State v. Mesenbrink

• Decision Date: 15 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 17128,17128
• Citation: 771 P.2d 514,115 Idaho 850
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Timothy J. MESENBRINK, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 514

771 P.2d 514

115 Idaho 850

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Timothy J. MESENBRINK, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 17128.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 15, 1989.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Boise, Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellant. Myrna A.I. Stahman argued.

J. Gardiner Hackney, Jr., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the State from the trial judge's midtrial dismissal of a felony charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The sole question presented is the quantum of proof necessary to establish that prior to the instant case a defendant has been validly convicted of two previous driving under the influence charges within the previous five years. See I.C. § 18-8005(3). The trial judge held that the prosecution had failed to present such necessary proof. We dismiss the State's appeal.

This case came on for trial before a jury, and after two days of trial defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in jail, a fine of $1,000.00, and his driving privileges were suspended for one year. No appeal has been taken by the defendant from that conviction or sentence.

The State, following the submission of evidence by the prosecution and defense on the DUI charge, then sought to introduce proof of two prior convictions of the same charge for the purpose of bringing the defendant's conduct within the purview of I.C. § 18-8005(3), which provides:

18-8005(3). Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of three (3) or more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, within five (5) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony. (Emphasis added.)

In that phrase of the proceedings the State offered authenticated copies of two prior judgments of conviction of Mesenbrink for driving under the influence. The focus of this appeal is Mesenbrink's prior judgment of conviction in Canyon County. Mesenbrink asserts that such judgment of conviction in Canyon County does not demonstrate on its face that the defendant in that proceeding was informed of his rights to be represented by legal counsel, to confront witnesses, his rights against compelled self-incrimination, to understand the charges against him, and to understand the consequences of a plea of guilty.

The district court in the instant case agreed with the contentions of Mesenbrink, and dismissed the felony charges.

It is clear that the State carries the burden to show a voluntary waiver of sixth amendment rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Idaho, Boykin has been interpreted to require that the court record affirmatively show that the guilty plea was understood and was voluntary. See State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976). There, the Court stated that a plea should not be accepted unless understood to be voluntary, and that the consequences of the plea are understood. "The trial court should specifically inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives his right to a jury trial, he waives his right against self-incrimination, and he waives any defense he may have had to the charges." In the absence of following the procedures enunciated in Colyer, guilty pleas have been set aside. State v. Watson, 99 Idaho 694, 587 P.2d 835 (1978).

I.C.R. 11 (adopted in 1980), conditions the acceptance of all guilty pleas at the district court and magistrate levels upon the requirements delineated in subsection (c) thereof, i.e., a defendant must be informed of his rights 1) to be represented by legal counsel, 2) to confront witnesses, 3) against compelled self-incrimination, 4) to understand the charges levied against him, and 5) to understand the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments possible.

I.M.C.R. 5(f) (1980), mandates the use of a uniform citation form which contains a checklist of questions to be asked the defendant prior to a court entering judgment. The court is therein required to advise a defendant of constitutional and statutory rights, and the court must indicate such procedures have been followed if the defendant chooses to enter an uncounseled guilty plea.

The form of the judgment entered in defendant's previous Canyon County conviction of DUI fails to incorporate the information mandated by I.M.C.R. 5. In contrast, the previous judgment of conviction of DUI in Ada County, on its face contains such I.M.C.R. 5 checklist.

We note that the record contains no basis for any contention that the defendant was not convicted of DUI in the Canyon County procedures. There is no indication of any appeal from the Canyon County decision, nor any subsequent proceedings contending that the actions were improper. Nevertheless, we note the point of conflict between two doctrines. First, the desire for finality of judgments and the presumption of the legality and correctness of the procedures underlying those judgments. We note that the requirements are simple and not burdensome. In contrast, we note the constitutional requirement of a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In this regard do we place an unreasonable burden upon the State to go behind the face of the judgment of conviction to show that the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights prior to the entry of that conviction? In the instant case we do not view such a burden as onerous, but merely a perfunctory indication on the face of the documents that compliance has been had with the provisions of I.C.R. 11 and I.M.C.R. 5(f). Hence, we view our decision in the instant case as placing no further or undue burden upon law enforcement officials, but rather as only requiring our courts to follow our mandated rules of procedure. Although we have addressed the assertions of the State in the instant case in the hope of providing future guidance to our courts, we are not convinced that the appeal by the State is well taken. As noted, the defendant was charged, a jury selected and seated, and proof introduced. It was only thereafter that the court, on motion, dismissed the felony charge. We decline to discuss the attachment of jeopardy precluding any retrial of the defendant.

The appeal is dismissed.

BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.

JOHNSON, Justice, dissenting.

I dissent both from the dismissal of the appeal and from the guidance given by the majority concerning the prima facie proof of a prior conviction where questions are raised about the constitutional validity of the conviction.

THE STATE WAS ENTITLED TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING.

The majority dismisses the State's appeal on the ground that at the time the trial court dismissed the felony charge, the defendant had been charged, a jury selected and seated, and proof introduced. To complete the statement of the posture of this case, it should also be noted that at the time the trial court ruled that the felony charge would be dismissed, the jury had already returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of driving under the influence. The only question that was before the trial court was whether the conviction would be for a felony or a misdemeanor. After rejecting the exhibit containing the record of the Canyon County conviction, the trial court stated:

I think my ruling would have to be, then, that as to that portion of the information that charges the defendant with having been twice previously convicted within the past five years, that the State would be unable to present that to the jury as a factual issue. There would be no evidence to support taking it to the jury. So that portion of the information enhancing this from mere driving while intoxicated to driving while intoxicated as a felony would have to be dismissed, but that there is still a conviction for misdemeanor DUI.

The State invokes I.A.R. 11(c)(1) and (5) in support of its right to appeal the trial court's ruling. This rule provides:

Rule 11. Appealable judgments and orders.--An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following judgments and orders:

....

(c) Criminal proceedings. From the following judgments and orders of the district court in a criminal action, whether or not the trial court retains jurisdiction:

(1) Final judgments of conviction.

....

(5) Any order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the objection of the prosecutor.

I would hold that the State had the right to appeal the trial court's ruling under either I.A.R. 11(c)(1) or (5). By their plain meaning, these sections of the rule apply to the trial court's action in dismissing the felony charge and entering conviction of a misdemeanor charge. Cf. State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 825, 642 P.2d 61, 62 (1982); State v. Molinelli, 105 Idaho 833, 835, 673 P.2d 433, 435 (1983).

THE STATE PROVED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION.

The majority offers guidance to our courts as to the quantum of proof necessary to establish that a defendant in a felony DUI case has been validly convicted of two previous DUI charges. I disagree with the guidance that is given and note that it is dicta.

In rejecting the exhibit containing the record of the Canyon County conviction, the trial court ruled that the packet of court records submitted did not establish that:

A. The Defendant was represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel, including the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent;

B. The Defendant waived his right to trial by jury, his right against compulsory self-incrimination, and his right to confront witnesses against him.

The Judgment and/or Commitment that is the first page of the exhibit indicates that the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence. At the bottom of this document the following appears: "(x) Def/Atty (x) PA (x) Jail....