State v. Mead, APPEAL NO. C-190604
| Decision Date | 02 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | APPEAL NO. C-190604,APPEAL NO. C-190620,APPEAL NO. C-190625,APPEAL NO. C-190623,APPEAL NO. C-190622,APPEAL NO. C-190624,APPEAL NO. C-190621 |
| Citation | 2021 Ohio 1107 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT MEAD, Defendant-Appellant. |
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adam Tieger, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio, Hamilton County.
Andrew W. Garth, Interim City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and Susan M. Zurface, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio, City of Cincinnati.
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Scott Mead appeals from seven municipal court judgments in which he was convicted of domestic violence, telecommunications harassment, violating a protection order, menacing by stalking, and aggravated menacing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
{¶2} Mead and Tonya Luckett were in an on-again/off-again relationship for over a year and a half. The relationship ended in a physical altercation and relentless phone calls, which serve as the bases for the charges in this case.
{¶3} On March 4, 2018, Luckett left work and returned to the home that she shared with Mead. Luckett testified that Mead was drunk and angry. According to Luckett, Mead struck her in the face and knocked her onto the floor. Mead got on top of her and continued to strike her. Mead then grabbed her hair and dragged her through the kitchen. As a result, Luckett claims that she lost control of her bodily functions and sustained several injuries. Photographs taken the following day showed swelling and bruising to her face and arms. Luckett called the police immediately following the altercation and Mead was charged with domestic violence.
{¶4} Five months later, on August 9, 2018, Luckett appeared before the court and said that she did not want to move forward with the case or the pending protection order. Luckett stated that she had reconciled with Mead and that she was hoping to rekindle their relationship. However, the relationship only continued to deteriorate.
{¶5} On August 30, 2018, Luckett received approximately 30 phone calls from Mead. Luckett called the police and Officer Eric Connor responded to thescene. Luckett's phone rang 15 to 20 times in Connor's presence. Connor answered one of the calls, identified himself as a police officer, and explained that he had received a call for harassment. The caller identified himself as "Scott Mead." Connor instructed Mead to stop calling, but the calls continued. Mead was subsequently charged with telecommunications harassment.
{¶6} On September 1, 2018, Luckett again contacted the police regarding incessant phone calls from Mead. Officer Ted Yaeger advised Luckett to file for a civil protection order ("CPO"). Luckett heeded Yaeger's advice and filed for a CPO that same day. Luckett was subsequently granted a temporary protection order.
{¶7} On September 4, 2018, Luckett returned to Yaeger with further complaints of nonstop phone calls from Mead. Mead was subsequently charged with telecommunications harassment. Later that day, Yaeger served Mead with the temporary protection order.
{¶8} On September 7, 2018, Luckett received approximately 40 to 80 phone calls from Mead. Luckett called the police and provided recordings of the phone calls. Mead was subsequently charged with violating a temporary protection order. Two days later, on September 9, 2018, Luckett received an additional 30 phone calls from Mead. Mead was again charged with violating a temporary protection order, as well as menacing by stalking.
{¶9} On May 4, 2019, Luckett received a call from Mead on her employer's public phone line. Luckett's coworker answered the phone and Mead asked to speak to Luckett. Mead immediately started yelling at Luckett and threatened "to kill [her] and put [her] in a black garbage bag." Luckett's employer called the police and Mead was subsequently charged with aggravated menacing.
{¶10} On September 30, 2019, all of the charges were tried together before a jury. The city of Cincinnati prosecuted Mead on the domestic-violence charge and the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney's Office prosecuted Mead on the remaining charges. Following three days of testimony, the jury found Mead guilty of one count of domestic violence, two counts of telecommunications harassment, two counts of violating a protection order, one count of menacing by stalking, and one count of aggravated menacing. On October 4, 2019, the trial court sentenced Mead to an aggregate term of 18 months' incarceration. Mead timely filed this appeal, raising five assignments of error for our review.
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Mead argues that his constitutional rights were violated because he was required to wear the same clothes for four consecutive days of trial.
{¶12} The United States Supreme Court has held that the state cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable jail clothes. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). The rule entitling a defendant to be tried in ordinary clothing is designed to preserve the presumption of innocence, a "presumption so basic to the adversary system." Id. at 504. A defendant's appearance in jail clothing is a constant reminder to the jury that the defendant is in custody, and the constant reminder of the accused's condition may affect a juror's judgment. Id. at 504-505.
{¶13} It is undisputed that Mead was not compelled to appear in jail clothes. On the first day of trial, Mead wore dress clothes and black dress shoes provided by defense counsel. On the next three days of trial, Mead wore the same dress clothes and tennis shoes he had been wearing when he was arrested. The sheriff's officerefused to accept any additional clothes or shoes from defense counsel. Mead contends that the presumption of innocence was violated when he was compelled to wear the same clothes throughout his four-day trial.
{¶14} Mead does not cite, and we cannot find, any cases to support his contention. In fact, the only courts to address the issue have ruled against Mead. See People v. Purscelley, Cal.App. No. D056288, 2010 WL 2952450 (Jul. 29, 2010) (); Johnson v. Sherman, C.D.Cal. No. 5:17-01860 ODW, 2020 WL 3655494 (May 14, 2020) ().
{¶15} There is nothing in the record to suggest that Mead's repeatedly-worn dress clothes were the equivalent of identifiable jail clothes. The trial occurred over a four-day period and Mead wore nondescript dress clothes. In addition, Mead wore two different pairs of shoes during the course of the trial, which is consistent with a person not being incarcerated. Under these circumstances, Mead has not established a violation of his constitutional rights.
{¶16} Mead's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Mead argues that the 11-month postaccusation delay on his September 10 and September 11 charges violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
{¶18} Appellate review of a speedy-trial determination involves mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Rice, 2015-Ohio-5481, 57 N.E.3d 84, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). We give deference to the trial court's factual findings as long as they aresupported by competent, credible evidence, and we review de novo the court's conclusions of law. Id.
{¶19} To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, courts must balance four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); State v. Selvage, 80 Ohio St.3d 465, 467, 687 N.E.2d 433 (1997).
{¶20} The first factor acts as a triggering mechanism for inquiry into the other factors. Barker at 530. The United States Supreme Court has explained:
Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
{¶21} Courts have generally found postaccusation delays presumptively prejudicial as they approach one year. See, e.g., State v. Sears, 166 Ohio App.3d 166, 2005-Ohio-5963, 849 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.) (); Selvage at 468 ().
{¶22} On September 10, 2018, the Harrison Police Department filed a misdemeanor complaint and issued an arrest warrant against Mead for violating a protection order. On September 11, 2018, the Harrison Police Department filed another misdemeanor complaint and issued another arrest warrant against Mead for menacing by stalking. Mead was not arrested until August 15, 2019, more than 11 months after...
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