State in Interest of J.F.

• Citation: 286 N.J.Super. 89,668 A.2d 426
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey in the Interest of J.F., Juvenile-Appellant.
• Decision Date: 22 December 1995
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division

Page 89

286 N.J.Super. 89

668 A.2d 426

STATE of New Jersey in the Interest of J.F., Juvenile-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted Nov. 20, 1995.

Decided Dec. 22, 1995.

Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, for appellant (Cecelia Urban, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Carmen Messano, Hudson County Prosecutor, for respondent, State of New Jersey (Charles Centinaro, Assistant Prosecutor, on the letter brief).

Before Judges HAVEY, CONLEY and BRAITHWAITE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

CONLEY, J.A.D.

Following a non-jury trial, J.F. was adjudicated a delinquent based upon the trial court's determination that he had engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1a, and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. An indeterminate term not to exceed one year at the New Jersey Training School for Boys and a two year probationary term, along with the necessary Violent Crime Compensation Board penalty, were imposed.

On appeal, J.F. contends:

POINT I. J.F.'S CONFESSION WAS INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN.

POINT II. ABSENT CORROBORATION OF J.F.'S CONFESSION, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ACQUITTED HIM OF BOTH CHARGES. (Not raised below).

POINT III. THE DISPOSITION IN THIS CASE WAS ILLEGAL, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCARCERATED J.F. ALTHOUGH HE IS DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED, AND IMPOSED AN UNAUTHORIZED SPLIT SENTENCE. (Not raised below).

1. The Juvenile Code Prohibits Incarcerating Developmentally Disabled Juveniles Such As J.F. In Correctional Facilities.

2. It Was Illegal For The Trial Court To Both Incarcerate J.F. And Place Him On Probation.

POINT IV. J.F.'S ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY SHOULD BE VACATED BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, Pars. 1 and 10.

We have carefully considered these contentions. At the least, Point III raises a substantial issue as to the sentence imposed. See State in the Interest of R.M., 141 N.J. 434, 661 A.2d 1277 (1995). Our consideration, however, of Points I and II, convinces us that a reversal of the adjudications is otherwise required, rendering J.F.'s other contentions moot.

J.F. was tried with two co-juveniles who were also charged with aggravated arson and conspiracy thereof. Each juvenile had given a confession that inculpated all of the juveniles. A pretrial application by the State to jointly try the juveniles and to admit each one's confession was granted. In doing so, however, the trial judge recognized that each juvenile's confession could be considered as evidence against that juvenile only and expressly held that he would not consider a juvenile's confession as evidence of "any implication of any co-[juvenile]." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627-28, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 485-86 (1968); State in the Interest of J.P.B., 143 N.J.Super. 96, 113, 362 A.2d 1183 (App.Div.1976).

On October 12, 1993, a fire occurred in a factory located at 126 Webster Avenue, Jersey City, at approximately 11:30 a.m. Aside from the juveniles' confessions, the evidence presented by the State to establish their guilt consisted of the following. A United States Postal Carrier testified that he had seen three hispanic juveniles on the first floor of the building between 11:15 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. on the day of the fire. He did not, however, identify J.F. as one of the juveniles he saw that morning. In addition, Leo Lindo, a commercial tenant, saw three juveniles around 11:00 a.m. on the day of the fire chasing a cat into his leased space on the third and fourth floors. He identified J.F. as one of the boys he had seen that morning. Because he was afraid they would steal something, he asked them to leave and said they could give him a telephone number where he could contact them if he found the cat. They did so and left. Shortly thereafter, Lindo saw smoke coming from the elevator shaft and activated the fire alarm.

Lastly, the State presented the testimony of Jersey City Arson Investigator Thomas Murphy who had investigated the cause of the fire. Investigator Murphy, however, was not identified on the State's witness list as an expert witness and he was, therefore, precluded from offering any opinion testimony as to the cause of the fire or its origin. The extent of his testimony, aside from that relating to the various confessions that he had obtained, was the following.

Upon his examination of the damage to the building, the investigator found most of the damage had occurred in an area that he described as a garbage room at the south end of the first floor. He described that room as containing a disconnected hot water heating unit, a disconnected refrigerator, and some garbage. An adjoining garbage room and a loading dock area on the first floor were also damaged, as was a room housing the elevator shaft. On the remaining floors, fire damage was observed around the elevator shaft and smoke damage was found in the attic.

As to the confession of J.F., Murphy established that between October 12 and October 20, when J.F.'s confession was taken, he had interviewed and taken statements from four other juveniles, two of whom inculpated J.F. At about 3:45 p.m. on October 20, 1993, J.F. was arrested and, with his guardian, Maria Garcia, was transported to the arson investigation headquarters at the Jersey City Fire Department. There he was questioned primarily by Investigator Jimenez, a Spanish-speaking officer. Investigator Murphy and a third investigator were also present. At 5:05 p.m., J.F. commenced a taped recorded statement which was completed at 5:31 p.m.

It appears undisputed that J.F.'s guardian, Maria Garcia, is Spanish-speaking. Thus, when the Miranda ¹ rights were given and a waiver thereof obtained, Investigator Murphy testified that Jimenez read the Miranda rights in Spanish. Murphy does not speak Spanish and Jimenez did not testify, thus the record does not reflect what actually was conveyed to Maria. Cf. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 503, 662 A.2d 308 (1995) ("[t]he problem of communicating Miranda rights to non-English-speaking defendants is important, particularly in a state with so diverse a population ... the Attorney General should develop appropriate bilingual Miranda warnings. In making that recommendation, we recognize that law-enforcement cannot print Miranda warnings for all linguistic minorities. But that should not prevent the State from preparing cards for the larger segments of the non-English speaking population."). The transcript of J.F.'s statement, however, does reflect difficulty on Maria's part in understanding the warnings and the waiver thereof. ² What is plain, moreover, is that the remainder of the interview and resulting confession was conducted by the investigator entirely in English, with the only exception at the conclusion of the statement when Jimenez asked:

Q. Okay, this concludes the statement. [J.F.] and Maria, was this a voluntary statement which means, I am talking in Spanish (Talks in Spanish).

A. Yes.

Needless to say, the record is insufficient to demonstrate that J.F.'s guardian understood what it was J.F. and she were acknowledging and waiving by signing the Miranda waiver. Because, moreover, we do not know how the investigator conveyed to her the concept of voluntariness, her affirmative answer thereof is meaningless. It could as well be said that because the statement itself was obtained in a question and answer exchange between J.F. and Jimenez conducted entirely in English, Maria was unable to provide any support, assistance or guidance--at the least, the State did not demonstrate to the contrary.

Within the context of these factual circumstances, we address Points I and II in that order. In Point I, J.F. contends that his confession should not have been admitted because his guardian was effectively excluded from his custodial interrogation ³--an assertion we conceive to be an accurate characterization of what occurred, albeit perhaps not intended by the law enforcement officials.

The Supreme Court of the United States has set the standards for conducting a proper custodial interrogation. Where the police or agents of the police seek to interrogate a juvenile, they must comply with the guidelines established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); see State in the Interest of J.P.B., supra, 143 N.J.Super. at 104-06, 362 A.2d 1183. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is made "voluntarily knowingly, and intelligently." Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707.

Moreover, admissibility of a juvenile's confession, as with any criminal defendant's confession, requires proof of its voluntariness. In the case of juveniles, generally considered more susceptible than adults to psychological and other pressures, the Supreme Court of the United States has expressed the view that a higher standard of voluntariness is appropriate. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 1212-13, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 329, reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965, 82 S.Ct. 1579, 8 L.Ed.2d 835 (1962) ("[a 14-year-old] cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his rights--from someone concerned with securing him those rights--and without the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult...