State v. Meyer
| Decision Date | 07 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 379A95,379A95 |
| Citation | 345 N.C. 619,481 S.E.2d 649 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Jeffrey Karl MEYER. |
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William N. Farrell, Jr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Ellen B. Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Staples Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
On 16 May 1988, defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder. On 3 June 1988, a jury was impaneled in Superior Court, Cumberland County, for a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000. During the presentation of defendant's evidence in this sentencing proceeding, defendant escaped from the Cumberland County Jail. On 14 June 1988, upon motion by defendant's counsel, the trial court declared a mistrial. Defendant was apprehended on 19 June 1988. Following several motions by defendant, the sentencing proceeding was moved to New Hanover County.
On 16 November 1988, upon recommendation of the jury, the trial court imposed two sentences of death. Defendant appealed those sentences of death pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a). On defendant's first appeal, this Court concluded defendant was entitled to a new capital sentencing proceeding under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990). State v. Meyer, 330 N.C. 738, 412 S.E.2d 339 (1992).
Defendant's second capital sentencing proceeding was heard at the 21 August 1995 Mixed Session of Superior Court, Cumberland County. On 31 August 1995, upon recommendation of the jury, defendant was once again sentenced to death for both of the first-degree murder convictions.
Except as necessary for an understanding of the issues, we will not repeat the evidence inasmuch as it is adequately summarized in our prior opinion on the first appeal.
Defendant brings forth several issues for review, but we need focus only on defendant's contention that the trial court violated his constitutional right to be present at all stages of his capital trial. Defendant contends that twice during his capital sentencing proceeding, the trial court failed to ensure defendant's presence as required by the North Carolina Constitution. However, we address specifically only the unrecorded in-chambers conference that took place with the attorneys in defendant's absence.
The defendant in a capital trial must be present at every stage of the proceeding. N.C. Const. art. I, § 23. This constitutional mandate serves to safeguard both the defendant's and society's interests in reliability in the imposition of capital punishment. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 30, 381 S.E.2d 635, 651 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S.Ct. 3266, 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990). As this Court has previously stated:
State v. Moss, 332 N.C. 65, 73-74, 418 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1992) (quoting State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1990)).
In the present case, on the second day of jury selection, the trial court addressed the first group of seated jurors and gave them general instructions. At the end of this exchange with the jurors, the transcript reflects that the following occurred:
COURT: All right. Have the others--let me have the jurors--the other jurors now.
There is no record of what occurred in-chambers between the judge and the attorneys.
This Court has previously held that an in-chambers conference is a "critical stage" of a defendant's capital trial at which he has a constitutional right to be present. See State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 221, 410 S.E.2d 832, 843 (1991). "Notwithstanding an accused's right to be present, certain violations of this right may be harmless if such appears from the record." Id. at 222, 410 S.E.2d at 844. In State v. Brogden, 329 N.C. 534, 541-42, 407 S.E.2d 158, 163 (1991), this Court concluded that it was error for the trial court to conduct an in-chambers conference with the attorneys but without defendant.
Based upon the precedent set in Brogden, 329 N.C. 534, 407 S.E.2d 158, this Court in State v. Exum, 343 N.C. 291, 470 S.E.2d 333 (1996), held that the trial court had violated defendant's nonwaivable right to be present at all stages of his capital trial by conducting an unrecorded in-chambers conference during the trial with the attorneys present but out of the hearing of defendant. In Exum, the following exchange occurred immediately after the examination of a defense witness:
THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, we're going to take our lunch break now--well, let me confer with the lawyers a minute.
Sheriff, take the jury back in the jury room.
(The jury is absent.)
THE COURT: All right. Let's--I think you're excused, Dr. Brown.
Id. at 294, 470 S.E.2d at 335. After noting that the in-chambers conference was a part of the trial from which defendant was excluded, this Court held that
because the in-chambers conference was not recorded and the nature and content of the private discussion cannot be gleaned from the...
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State v. Atkins
...three separate off-the-record bench conferences involving only counsel. Defendant contends this Court's holding in State v. Meyer, 345 N.C. 619, 481 S.E.2d 649 (1997), mandates the award of a new capital sentencing proceeding. Our review of the record and applicable precedent leads us to ho......
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Meyer v. Branker
...found error when the trial judge conducted an unrecorded in-chambers conference without Meyer's presence. See State v. Meyer, 345 N.C. 619, 623, 481 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1997). The capital sentencing proceeding from which Meyer now seeks habeas relief, his fourth, began on January 28, 1999. The......
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State v. Meyer, 379A95-2.
...of first-degree murder, and the trial court entered judgments in accordance with those recommendations. State v. Meyer, 345 N.C. 619, 620, 481 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1997) (Meyer II ). On appeal, this Court vacated the judgments and remanded for resentencing because defendant was absent from an u......
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State v. Jones
...is apparent, the State then has the burden to show that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Meyer, 345 N.C. 619, 623, 481 S.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1997). "The State may show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the transcript reveals the substanc......