State v. Meyer

• Decision Date: 14 April 1949
• Docket Number: No. 34969.,34969.
• Citation: 37 N.W.2d 3,228 Minn. 286
• Parties: STATE v. MEYER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

37 N.W.2d 3

228 Minn. 286

STATE v. MEYER.

No. 34969.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 14, 1949.

Certified to Supreme Court, from Sibley County; Jos. J. Moriarty, Judge.

Norman Meyer pleaded guilty to charge of third degree burglary, his motion for arrest of judgment and objection to imposition of sentence under Youth Conservation Act were sustained and the question of constitutionality of the Act certified to Supreme Court.

Reversed with instructions to proceed with imposition of sentence in accordance with law.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Ralph A. Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lowell J. Grady, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Everett L. Young, County Atty., of Gaylord, for plaintiff.

Paul C. Thomas, of St. Paul, and Maynard E. Pirsig, of Minneapolis, for the Youth Conservation Committee of the Minnesota State Bar Association, Amici curiae.

H. A. Knobel, of Gaylord, Wm. F. Odell & Wm. B. Odell, of Chaska, Ray G. Moonan, of New Prague, W. L. Heinen, of Le Center, Kermit J. Lindmeyer, of Shakopee, and John M. Fitzgerald, of New Prague, for defendant.

KNUTSON, Justice.

Defendant was arraigned upon an information filed upon his application under M.S.A. § 628.32, charging him with having committed the crime of burglary in the third degree. The information alleges that the crime was committed on December 18, 1948. Defendant became 18 years of age on August 13, 1948. He was arraigned on January 27, 1949. Prior to arraignment the court appointed counsel to represent defendant. He entered a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the information. Thereafter an adjournment was taken, and later, when the county attorney moved for imposition of sentence, defendant, being then represented by additional counsel, inquired of the court whether it proposed to sentence defendant under and pursuant to the provisions of L.1947, c. 595, M.S.A. §§ 260.125, 260.13, commonly known as the Youth Conservation Act. When informed by the court that there was no other alternative under the law, defendant's counsel moved for an arrest of judgment and objected to the imposition of sentence under that chapter on the ground that the act was unconstitutional. The court sustained the objection, granted defendant's motion, and, with the consent of the state and defendant, certified to this court the questions as to the constitutionality of the act.

The Minnesota Youth Conservation Act, L.1947, c. 595, M.S.A. § 260.125, is patterned after the Youth Correction Authority Act adopted by the American Law Institute in 1940.¹ References herein are to sections found in M.S.A. A number of changes were made in our act from the model code, intending to adapt it to our indeterminate sentence and our existing criminal procedure and also to include within its scope provisions for the prevention of delinquency in youth, as well as the rehabilitation of youth who have committed violations of our laws. It also extends the provisions of the act to juvenile court cases which are not included in the model act. The purpose of the model act, § 1,² is somewhat more limited than our statute, § 260.125, subd. 1.³

So far as the method of handling young people found guilty of violation of law is concerned, the purposes of the two acts are the same. Acts similar to ours were adopted in California in 1941, St.1941, p. 2522, in Wisconsin in 1947,⁴ and in Massachusetts in 1948.⁵

A brief description of the act may be helpful to an intelligent understanding of its validity. Under the act there is created a youth conservation commission, § 260.125, subd. 2, consisting of five persons, including the director of the division of public institutions, the chairman of the state board of parole, and three others appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. One of the appointed members is designated as chairman by the governor. Such chairman is the full-time director of the commission. Subd. 3. The act provides for a salary for the director, Subd. 7, and per diem compensation for the other two appointive members, but no additional compensation for the director of the division of public institutions or the chairman of the state board of parole. Subd. 3.

The act applies to two distinct groups: Those found delinquent by juvenile courts, § 260.125, subd. 14, and § 260.13, and those convicted of a felony or a gross misdemeanor in the district courts who are under the age of 21 years, § 260.125, subd. 13.

The act does not affect the procedure governing trial or hearing. It applies only when there has been a conviction or a plea of guilty and affects only the disposition that may be made of the offender after such conviction. It does not affect the power of the trial court to grant a new trial or set aside its judgment by reason of surprise, fraud, perjury, or otherwise, nor does it affect the right of appeal. Subd. 30.

With respect to juvenile court cases, the principal change introduced by the act consists of eliminating the power of the juvenile court to commit a minor to the state training school for boys at Red Wing or to the home school for girls at Sauk Center, and requires the court instead to commit the youth to the commission. § 260.13, as amended by L.1947, c. 595, § 2. The juvenile court retains authority to place the youth on probation or to make such other disposition of the case as the court may decide, not involving commitment to a state school.

The district court cannot commit a youth under the age of 21 years to a penal institution, but must sentence him to the commission. The court retains authority to place the youth on probation on any terms it sees fit after a presentence investigation has been made. Unless the court places the youth on probation, the court must commit the offender to the commission for the maximum term prescribed by the statute creating the crime for which the youth was committed. § 260.125, subd. 13.

Upon commitment by a juvenile court, the commission has the right to retain control of the youth until he or she reaches the age of 21 years. At that time the offender must be discharged in any event. Subd. 26. The commission may confine the youth in the state training school for boys or the home school for girls or place him or her on probation, or, after confinement, on parole on such terms as it may prescribe, having in mind the best interests of the youth and society. Subd. 19(a), (c to g). It cannot confine the youth in a penal institution. Subd. 14. It may discharge the youth from its control entirely before the age of 21 is reached. Subd. 26.

When commitment is from a district court upon conviction of a felony or gross misdemeanor, the commission is given authority to confine the youth in a penal institution or place him on probation or, after confinement, on parole, on such terms as it may prescribe. Subd. 19. The youth must in any event be discharged on the expiration of the term for which the court sentenced him. Subd. 26. If before that time he reaches his 25th birthday, he must then be discharged, unless the commission finds that to do so would be dangerous to the public, in which event he is turned over to the regular adult criminology agencies. Subd. 27.

Whether the commitment is from a juvenile court or district court, before treatment is prescribed by the commission it must make a study of the youth. Subd. 18.

1. Defendant contends that the act violates Minn.Const. art. 4, § 27, M.S.A., which provides that "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." The title to the act is as follows:

"An act relating to prevention of delinquency and crime; providing for methods of treatment, training and education of young persons, including persons under 21 years of age found delinquent or guilty of crime; creating a youth conservation commission; appropriating funds therefor; and amending Minnesota Statutes 1945, Section 260.13."

The requirements of this constitutional provision are well stated in C. Thomas Stores Sales System, Inc., v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 509, 297 N.W. 9, 13, as follows:

"The subject of a statute is the matter to which it [art. 4, § 27] relates and with which it deals. A subject embraces all provisions which are germane to it; they may be parts of it, incident to it, or means auxiliary to the end in view. The subject must be single; the provisions by which the object is accomplished may be multifarious. The constitutional provision ought to be practically and liberally construed."

In Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 578, 50 N.W. 923, 924, 28 Am.St.Rep. 382, we said:

"* * * To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. All that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject. * * * All that is required is that the act should not include legislation so incongruous that it could not, by any fair intendment, be considered germane to one general subject. * * * The title was never intended to be an index of the law."

These rules have been stated so often that it seems needless to elaborate upon them here. See, also, State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 21 Am.Rep. 765; State ex rel. Schulman v. Phillips, 73 Minn. 77, 75 N.W. 1029; Lien v. Board of Com'rs, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N.W. 1094; State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297; 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8910.

Tested by these rules, we have no difficulty in finding that the act meets the requirements of Minn.Const. art. 4, § 27.

2. Defendant next contends that the act is in violation of Minn.Const. art. 3, § 1, and art. 6, §§ 1, 2, and 5, in that it violates the...