State v. Meadows
| Decision Date | 17 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. COA02-734.,COA02-734. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Gary Louis MEADOWS. |
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Buren R. Shields, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Everett & Hite, L.L.P., by Kimberly A. Swank, Greenville, for defendant-appellant.
Gary Louis Meadows ("defendant") appeals convictions for the first-degree murder of his former girlfriend, Latonya Michelle Davis ("Davis"), and the attempted first-degree murder of William Todd Burgess ("Burgess"), Davis' neighbor and new boyfriend. The evidence tended to show Davis and defendant were involved in an intimate relationship between 1996 and 1999. Although Davis lived at home with her parents, defendant served as the father figure to Davis' son,1 Daveon. There was evidence of domestic violence in Davis and defendant's relationship. It is undisputed that on 15 June 1999, Burgess took Davis out to dinner to celebrate her twenty-first birthday. When they arrived home, defendant was waiting for them.
Burgess testified to the events of 15 June 1999. According to Burgess, he and Davis dropped Daveon off at the home of Davis' brother and then stopped by Burgess' office to pick up some paperwork on their way to the restaurant. After the date, Davis and Burgess picked up Daveon. Davis then dropped Burgess off in the street in front of Burgess' house and continued into her driveway. Burgess returned to Davis' house because he had forgotten the paperwork in Davis' car. While Burgess was in Davis' yard, defendant approached him, from behind and to his right, mumbling "negative words." As Burgess turned towards defendant and realized he was within five feet of him, defendant shot him. Burgess then explained, Burgess fled the scene.
Defendant testified on his own behalf as to the events of 15 June 1999. According to defendant, at approximately 11 p.m., he went to Davis' home to give her a birthday present. When defendant arrived, since Davis was not home, he waited on the porch. After Davis pulled into the driveway, Daveon went up on the porch where he and defendant greeted one another. Burgess came across the yard and began kissing, hugging and grabbing Davis. Defendant testified he stepped off the porch and saw Burgess move as though he was pulling a gun or a knife from his crotch area. Defendant saw the item shine, and believed he needed to shoot Burgess to save himself. Defendant Although defendant knew he hit Burgess, he did not think Davis had been shot.
Defendant was subsequently arrested, indicted, tried by a jury, and convicted of the first-degree murder of Davis and the attempted first-degree murder of Burgess. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 180 months to 225 months for the first-degree attempted murder of Burgess and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder of Davis.
Defendant appeals asserting the trial court erred by: (I) permitting Daveon to testify; (II) admitting evidence of Davis' prior statements regarding her relationship with defendant; (III) refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; (IV) refusing to instruct the jury on self defense; and (V) allowing use of the short form indictment.
Defendant appeals asserting the trial court abused its discretion by finding Daveon, who was three years old when he witnessed his mother and Burgess being shot and five years old at the time of trial, was competent to testify.2
North Carolina law provides: "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except ... when the court determines that he is (1) incapable of expressing himself ... or (2) incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601 (2001). State v. Ford, 136 N.C.App. 634, 639, 525 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (2000) (quoting State v. Hicks, 319 N.C. 84, 89, 352 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1987)) (internal citation omitted). "When exercising its discretion, the trial court `must rely on [its] personal observation of the child's demeanor and responses to inquiry on voir dire examination.'" State v. Andrews, 131 N.C.App. 371, 373-74, 507 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1998) (quoting State v. Fearing, 315 N.C. 167, 174, 337 S.E.2d 551, 555 (1985)).
Defendant asserts the trial court judge abused his discretion in determining Daveon understood his duty to tell the truth. We disagree. During voir dire, Daveon testified on direct examination:
Daveon was later examined by the court, and the following exchange occurred:
These exchanges demonstrate Daveon was capable of expressing himself, understood the difference between the truth and a lie and knew to tell the truth, as required for competency by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 601.
Defendant asserts Daveon was nevertheless an incompetent witness because he testified that telling the truth was "bad." We note, Daveon later demonstrated his understanding that "[t]elling the truth is what you do" and promised to only tell the truth. Considering the entire transcript, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by not finding Daveon incompetent based upon his singular statement that telling the truth was "bad." See Andrews, 131 N.C.App. at 374,
Defendant asserts a number of additional reasons why Daveon was not a competent witness. First, Daveon stated he lives with "[m]y grandaddy, my grannie and my mommy." However, Daveon explained he calls his grandmother both "grannie" and "mommy" because "my other mama [is] gone." Second, Daveon often nodded his head instead of responding audibly. Since a witness need only be capable of expressing himself, we cannot find Daveon's silent expression improper. Third, Daveon stated his mother died only one minute earlier. The transcript reveals Daveon's confusion, and it appears Daveon was attempting to testify the shooting took one minute.3 Fourth, Daveon did not know Burgess' name. Considering Burgess has never been a part of Daveon's life, his inability to recall Burgess' name does not support the conclusion the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Daveon's testimony. Rather, this instance demonstrates that Daveon understood his role, as he responded precisely as he promised Judge Bridges and stated he did not know the other man's name. We do not find any of these assertions by defendant support the conclusion the trial court abused its discretion by finding Daveon competent to testify.
Finally, defendant asserts Daveon was incompetent to testify because he could not distinguish between what he saw and what he was told. On voir dire while conversing with the court, Daveon explained he was ready to tell the court what he saw, saying He explained no one had told him about...
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§ 18.05 Child Competency and Testimony
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§ 18.05 CHILD COMPETENCY AND TESTIMONY
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