State v. Meddaugh

Decision Date17 February 2022
Docket NumberAppeal No. 2021AP939-CR
Citation401 Wis.2d 134,972 N.W.2d 181,2022 WI App 12
Parties STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jere J. MEDDAUGH, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public defender of Madison.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

BLANCHARD, P.J.

¶1 Jere Meddaugh appeals a judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigatory stop by a deputy sheriff. Meddaugh argues that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Meddaugh as he rode a bicycle on a city sidewalk and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Based on events that occurred following the stop, Meddaugh was arrested and ultimately convicted. We agree with Meddaugh that the State failed to show that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and the court's denial of the suppression motion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Testimony by a Wood County deputy sheriff was the only evidence offered by either party at the suppression hearing. The circuit court fully credited the deputy's testimony and neither party argues that the court clearly erred in any aspect of its fact finding. We now summarize the testimony.

¶3 The deputy was patrolling in a marked squad car in the city of Wisconsin Rapids during the early morning hours of Sunday, April 26, 2020. At approximately 12:39 a.m., he noticed a flashing red light moving across a "large, asphalt playground" that adjoined an elementary school building.

¶4 The deputy drove toward the light by passing through an open gate and onto a driveway at one end of the playground area.1 He was able to see that the light was attached to a bicycle being pedaled across the playground area by an individual who was later identified to be Meddaugh.2 The bicycle was moving away from the deputy's squad car. Meddaugh wore black clothing.

¶5 The deputy drove in the direction of the bicycle, closing the distance between them. When the squad car came within approximately 20 feet, the deputy turned on the squad car's spotlight and pointed it at Meddaugh. Meddaugh continued to pedal. The deputy drew the squad car up parallel to the bicycle, leaving about 15 feet of space between them. Meddaugh looked in the direction of the deputy and "waved with his hand up in the air." Through the squad car's open window, the deputy "yelled for [Meddaugh] to stop." Meddaugh did not stop. Instead, he continued in the same direction, traveling at "a normal pace."

¶6 As the squad car and bicycle moved in parallel, the space for vehicle traffic on the playground area began to narrow. The deputy allowed Meddaugh to proceed in front of him and the deputy trailed behind him.

¶7 Continuing in the same direction, Meddaugh left the playground area by riding around two posts with a cable strung between them at the end of a driveway. Still riding the bicycle, Meddaugh crossed one city street and then rode onto the sidewalk of a different street. The deputy followed him by driving around the posts and cable, crossing the same street that Meddaugh had, and continuing on in the same direction as Meddaugh. On the next street's sidewalk, Meddaugh continued to ride the bicycle in the same direction.

¶8 The deputy drove on the street and reached a point ahead of where Meddaugh was riding.3 The deputy directed the spotlight at him, either for a second time or perhaps having continued to do so since they were both in the playground area. Meddaugh stopped and got off the bicycle. The deputy got out of the squad car and announced that he was a law enforcement officer.

¶9 It was at this moment, the parties now agree, that the deputy seized Meddaugh for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed below, Meddaugh seeks to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of this seizure on the ground that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him.

¶10 Based on events that occurred after the challenged seizure, Meddaugh was arrested near the scene of the stop, shortly after the stop. A search of his person revealed suspected contraband and Meddaugh was charged with various crimes. In the circuit court, Meddaugh moved to suppress all evidence obtained during or as a direct result of his seizure by the deputy.

The court denied the motion. Based on Meddaugh's plea of no contest to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, the court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him. Meddaugh now appeals the suppression ruling. See WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10) (2019-20) (allowing review of order denying motion to suppress evidence upon appeal of final judgment notwithstanding defendant's entry of plea of guilty or no contest).

DISCUSSION

¶11 On appeal, Meddaugh argues that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. We agree.

¶12 We review an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence as an issue " ‘of constitutional fact.’ " State v. Howes , 2017 WI 18, ¶17, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812 (quoted source omitted). This creates " ‘a two-step inquiry.’ " Id. (quoted source omitted). "First, we will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous," and "[a] finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence." State v. Anderson , 2019 WI 97, ¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285. "Second, we review the application of constitutional principles to those facts independently of the decision[ ] rendered by the circuit court ...." Id.

¶13 An investigatory stop, or Terry stop,4 "complies with the Fourth Amendment ‘if the police have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed.’ " State v. Genous , 2021 WI 50, ¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41 (quoted source omitted). "Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer possess specific and articulable facts that warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Young , 2006 WI 98, ¶21, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729. "While it is a low bar, a mere hunch is insufficient." Genous , 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8, 961 N.W.2d 41. Reasonable suspicion is determined "based on the totality of the circumstances," with the "focus not on isolated, independent facts, but on ‘the whole picture’ viewed together." Id. , ¶9 (quoted source omitted). The State bears the burden of proving that an investigative stop was a constitutional seizure of the person. See State v. Blatterman , 2015 WI 46, ¶17, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26.

¶14 To repeat, the parties agree that the deputy stopped Meddaugh, constituting a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, no later than when the deputy got out of the squad car and announced that he was law enforcement, which was after the deputy drove ahead of Meddaugh with the spotlight trained on him, and after Meddaugh had gotten off the bicycle. We agree with the parties that this constituted a seizure. See State v. Powers , 2004 WI App 143, ¶8, 275 Wis. 2d 456, 685 N.W.2d 869 (determining when an officer seized a person for Fourth Amendment purposes based when the officer made a " ‘show of authority’ " and when the person " ‘actually yield[ed] " as a result (quoted source omitted)). This obligates us to limit our consideration to events that occurred before the moment of the stop. See State v. VanBeek , 2021 WI 51, ¶25, 397 Wis. 2d 311, 960 N.W.2d 32 ("When a seizure is claimed to have occurred, we first determine when it began and whether it was constitutionally permissible at its inception. " (emphasis added)).

¶15 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the State failed to clear the "low bar" of reasonable suspicion and instead relied on what could be described, at most, as "a mere hunch" of the deputy. See Genous , 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8, 961 N.W.2d 41. That is, the evidence regarding events leading up to the stop fails to establish articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts that could have led a reasonable officer to suspect that Meddaugh had engaged in criminal activity, was currently doing so, or was about to do so. See Young , 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21, 717 N.W.2d 729.

¶16 In a nutshell, the deputy observed an individual wearing black clothing and riding a bicycle, crossing and then leaving publicly accessible school grounds in the early hours of a Sunday morning, while the state was under the Wisconsin Department of Health Services’ Safer at Home order due to the COVID-19 pandemic.5 We now explain why we conclude that none of the facts or circumstances here meaningfully contributed to reasonable suspicion, so that the facts as a totality could not constitute reasonable suspicion. Along the way we address the State's contrary arguments.

¶17 We begin with the fact that Meddaugh wore only black clothing. It is true that in some circumstances the way that a person who is observed by police is dressed can contribute to reasonable suspicion. See State v. Matthews , 2011 WI App 92, ¶11, 334 Wis. 2d 455, 799 N.W.2d 911 (police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a man wearing a ski mask and hoodie late at night in a high-crime area who had an "unusual" encounter with a woman he walked past). However, here Meddaugh's black clothing does not meaningfully contribute to reasonable suspicion because a flashing red light was attached to the bicycle and because he rode out in the open in a public space, making his presence easily detectable. Further draining the...

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2 cases
  • State v. McBride
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2022
    ...1, ¶21. ¶13 The State bears the burden of proving that an investigatory stop was constitutional. State v. Meddaugh, 2022 WI.App. 12, ¶13, 401 Wis.2d 134, 972 N.W.2d 181. When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unl......
  • State v. Braly
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • June 9, 2022
    ... ... committed.[4] Id.; see also State v ... Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶¶28-30, 364 Wis.2d 234, ... 868 N.W.2d 143. The State has the burden of establishing that ... the stop was based on reasonable suspicion. State v ... Meddaugh, 2022 WI.App. 12, ¶13, 401 Wis.2d 134, 972 ... N.W.2d 181. To meet that burden, the State "'must be ... able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken ... together with rational inferences from those facts, ... reasonably warrant' the intrusion of the stop." ... ...

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