State v. Mendez
| Decision Date | 23 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 35126.,35126. |
| Citation | 154 Conn.App. 271,105 A.3d 917 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut, v. Sanjae Thaj MENDEZ. |
154 Conn.App. 271
105 A.3d 917
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Sanjae Thaj MENDEZ.
No. 35126.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued Sept. 15, 2014.
Decided Dec. 23, 2014.
Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Brian W. DeBlasiis, certified legal intern, with whom were Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, John C. Smriga, state's attorney,
and Joseph J. Harry, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
GRUENDEL, LAVINE and FLYNN, Js.
Opinion
LAVINE, J.
The defendant, Sanjae Thaj Mendez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–134 (a)(1) and 53a–48, and conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–119, 53a–123a (3), and 53a–48.1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On March 13, 2011, Jose Mota, a Fairfield University student, held a party at his on-campus townhouse. The victim, Montovani Joaquin, attended the party with his
cousin. The defendant arrived at Mota's party with several other people including Axel Lee. Lee drove the defendant to the Fairfield University campus in his black Mazda. While at the party, the victim noticed the defendant inside the townhouse.
When the party ended at approximately 5 a.m., the victim left the townhouse and saw the defendant standing outside with a group of people. When the victim passed by the defendant, he felt something strike the back of his head and immediately turned around and saw Lee standing behind him. The victim began “fighting” with Lee when he felt someone approach him from the left. As the victim turned to the left, the defendant punched him directly in the jaw. The victim fell to the ground and felt someone “yank” his gold and silver chain from his neck. The victim then saw three people, including the defendant, run toward a black Mazda, which prompted him to chase after them. The victim saw the defendant getting into the passenger seat of the car. In an attempt to stop them, the victim grabbed onto the hood and then the rear bumper of the black Mazda, leaving blood stains on the Mazda before the car pulled away. As the Mazda drove away, Mota heard people screaming. He went outside and found the victim on the ground bleeding. Mota ran to pick up the victim; he saw that the victim's jaw appeared to be dislocated, he was missing teeth, and was no longer wearing his gold and silver chain.
Fairfield University Public Safety Officer Bruno Morias was working the midnight to 8 a.m. shift when a man stopped him to report that individuals in a black Mazda had assaulted the victim and stole his chain. Morias subsequently spotted the black Mazda on campus and initiated a motor vehicle stop along with two Public Safety Officers, Edward Baclawski and Filipe Rodriquez. Morias identified the driver as Lee and the passenger in the right rear seat as the defendant. When
the victim arrived at the scene of the motor vehicle stop, Rodriquez asked him who assaulted him. The victim pointed to the defendant while making punching motions to his jaw and “yanking towards his neck area.” Morias then called for an ambulance and the Fairfield Police Department.
The victim was taken to St. Vincent's Medical Center in Bridgeport and was later transferred to Yale–New Haven Hospital to be examined by a maxillofacial surgeon who diagnosed the victim with a jaw that was broken in two places. The victim underwent corrective surgery at University Hospital in New Jersey to realign his jaw with plates and screws. After the surgery, the victim's jaw was wired shut for four to six weeks. Two of his teeth were pulled. During that time, the victim could take nourishment only through a straw. At the time of trial, the victim continued to have pain in his mouth and complained that his jaw will never function the same as it did before it was broken.
The Fairfield Police Department investigated the incident and obtained arrest warrants for both Lee and the defendant. The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a–134 (a)(1) ; assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–60 (a)(1) ; larceny in the second degree in violation of §§ 53a–119 and 53a–123 (a)(3) ; conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a–48 and 53a–134 (a)(1) ; and conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of §§ 53a–48, 53a–119, and 53a–123a (3).
A jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree, and not guilty of the other three charges. The court sentenced him on each count to five years incarceration, suspended after one year, and five years of probation. The court ordered
the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree.2 Specifically, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to cause “serious physical injury” to the victim. We disagree.
“The standard of review employed in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and
logical.... On appeal, we do not ask whether there
is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact's] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 128 Conn.App. 20, 26–27, 17 A.3d 1060, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 919, 21 A.3d 463 (2011).
To establish the crime of conspiracy, the evidence must show that an agreement to engage in conduct constituting a crime had been entered into, that the conspirators intended for the conduct to be performed, and that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy followed. General Statutes § 53a–48 (a) ; State v. Palangio, 115 Conn.App. 355, 362, 973 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 919, 979 A.2d 492 (2009). “Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, with the intent divided into two elements: (a) the intent to agree or conspire and (b) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy.... Thus [p]roof of a conspiracy to commit a specific offense requires proof that the conspirators intended to bring about the elements of the conspired offense.”(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 167, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). A formal agreement is not necessary to sustain a conspiracy conviction “[b]ecause [given] the secret nature of conspiracies, a conviction is usually based on circumstantial evidence ... [and] inferred from the conduct of the accused. ”(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boykin, 27 Conn.App. 558, 564–65, 609 A.2d 242, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 905, 610 A.2d 179 (1992).
In the present matter, the crime that was the object of the conspiracy was robbery in the first degree. Section 53a–134 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery ... he or
another participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime....” General Statutes § 53a–3 (4) defines “serious physical injury” as an “injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which...
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