State v. Meek
Decision Date | 30 September 1968 |
Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 1,1 |
Citation | 445 P.2d 463,8 Ariz.App. 261 |
Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Walter W. MEEK, Appellant. 162. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrell F. Smith, Former Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Snell & Wilmer, by Mark Wilmer, Phoenix, for appellant.
Appellant, Walter W. Meek, was accused in a direct information filed in the Superior Court of Maricopa County of criminal contempt (§ 13--341 A.R.S.).
Trial was held in the Superior Court of Maricopa County on 1 March 1968, and the testimony at that trial indicates that Walter Meek, a reporter for the Arizona Republic, a newpaper of state-wide circulation printed in the city of Phoenix, Arizona, was, on 11 October 1967, attending a preliminary hearing in the courtroom of Justice of the Peace C. Stanley Kimball for one Danny Lee Eckhart in a case of more than passing interrest to the press and news gathering agencies in the State of Arizona. The attorney for the defendant invoked the provisions of Rule 27 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., which at the time of the preliminary hearing read as follows:
A reading of the transcript leaves no doubt that the defendant was not an attorney in the case, was not an officer of the court, and refused to leave the courtroom when ordered by the magistrate after the attorney for the defense had invoked Rule 27 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure in existence at that time. The testimony of the defendant indicates that he remained on advice of his employer, after legal advice, and as he stated:
'* * *
'We--my employers and I--had understood tht there might be an attempt on the part of defense counsel to invoke Rule 27, and it was a part of my purpose in being there to challenge the validity and legality of the rule excluding the public and the press.
'Q Were you informed as to whether or not your employer had legal advice as to whether or not it was the opinion of their counsel that the rule was unconstitutional?
'A Yes, my employer had informed me of the opinions which had been transmitted from counsel.'
Defendant was convicted, fined $300 for contempt of court, and he prosecutes this appeal.
Appellant in his brief presents only one question for our consideration. In his brief he states:
Our Constitution, Article VI, Section 5, Subsection 5, A.R.S. (as amended 1960), and our statute 12--109 A.R.S. provides that the Supreme Court may provide rules to 'regulate pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts of the state'. And our Supreme Court has stated that by authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt rules of both civil and criminal procedure the legislature withdrew from the field of court procedure. State of Arizona v. Pierce, 59 Ariz. 411, 129 P.2d 916 (1942). And our Supreme Court has recently stated that they have the inherent power to make rules. Arizona Podiatry Association v. Director of Insurance, 101 Ariz. 544, 422 P.2d 108 (1966).
Appellant then is asking this Court, an intermediate appellate court, to declare unconstitutional a rule of procedure adopted by our highest court. It is true that we frequently construe the effect of the rules of criminal or civil procedure, but this is quite different from asking this Court to rule upon the constitutionality of a rule of criminal or civil procedure which has been promulgated by the Supreme Court of Arizona. If we did so, we would in effect be passing judgment upon the same court that passess judgment upon our actions. We have been recently reminded in regard to prior decisions of our Supreme Court that this is not our obligation:
McKay v. Industrial Commission, 103 Ariz. 191, 438 P.2d 757 (1968).
We belive that the rule is even stronger when as here we are being asked to declare unconstitutional a rule or procedure adopted by our Supreme Court:
Ser-Nestler, Inc. v. General Finance Loan Co., Fla.App., 167 So.2d 230 (1964).
Being unable to declare the rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court of this State unconstitutional, we can only address ourselves to the facts in this case and determine whether the defendant Meek was legally found guilty of criminal contempt by the trial court. A reading of the transcript indicates that he was.
Judgment affirmed.
Although I agree with my colleagues that the record supports the fact that the defendant was guilty of refusing to leave the courtroom after Rule 27 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure had been invoked, I am unable to agree with their holding that because we are dealing with the Rules of Criminal Procedure we are precluded from going into the merits of this case relating to the constitutional questions.
The mere fact that the Supreme Court may have inherent or constitutional authority to adopt Rules of Criminal Procedure does not in and of itself prevent the Court of Appeals from considering the constitutionality of the rules as they may be involved in an appeal, provided the Supreme Court had not already passed on the matter.
I find no quarrel with the cases cited by the majority, however I am unable to read into their reasoning that the Supreme Court holds that once they have adopted a rule of criminal procedure any case on appeal involving the constitutionality of such a rule must not be inquired into by this Court. This in effect is what is being done here as the facts are not in dispute and only the constitutional questions are...
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People ex rel. T.D., 05CA0731.
...for criminal appeals, stating: "As an intermediate appellate court, we are not the appropriate forum to do so."). In State v. Meek, 8 Ariz.App. 261, 445 P.2d 463 (1968), a majority of the Arizona Court of Appeals held that, as an intermediate appellate court, it lacked jurisdiction to deter......
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In Interest of T.D., Court of Appeals No. 05CA0731 (CO 3/9/2006)
...for criminal appeals, stating: "As an intermediate appellate court, we are not the appropriate forum to do so."). In State v. Meek, 8 Ariz. App. 261, 445 P.2d 463 (1968), a majority of the Arizona Court of Appeals held that, as an intermediate appellate court, it lacked jurisdiction to dete......
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Schavey v. Roylston
...an appropriate writ of mandamus. 1 The constitutionality of this rule, prior to its modification, was challenged in State v. Meek, 8 Ariz.App. 261, 445 P.2d 463 (1968), but Division One of this Court (majority opinion) held that it had no authority to rule upon the constitutionality of a ru......
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State v. Meek, 1
...rules promulgaged by our State Supreme Court, and decided the matter without reference to the constitutional question. State v. Meek, 8 Ariz.App. 261, 445 P.2d 463 (1968). The Arizona Supreme Court, on a petition for review, remanded this case to the Court of Appeals, entering the following......