, County Attorney, for the state.
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss three indictments against him and certified the question involved to this court for decision.
In September, 1922, the grand jury of Todd county returned four indictments against defendant accusing him of (1) murder, (2) burglary, (3) grand larceny, and (4) possession of burglary tools. Upon arraignment defendant entered his plea of not guilty to each of the indictments. His immediate trial upon the first indictment resulted in his conviction of murder in the third degree. He was sentenced and committed to the state penitentiary where he has ever since been confined in penal servitude.
The other three cases against the accused remained upon the district court calendar to and including the March, 1924, term of court, having been continued upon motion of the county attorney from term to term without notice to defendant. The county attorney caused the cases to be replaced upon the calendar for the February, 1927, term, a motion having been made for an order dismissing the indictments. Defendant's application for the dismissals rests upon the claim that the defendant has not been given a speedy trial within contemplation of the law.
Aside from the constitutional provisions (U.S. Const. Amend. VI, and art. 1, § 6, Minn. Const.) we have a statute which entitles a defendant to a prompt trial "unless good cause to the contrary be shown." G.S. 1923, § 9954. "Good cause" means a substantial reason -- one that affords a legal excuse. The suggestion that defendant could not be tried because he was in state prison is without substance. The state that holds him in prison is the same state that prosecutes these indictments. His imprisonment could not be used by him as an excuse to avoid trial, much less by the state.
The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has "gone to sleep at the switch" (no reference to counsel in this case) while the defendant and his counsel rest in silence. We hold that these solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive weapons, but are for the benefit of defendants who claim their...
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