State v. Mechtel, 91-2870-CR
| Decision Date | 31 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2870-CR,91-2870-CR |
| Citation | 176 Wis.2d 87,499 N.W.2d 662 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Allen D. MECHTEL, Defendant-Appellant. . Oral Argument |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen. with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.
This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.61, Stats. The defendant-appellant, Allen D. Mechtel, appeals from judgments of conviction and orders denying postconviction relief entered in the circuit court for La Crosse County, Peter G Pappas, Circuit Judge. The sole issue certified by the court of appeals is "whether a federal magistrate's decision on a fourth amendment suppression issue is binding on the trial court in a state criminal prosecution, under the facts presented in this case." The federal magistrate's decision was rendered in a separate federal prosecution upon the defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that officers had intentionally or recklessly made false statements when applying for a search warrant before a state circuit court judge in the state prosecution and that the application for that warrant failed to establish probable cause. The defendant argues that the magistrate's decision is now binding on state courts and that therefore his judgments of conviction, which were entered in state court before the magistrate made his determination, should be vacated, a new trial should be granted, and any evidence seized under the allegedly deficient warrant should be suppressed. We disagree.
We briefly address and reject the other arguments the defendant raises.
On June 3, 1988, a circuit court judge heard testimony from investigators from the La Crosse Police Department. The officers testified about facts they had uncovered regarding the defendant. The circuit court judge issued a search warrant, and La Crosse police executed the warrant, seizing drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms from the defendant's home. The criminal complaint charged the defendant with possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to deliver and with several counts of possession of firearms after having been convicted of a felony. These latter counts were later dismissed without prejudice because a federal prosecutor intended to begin a separate and distinct federal prosecution on the firearms charges.
In state circuit court, the defendant filed a motion alleging that the police falsely represented material facts when applying for the warrant. The defendant sought an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). In Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that if
the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.
Id. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77. See also State v. Anderson, 138 Wis.2d 451, 462, 406 N.W.2d 398 (1987).
The circuit court held a Franks hearing and denied the defendant's suppression motion. A trial was held, and the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to deliver, in violation of secs. 161.41(lm)(h) and 161.41(lm)(c)3, Stats.
Subsequently, the defendant was indicted for a federal firearms violation. The evidence of this federal firearms violation had been seized at the same time as the evidence of the state drug violations and pursuant to the same search warrant. A federal magistrate held a new Franks hearing and in a "Report and Recommendation" determined that
the testimony at the probable cause hearing contained intentional or reckless false statements or omissions which were material to the probable cause determination.
. . . . .
... With these false statements stricken from, and the omissions added to, the evidence adduced at the probable cause hearing, I have also concluded that probable cause does not exist for the issuance of the warrant....
The United States Attorney's Office then filed an "order for dismissal" of the indictment, which the district court judge granted.
After the federal indictment was dismissed, the defendant filed a "motion for vacation of judgment of conviction, for vacation of order denying motion to suppress fruits of search ..., for entry of an order suppressing fruits of said search, and for a new trial" in the La Crosse County circuit court. The defendant argued that, given the procedural posture of the case and state courts' obligation to accept federal determinations of federal law, the state court had "no alternative but to act in accord with the federal determination."
In response, the state sought a new Franks hearing in state court. In its motion, the state said that an evidentiary hearing on the Franks issues would be "in the interest of justice" because it would allow a full airing of the Franks issues. The state asserted that the federal magistrate had made an error on one crucial point. At the same time, the state conceded that the magistrate correctly identified some factual errors in the testimony supporting the warrant. The state conceded that during the trial the defendant became aware of facts that would have been relevant to the pretrial state Franks hearing and that knowledge of those facts "would allow" the defendant to "question whether he received a 'full, fair, and adequate hearing' as part of the state court proceeding."
The defendant objected to a new Franks hearing. The circuit court granted the state's request, and the court of appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal that order. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held that the state could not force the defendant to participate in another Franks hearing. Upon remand from the court of appeals, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion to vacate his convictions, suppress the evidence, and have a new trial.
The defendant appealed; the court of appeals certified the issue described earlier; and we accepted certification.
The first issue concerns the effect the federal magistrate's determination has in state court. (The issue of whether state courts should respect the federal determination in this case as a matter of judicial comity has not been argued The federal magistrate determined that testimony at the probable cause hearing contained false statements or omissions that were either intentionally or recklessly made and that, setting aside the false testimony and taking into account the omitted matter, the remaining testimony did not support a finding of probable cause.
The district judge signed the order of dismissal of the federal case by signing an "order for dismissal" submitted by the United States Attorney's Office. The order was filed after the magistrate made his determinations, which were contained in his "Report and Recommendation." The parties argue over whether the magistrate's determination was indeed a final determination of the suppression issue. The defendant argues that the magistrate's determination resulted in the dismissal of the case. The state claims that no legitimate inference can be drawn that the magistrate's determination had an effect on the district judge's decision to dismiss. We need not reach this issue because our holding would be the same even if the magistrate had played no role in this case and the district court judge had made the fourth amendment determination and expressly dismissed the firearms charges because of that fourth amendment determination.
The defendant cites Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), and United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 930-31 (5th Cir.1970), arguing that Mapp stands for the proposition that because the federal constitutional standards as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court are the minimum standards which a state court can apply, evidence excluded in federal court cannot be used in either federal or state proceedings. We reject this assertion.
Certainly, the United States Supreme Court's determinations on federal questions bind state courts. It is clear, however, that determinations on federal questions by either the federal circuit courts of appeal or the federal district courts are not binding upon state courts. See Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis.2d 289, 307, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983); State v. Webster, 114 Wis.2d 418, 426 n. 4, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983); Mast v. Olsen, 89 Wis.2d 12, 15-16 n. 4, 278 N.W.2d 205 (1979); Stuart v. Farmers Bank, 137 Wis. 66, 75, 117 N.W. 820 (1908); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 157 Wis.2d 250, 257, 458 N.W.2d 841 (Ct.App.1990). See also Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir.1992); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir.1970). "Until the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal law." Id. at 1075 (citation omitted).
'In passing on federal constitutional questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the same position....'
The Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or...
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