State v. Mews

Decision Date09 March 2015
Docket NumberNo. CAAP–13–0003525.,CAAP–13–0003525.
Citation134 Hawai'i 478,344 P.3d 362 (Table)
PartiesSTATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Keith S. MEWS, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

Keith S. Shigetomi, on the briefs, for DefendantAppellant.

Sonja P. McCullen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, on the briefs, for PlaintiffAppellee.

NAKAMURA, C.J., FUJISE and LEONARD, JJ.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

DefendantAppellant Keith S. Mews (Mews) appeals from the August 23, 2013 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit1 (Circuit Court) for the offense of Robbery in the Second Degree, pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 708–841(1)(a) and/or (1)(c) (2014), and sentencing him to an extended term of twenty years imprisonment.

After a careful review of the record, the issues raised and the arguments made by the parties, and the applicable authority, we resolve Mews's points on appeal2 as follows and affirm.

1. The Circuit Court did not err in its instructions regarding identification. Mews argues that the Circuit Court erred in providing jury instructions that were insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent or misleading in light of the Hawai‘i Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawai‘i 302, 277 P.3d 1027 (2012). Specifically, Mews argues that because he requested a “complete eye witness identification instruction” during the extended term sentencing trial, that the case was not ‘currently pending on direct appeal’ when Cabagbag was published and should not be evaluated by the rule then in effect.” Mews states that because Cabagag should apply, he therefore is entitled to a new trial.

This argument is without merit. As the court made clear, Cabagbag was intended for prospective application only. State v. Cabinatan, 132 Hawai‘i 63, 319 P.3d 1071 (2014). The jury was instructed and verdict was rendered in this case two months before the opinion in Cabagbag was issued and, in any event, did contain an instruction regarding identification.

Mews argues in the alternative that the “manner in which the show-up was conducted warranted a more specific instruction to guide the jury in assessing the identification evidence” than what was given by the Circuit Court. “Under the pre-Cabagbag standard, we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury's attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.’ Cabagbag, 127 Hawai‘i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting [ State v.] Okumura, 78 Hawai‘i [383,] 405, 894 P.2d [80,] 102 ).” Cabinatan, 132 Hawai‘i at 76, 319 P.3d at 1084.

Here, the jury's attention was drawn to the issue of identification. The issue was discussed in voir dire, opening statements, during examination of witnesses and closing argument. In addition, the trial court did instruct the jury on identification and adequately informed the jury of the relevant factors it should consider such as the opportunity to observe, length of time elapsed after the observation, and “all other circumstances and evidence bearing upon the issue.” We conclude it was not error to refuse Mews's proffered identification instruction. Okumura, 78 Hawai‘i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102.

2. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that imposing an extended term was necessary for the protection of the public. The jury heard evidence of the offense, in which Mews...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT