State v. Mejia

• Decision Date: 12 July 1995
• Citation: 662 A.2d 308,141 N.J. 475
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rigoberto MEJIA, a/k/a Martin Gamez, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 475

141 N.J. 475

662 A.2d 308

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rigoberto MEJIA, a/k/a Martin Gamez, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 24, 1994.

Decided July 12, 1995.

Jacqueline E. Turner and Abby P. Schwartz, Asst. Deputy Public Defenders, for appellant (Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, attorney).

Mark P. Stalford, Asst. Prosecutor, for respondent (John Kaye, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Stacy H. Gaffney, Asst. Prosecutor, on the brief).

Deborah Bartolomey, Deputy Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey (Deborah T. Poritz, Atty. Gen., attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

POLLOCK, J.

Defendant, Rigoberto Mejia, also known as Martin Gamez, and the victim, Balbino Garcia, were undocumented workers employed at the Breakers Hotel in Spring Lake. Mejia had entrusted Garcia with $750 from Mejia's earnings. When Mejia learned that Garcia was about to leave the United States, Mejia demanded the return of the money. Although Garcia had placed $1,201 in his eye-glass case, he denied possession of Mejia's money. After a dispute, Garcia fled down a basement hallway. Mejia fired a single shot, which struck Garcia in the back. A short time later, Garcia died. The State claimed the shot was purposeful; Mejia claimed it was accidental.

At trial, the critical issue was whether Mejia had intended to kill Garcia. The trial court instructed the jury that to find defendant guilty of capital murder, it must unanimously find that he had so intended. The court, however, failed to charge that to find Mejia had intended to cause only serious bodily injury resulting in death, the jury need not be unanimous. That omission was critical. At the time of the offense, a defendant who intended to cause serious bodily injury, but not death, was not subject to the death penalty. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988). On the facts, the erroneous charge constitutes reversible error.

The jury convicted Mejia of capital murder and related offenses. We affirm Mejia's conviction for murder, but reverse the imposition of the death penalty. On remand, if the State elects not to seek the death penalty, Mejia's murder conviction will stand, and the Law Division shall sentence him under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b. If the State elects to seek the death penalty, all convictions will be vacated and the State may re-try him for murder and all other offenses.

-I-

The record, which includes Mejia's statement to the police, reveals the following facts. Defendant did not testify at either the guilt- or penalty-phase hearings. In the summer of 1991, Mejia and Garcia were co-workers at the Breakers, sharing a room in the hotel basement until Mejia was fired. Before leaving, Mejia asked Garcia to safeguard his savings of $750 "in case of emergency so that it would be protected."

After moving to Brooklyn, Mejia called Garcia several times to recover his money. Garcia, however, did not return the money, and Mejia learned that Garcia intended to return to Mexico before Christmas. In fact, Garcia planned to return on December 8, 1991, on a 7:00 a.m. flight. Three hours before the flight, Mejia, armed with a .357 magnum and accompanied by an accomplice armed with a knife, confronted Garcia in the hotel basement.

Garcia "spoke badly to [Mejia] and pushed his way out of the room and ran down the hall." Mejia pursued Garcia into a bedroom occupied by Garcia's brother-in-law and nephew and pointed his handgun at the three men. According to Mejia's statement, Mejia "didn't want to kill [Garcia]" and threatened Garcia with the pistol to scare him. Garcia tried to take the pistol from Mejia, who struck Garcia with the gun, fracturing Garcia's skull.

Garcia fled down the hallway with Mejia in pursuit. Mejia claims that he slipped while chasing Garcia and accidentally fired the gun. According to the State's ballistic expert, the gun was fired within one-half inch of the victim's back. As Garcia lay dying, he told his girlfriend that Mejia had shot him.

Three days later, Garcia's nephew called the police after observing Mejia walking along the boardwalk in Belmar. When the police arrested Mejia, he was carrying a .357 magnum with five cartridges in its six-cartridge chamber. A State Police ballistics expert determined that the bullet taken from Garcia's body had been fired from Mejia's gun.

A Monmouth County Grand Jury charged Mejia with murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; felony murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3); armed robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b; possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; and unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b. The prosecutor served a notice of aggravating factors specifying that Mejia had committed the murder during a felony, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g) ("the c(4)(g) factor").

The jury convicted Mejia on all counts. At the penalty phase, the jury found that defendant had committed the murder during a felony. Mejia relied on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), which lists as a mitigating factor "[a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense" ("the catch-all factor"). Of the eight mitigating factors specified by Mejia, the jury unanimously found two factors because Mejia's father had physically and mentally abused him as a child. Five jurors found that Mejia had suffered emotional deprivation during his childhood. Three found a non-specific catch-all factor. The jury unanimously found that the single aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the jury sentenced Mejia to death.

On the non-capital offenses, the court sentenced Mejia: for armed robbery, twenty years without parole eligibility to run consecutively to the death sentence; for aggravated assault, ten years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility; for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, ten years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility; and for unlawful possession of a weapon, a concurrent five-year term with two and one-half years of parole ineligibility.

-II-

Defendant urges as plain error the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could return a non-unanimous verdict that he intended only to cause serious bodily injury. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 89, 549 A.2d 792. We agree. We also find that the evidence provides a rational basis for a jury to find that defendant intended only to cause serious bodily injury. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's death sentence and remand for imposition of a non-capital-murder sentence. On remand, if the State should seek the death sentence, the murder conviction must be vacated and the murder count retried. See State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 543, 601 A.2d 175 (1992) (vacating capital sentence but permitting State to re-try murder count on remand); State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 229, 593 A.2d 266 (1991) (vacating death sentence and remanding for imposition of non-capital murder sentence); State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 504-05, 575 A.2d 435 (1990) (discussing effect of partial criminal reversal and whether reversal of capital-murder count requires reversal of any other related count).

-A-

The intent to cause serious bodily injury, like the intent to kill, can establish the requirement that a murder is "knowing" or "purposeful" under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a. Because of recent constitutional and statutory amendments, P.L. 1993, c. 111 (signed May 5, 1993), murderers who intend to commit serious bodily injury, like those who intend to kill, are death-eligible. At the time of defendant's offense, however, only a defendant who intended to kill would be subject to a death sentence. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 89, 549 A.2d 792. Accordingly, the trial court should have instructed the jury to distinguish between finding that defendant intended to kill and that he intended to inflict serious bodily injury.

After defining "purposeful" and "knowing," the trial court instructed the jury:

And so your inquiry as to this form of murder will be has the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly caused the death of the victim, Mr. Garcia. If you are unanimously so satisfied, then you will indicate that on the verdict sheet and return a verdict of guilty to purposely or knowingly causing the death of the victim.

If you're not satisfied, you will so indicate on the verdict sheet and return a verdict of not guilty to purposely or knowingly causing the death of the victim.

The trial court then proceeded to define "the other form of murder":

The next inquiry is with regard to the other form of murder under the statute. If you're satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant either purposely or knowingly caused the death of the victim, then you don't have to answer the other question as to that second form of murder. But if your decision is that he's not guilty of purposely or knowingly causing the death of the victim, then you must consider now whether the defendant purposely or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to the victim which resulted in the death.

Essentially, the court required the jury to deliberate sequentially and to acquit defendant of "intent to kill" murder before reaching the issue of "serious bodily injury" murder. The court later emphasized:

And so you make the following determination with regard to [the murder count] of the indictment: One, how do you find the defendant on the charge that on or about December 8, 1991 he purposely or knowingly caused the death of the victim, Balbino Garcia. If your verdict is guilty to that particular question, then you don't have to consider any of the other issues that are involved in count one that are on the verdict sheet, and I'll go over that with you shortly.

But if you determine...