State v. Melendrez
| Decision Date | 07 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0344,2 CA-CR 2015-0344 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JESSIE TITO MELENDREZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Teresa Godoy, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISIONPresiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Miller concurred.
¶1 After a jury trial, Jessie Melendrez was convicted of seven drug-related offenses. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which are 15.75 years. On appeal, Melendrez contends the court erred by denying his motion to suppress and his motion for a judgment of acquittal. He also maintains the court erroneously admitted evidence of other acts and testimony that he characterizes as "an opinion of [his] guilt." For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding Melendrez's convictions. See State v. Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, ¶ 2, 326 P.3d 339, 341 (App. 2014). In October 2013, officers arrested K.C. for drug possession. In exchange for her release, K.C. offered information about Melendrez, who she said was a "supplier of heroin and methamphetamine in the Tucson area." During a subsequent meeting with a detective, K.C. referred to Melendrez as "Jessie" and described his car, the location of his house, and where he kept the drugs in his house. Officers drove K.C. to the area where she said Melendrez lived, and she identified his house. A car that matched the description K.C. had given was also parked outside, and a records check revealed that it belonged to Melendrez.
¶3 While an officer kept the house under surveillance, the detective directed K.C. to place three telephone calls to Melendrez to arrange a purchase of heroin and methamphetamine at a nearby grocery store. During the third call, K.C. told Melendrez she was at the store, and he said he would "be right there." About a minute after that call ended, the officer watching the house saw the car belonging to Melendrez leave. Two other officers began following the car, observed two traffic violations, and initiated a stop.
¶4 Melendrez was driving the vehicle with a fifteen-year-old passenger, who stated that she was Melendrez's daughter. As the officers gathered information from Melendrez and the passenger, a drug-detection dog was brought to the scene, and it alerted to the presence of drugs on both door handles and the passenger seat of the car. During a search of the car, officers found a handgun in the center-console area. The passenger, who officers had identified as Z.G., admitted to the detective that Melendrez was not her father and that she had concealed drugs inside her body. Z.G. was then taken to the police station where she retrieved the drugs, consisting of approximately 24.9 grams of heroin and 27.7 grams of methamphetamine.
¶5 Meanwhile, the detective obtained a search warrant for Melendrez's house. There, officers found approximately 25.1 grams of heroin and 276.7 grams of methamphetamine concealed in a pipe in the living room wall, which was consistent with K.C.'s description of where Melendrez had hidden the drugs. Officers also found drug paraphernalia, including scales, baggies, straws, and foil; approximately $2,500 cash, most of which was inside a man's jacket pocket that also contained a baggie of methamphetamine; a man's shirt with a baggie of heroin in the pocket; and a revolver.
¶6 A grand jury indicted Melendrez for transportation of a dangerous drug for sale (methamphetamine), transportation of a narcotic drug for sale (heroin), weapons misconduct for possessing a weapon during the commission of a felony drug offense, possession of a dangerous drug for sale (methamphetamine), possession of a narcotic drug for sale (heroin), possession of drug paraphernalia, and second-degree money laundering.1
¶7 Before trial, Melendrez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the officers illegally stopped his car based on information from K.C., "an unknown informant," and pretextual traffic violations. As part of the latter argument, he maintained that the dog sniff unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. It found that "the officers took great lengths to corroborate [K.C.'s] information" and that they "had reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime [was being] committed and [Melendrez] was committing said crime." The court additionally noted that the traffic violations provided an "additional reason" for the stop but "the reason" for the stop was "the narcotics transaction" and the "scope of the detention" was "reasonably related" to that purpose.
¶8 A jury convicted Melendrez as charged, and the trial court sentenced him as described above. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶9 Melendrez argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. "When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review only the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and we view it in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4, 150 P.3d 787, 790 (App. 2007) (internal citation omitted). Although we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, we review de novo its determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, ¶ 5, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (App. 2008).
¶10 The United States and Arizona Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8. "The protection against unreasonable seizures 'extend[s] to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.'" State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, ¶ 20, 170 P.3d 266, 271 (App. 2007), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (alteration in Teagle). However, "[a] police officer may make a limited investigatory stop if the officer has an 'articulable, reasonable suspicion' that 'the suspect is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Woods, 236 Ariz. 527, ¶ 11, 342 P.3d 863, 866 (App. 2015), quoting Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, ¶ 20, 170 P.3d at 271-72; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) ().
¶11 Reasonable suspicion is a "commonsense, nontechnical concept[] that deal[s] with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on "'the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture' of what occurred at the scene." State v. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 8, 349 P.3d 205, 208 (2015), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Although an officer may not rely on a mere "hunch" to justify a stop, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Consideration "must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences [that an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience" and training. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, ¶ 22, 227 P.3d 868, 873 (App. 2010).
¶12 Melendrez maintains "the information that the officers had at the time of the stop did not establish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 'afoot.'" He asserts that K.C. was "an untested informant" and that it was therefore "important for the police to corroborate her information." Melendrez further argues that "[a]ll of the corroboration of criminal activity occurred after the police stopped Melendrez's vehicle."
¶13 We agree with Melendrez that K.C. was not a known, reliable informant and that the officers needed to corroborate the details of her information through their own observations to establish reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop. Cf. State v. Altieri, 191 Ariz. 1, ¶ 9, 951 P.2d 866, 868 (1997) (); State v. Saez, 173 Ariz. 624, 627, 845 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App. 1992) (). However, before the stop, the officers corroborated K.C.'s information, which proved reliable.
¶14 In her interview with the detective, K.C. identified Melendrez by his first name, "Jessie," described his car and the location of his house, and reported that he sold heroin and methamphetamine. She then drove with officers to the house, which had a car parked out front—both the house and the car matched K.C.'s description. Specifically, K.C. described the house as "cater[-]corner" to a convenience store that was "right up the street" from the police station and the car as a "maroon sedan with nice rims." In addition, the officers performed a records check on the car and confirmed that it belonged to "Jessie" Melendrez.
¶15 The detective also listened to...
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