State v. Meachum
| Decision Date | 13 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D15–3445.,1D15–3445. |
| Citation | 195 So.3d 417 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. John Kelly MEACHUM, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Laurel Cornell Niles, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ROWE
, J.
The State appeals an order granting John Kelly Meachum's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle search.1 Because we agree that the court erred in granting the motion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts
On October 26, 2014, three officers of the Panama City Police Department were on patrol in an area known to have a high rate of drug use, prostitution, and other criminal activity. The officers, who were in a single police cruiser, observed a vehicle in the parking lot of a pawn shop adjacent to Bambi's Dollhouse, a night club. The vehicle had its lights on and was in a parking space, backed against a fence on the east side of the lot. The officers observed the vehicle move from that parking space to pull behind some parked cars, and noted that the driver did not exit the vehicle. The vehicle then turned sideways and stopped in the middle of a route to exit the parking lot.
Officer Doheny approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked for Meachum's driver's license. Officer Doheny noticed a strong odor of alcohol and observed that Meachum was shaking and sweating as he fumbled through his wallet. Officer Doheny handed the license to Corporal Nichol, who returned to the police cruiser to conduct a warrant search. Based on Meachum's actions and the odor of alcohol, Officer Doheny determined Meachum was under suspicion of driving under the influence, and asked him to exit the vehicle. While Meachum was exiting the vehicle, Officer Tholke, who was on the passenger's side, observed a crack pipe on the driver's side floorboard. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, the officers located crack cocaine between the driver's seat and the center console. Meachum was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine and paraphernalia.
In its order granting the motion to suppress, the court stated that the encounter between Meachum and the officers was not consensual, but rather constituted an illegal detention. The court, noting that no traffic was impeded by Meachum's vehicle, concluded there was no probable cause of a traffic infraction, nor reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to the encounter to support a detention. As a basis for its conclusion that the encounter was not consensual, the court stated only the following: that the patrol car was occupied by three officers, that one of the officers went to the rear of the vehicle to obtain tag information while another approached and requested Meachum's driver's license to conduct a warrant search, and that one officer went to conduct further investigation of other persons. Having concluded that the encounter was not consensual, the court declined to further analyze the facts or circumstances of the incident. On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred when it concluded the encounter between the officers and Meachum was not consensual. We agree.
Analysis
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's findings of facts which are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and review de novo the application of the law to those facts. Delhall v. State, 95 So.3d 134, 150 (Fla.2012)
.
First, we must note that some of the trial court's factual findings with respect to the actions of the officers in this case are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The trial court mistakenly relied on facts from another case involving the same defendant and similar circumstances, which was addressed in the same motion hearing. In this case, there was no testimony as to an officer approaching the rear of the vehicle to obtain tag information, and there was no investigation of additional persons.
Second, the trial court's application of the law to the facts was erroneous. While any seizure of a person must be supported, at a minimum, by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of past, present, or impending criminal activity, not all contact between citizens and law enforcement constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.2 See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 549, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)
. To the contrary, where the contact with law enforcement does not involve the use of physical force or a show of authority to which the defendant succumbs, the interaction is considered a consensual encounter. Caldwell v. State, 41 So.3d 188, 195 (Fla.2010) (). Consensual encounters do not require any suspicion of criminal activity, and “police officers do not violate the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures simply by approaching individuals on the street and asking them to answer a few questions.” Id. at 196 ; see also
Brown v. State, 577 So.2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ().
Distinguishing between a consensual encounter and a seizure is a fact-intensive inquiry that is not dependent on any one factor; rather, courts apply a totality of the circumstances analysis from the perspective of a reasonable person. Caldwell, 41 So.3d at 199–200
. Although the presence of...
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Calhoun v. State
...asked or any opportunity given for Calhoun to "go on his way." See Royer , 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319 ; see State v. Meachum , 195 So. 3d 417, 419–20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (discussing the circumstances that would indicate an encounter was not consensual, including a blocked exit from the......