State v. Meminger
| Decision Date | 22 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 38316,38316 |
| Citation | 292 S.E.2d 681,249 Ga. 561 |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. MEMINGER. |
Beverly B. Hayes, Dist. Atty., H. Jeff Lanier, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dublin, for the State.
Tony H. Hight, Decatur, amicus curiae.
Richard T. Taylor, Dublin, for Charlie Meminger, Jr.
This case concerns the applicability of Code Ann. § 27-1303.
The defendant was convicted of armed robbery in Laurens County Superior Court and given a life sentence.
Meminger's case was set for trial during the week of May 5, 1980. On Friday, April 25, 1980, Meminger filed two discovery motions: one pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and a notice to produce pursuant to Code Ann. § 38-801. In the motions, Meminger requested to have disclosed and produced all results, reports, summaries, etc. of all forensic, scientific or other tests or examinations of any tangible items relating to the case. On Tuesday, April 29, 1980, Meminger was served with copies of the scientific reports, and on May 1, 1980, he was arraigned.
At trial, the state sought to introduce testimony regarding these reports, and the defense objected contending that § 27-1303 precluded such testimony as Meminger had filed his requests for discovery prior to arraignment and as the state failed to furnish him copies of these reports ten days prior to trial.
The trial judge overruled the objection to the testimony, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction ruling that as a result of the state's failure to comply with a "timely written request" under § 27-1303, the scientific reports and the testimony thereon must be excluded, and that, in this case, the failure to exclude was prejudicial error. Meminger v. State, 160 Ga.App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981). The state appeals. We granted certiorari and reverse.
1. We first address the question of whether either the Brady motion or the motion to produce constitutes a "written request" for the purposes of Code Ann. § 27-1303(a).
Code Ann. § 27-1303 1 allows, for the first time, the pre-trial discovery in criminal cases of scientific reports, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, which the state intends to use in prosecution of the case-in-chief or in rebuttal. It mandates the production of those items at least 10 days prior to trial following a timely written demand.
Neither the Brady motion filed in this case requiring exculpatory matter to be furnished, nor the notice to produce under Code Ann. § 38-801(g), mentioned Code Ann. § 27-1303 or in any other way informed the state that the defense was proceeding upon or relying upon the provisions of this discovery procedure.
A pleading to constitute a request for discovery under § 27-1303 should give the state reasonable notice that the defense desires the disclosure of all available scientific reports no later than ten days before trial; this notice would be adequate if the defense specifically refers to § 27-1303, or if it makes clear that scientific reports, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, should be furnished prior to the ten day limit.
However, the state admits that it treated the Brady Motion as a request for scientific reports pursuant to § 27-1303, and that, consequently, it provided the scientific reports to the defendant.
This action moves us to reach the crux of the problem in this case, i.e., what constitutes a "timely written demand" by the defense.
2. Code Ann. § 27-1303 provides that if a timely written demand has been made and if the report is available to the district attorney, then he must furnish the report or reports to the defense at least ten days prior to the trial of the case.
In regard to when a report is "timely" § 27-1303(a) provides:
The "spirit and reason" of this statute is to provide for discovery of scientific reports in criminal cases, an opportunity which until the enactment of this statute had been withheld from criminal defendants. [Some reports could previously have been discovered under the authority of Brady v. Maryland ]. This discovery statute was obviously designed to implement, not to impede, the fair and speedy determination of cases. Code Ann. § 27-1303 highlights this purpose by calling for the scientific reports to be provided the defendant at least ten days prior to the trial of the case.
The construction of the statute urged by Meminger, i.e., that a request made "at arraignment" is timely, and that consequently, any request preceding arraignment is timely, allows for absurd and contradictory results in the application of the statute.
For instance, if arraignment occurs five days before trial, there is obviously no way the prosecution may meet its burden of complying with the request at...
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Tabb v. State
...court did not err in admitting her statement at trial. See State v. Madigan, 249 Ga. 571, 292 S.E.2d 406 (1982); State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982). 4. Appellant contends that a mistrial should have been declared because the state improperly placed her character in issue.......
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Law v. State
...The meaning of "timely written demand" under Code Ann. § 27-1303 was recently interpreted by the Supreme Court. In State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 564, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982), the court held that "... for a request to be timely, whether it is made 'at arraignment' or at some other time, it m......
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Walraven v. State
...Appellant's request was both timely and sufficiently specific. McCarty v. State, 249 Ga. 618, 292 S.E.2d 700 (1982); State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982). The state argues that since the statement made by appellant to Zorda was not the product of custodial interrogation, Co......
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Bragg v. State, 70066
...). This discovery statute was obviously to implement, not impede, the fair and speedy determination of cases." State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561, 563(2), 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982). For this court to adopt the position that all evidence produced on notice and inspected would be admissible by the pr......