State v. Meiser
| Docket Number | A166534 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 2023 |
| Citation | 323 Or.App. 674,524 P.3d 130 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Erik John MEISER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Daniel J. Casey argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. Also on the reply briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and Pagán, Judge.
This case, in which the trial court rejected defendant's defense of guilty except for insanity (GEI) and found him guilty of murder, is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. State v. Meiser , 308 Or App 570, 481 P.3d 375 (2021) ( Meiser I ), rev'd in part and rem'd , 369 Or. 347, 506 P.3d 402 (2022) ( Meiser II ). In Meiser I , we concluded that ORS 161.2951 required defendant to prove that his antisocial personality disorder
played no part in bringing about the requisite lack of substantial capacity, and, because the record would allow a reasonable trier of fact to reject defendant's GEI defense on that basis, we affirmed. 308 Or App at 582, 585-86, 481 P.3d 375. As explained more fully below, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend that meaning of the statute and reversed in part and remanded. Meiser II , 369 Or at 360-62, 506 P.3d 402. On remand, we once again affirm.
A detailed description of the facts leading up to this case is set out in Meiser I , 308 Or App at 572-76, 481 P.3d 375, and, to a lesser extent, in Meiser II , 369 Or. at 350-52, 506 P.3d 402, and it is unnecessary for us to repeat that here. As relevant to the issues before us on remand, defendant, who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia
and antisocial personality disorder, was convicted of murder, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated murder, for the death of FH during a home invasion robbery.2 The trial court, acting as factfinder, rejected defendant's defense of GEI to that charge, and defendant assigned error to that ruling on appeal.3 Meiser I , 308 Or App at 576, 481 P.3d 375.
As to that assignment of error, we held that ORS 161.295 required defendant to prove that his asserted lack of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct in killing FH or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was the result of his schizophrenia—a qualifying "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295(1) —and that his co-occurring antisocial personality disorder—a "personality disorder" specifically excluded as a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295(2) —played no role in causing the requisite lack of capacity.4 Meiser I , 308 Or App at 585-86, 481 P.3d 375. And, because the evidence in the record permitted a finding that defendant's incapacity, in whatever form, was not solely the result of his schizophrenia
, we concluded that defendant had not established that he was entitled to prevail as a matter of law on the causation element of his defense, and, therefore, the trial court did not err in rejecting the defense.5 Id. As a result, we did not resolve the parties’ arguments with respect to whether the evidence compelled a finding that defendant lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Id. at 587-88, 481 P.3d 375.
On review, the Supreme Court concluded that we had erred in our interpretation of the statute, and it reversed in part and remanded.6 Analyzing the text and legislative history of the GEI defense, the court held that the legislature did not intend to "require that a person who can demonstrate the requisite lack of substantial capacity ‘as a result of mental disease or defect’ also prove that a co-occurring personality disorder in no part contributed to the incapacity." Meiser II , 369 Or. at 360-61, 506 P.3d 402. That is as far as the court went, however, remanding for our further consideration the issues regarding the "lack of substantial capacity" element that we had left unresolved in Meiser I . Id. at 361-62, 506 P.3d 402. The court also remanded for us to consider whether—given the court's rejection of the "sole cause" test for determining incapacity—the record "compelled a finding that defendant proved that he had experienced any qualifying incapacity ‘as a result of mental disease or defect,’ " noting that the answer to that question "may turn on whether the phrase ‘as a result of’ in ORS 161.295(1) means that the qualifying ‘mental disease or defect’ must be sufficient, on its own, to bring about the requisite incapacity, or whether the legislature intended to require some lesser degree of causal contribution from the qualifying ‘mental disease or defect.’ " Id.
We begin with the latter issue because it is dispositive. In supplemental briefing, defendant contends that the text and context of the statute demonstrate that the legislature intended to require a lesser degree of causal contribution from his schizophrenia
(the qualifying "mental disease or defect") than the "sufficient[ ] on its own" standard posited as a possibility by the Supreme Court.7 Further, in defendant's view, we need not decide precisely what lesser degree the legislature had in mind because the record shows that defendant's schizophrenia
was, at the least, "the predominant driver"8 of his behaviors. According to defendant, because there was no "expert evidence or testimony at trial attributing defendant's required lack of substantial capacity to anything other than schizophrenia—or at a minimum, to schizophrenia as ‘the predominant driver of his behaviors’ " (quoting trial testimony of Dr. Choi), the record compels the conclusion that defendant experienced the requisite incapacity "as a result of mental disease or defect."
The state, on the other hand, urges an "independent sufficiency" standard of causation.9 According to the state, that standard is suggested by the legislature's use of the term "as a result of" instead of "cause," and it is also necessary to give effect to the policy-based limitation the legislature intended in excluding personality disorders from the term "mental disease or defect." We agree with the state.
Again, the GEI defense provides:
ORS 161.295 (emphasis added). The statute thus requires that "three elements must exist ‘at the time of engaging in criminal conduct’: ‘mental disease or defect’; lack of ‘substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law’; and a causal link between the two." Meiser II , 369 Or. at 354, 506 P.3d 402 (quoting ORS 161.295(1) ). The issue before us presents a question as to the third element, specifically, the degree of causation required to establish the necessary "causal link" between defendant's schizophrenia—his mental disease or defect—and his asserted lack of substantial capacity.
As a starting point, we know from Meiser II that defendant's schizophrenia
need not be the "sole" cause—that "as a result of mental disease or defect" as used in ORS 161.295(1) does not mean "solely ‘as a result of mental disease or defect.’ " 369 Or. at 359, 506 P.3d 402 (emphasis in original); see also
id. at 355, 506 P.3d 402 (); id. at 359, 506 P.3d 402 (in amending ORS 161.295(2) to exclude personality disorders, the legislature intended "that a person who has ‘a personality disorder plus a psychosis * * * may still qualify’ " for the defense (quoting Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2075, May 13, 1983, Tape 324, Side A (statement of Jeffrey Rogers) (ellipses in Meiser II )). Given that holding in Meiser II —and the court's framing of the question before us on remand—we understand the court to suggest that, although the legislature did not intend that a defendant be required to prove the absence of a personality disorder as a potential contributing cause of his lack of substantial capacity, it may nonetheless have intended proof that the qualifying mental disease or defect was sufficient by itself to bring about the incapacity.
Next, we reject defendant's suggestion that "as a result of" means that the defense is available if the qualifying mental disease or defect is simply "one" cause of the defendant's incapacity. If we read ORS 161.295(1) to require only that defendant prove that his mental disease was one cause of his incapacity—no matter how remote or insignificant a cause it might have been—that reading would effectively nullify the exclusions set out in ORS 161.295(2).
The word "cause" when used in a criminal statute generally means "cause-in-fact." State v. Turnidge (S059155) , 359 Or. 364, 481, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), cert. den. , ––– US ––––, 137 S Ct 665, 196 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017). And while the word "cause" does not appear in ORS 161.295, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court in Turnidge discussed the concept of causation in the context of criminal statutes that "attach [ ] liability or responsibility for conduct that causes a result," and not in the context of criminal statutes that permit defendants to avoid responsibility for conduct that causes a result. Id. (emphasis added). Interpreting ORS 161.295 to make the GEI defense available to defe...
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Rinne v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd.
...to mean that the qualifying mental disorder must "be sufficient-on its own-to bring about the requisite incapacity." State v. Meiser, 323 Or.App. 674, 685, 524 P.3d 130, rev allowed, 371 Or. 60 (2023). That is consistent with a conclusion that the qualifying disorder must itself be the sour......