State v. Michael Beuke, 98-LW-5560
| Decision Date | 04 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | C-970807,98-LW-5560 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL BEUKE, Defendant-Appellant. APPEAL |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Breyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Ken Murray, David H. Bodiker, and Randall L. Porter, for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant-appellant, Michael Beuke, appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Common pleas declining to hear his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C 2953.21 and 2953.23. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The record indicates that, in July 1983, Beuke was convicted of one count of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, three counts of kidnapping, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon. The trial court imposed a sentence of death with respect to the aggravated murder charge.
This court upheld Beuke's convictions on direct appeal.[1] The Supreme Court of Ohio also upheld the convictions, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied Beuke's petition for a writ of certiorari.[2]
In November 1989, Beuke filed a petition for postconviction relief with the trial court. The court denied the requested relief, and this court again affirmed the trial court's judgment.[3]
On August 15, 1996, Beuke filed another petition for postconviction relief. In the second petition, Beuke set forth sixteen claims for relief. Many of those asserted claims were based upon materials that Beuke received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.
On August 19, 1997, the trial court journalized an entry in which it declined to hear Beuke's petition pursuant to R.C. 2953.23. The instant appeal followed.
On appeal, Beuke's asserts nine assignments of error.[4] Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, however, we have concluded that the ninth and final assignment of error is dispositive of the majority of the remaining assignments. In the ninth assignment, Beuke claims that the trial court erred in declining to entertain the petition pursuant to R.C. 2953.23. We begin with that assignment of error.
R.C 2953.23(A) sets forth the circumstances under which the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a successive petition for postconviction relief. The statute provides, in part, as follows:
*** a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) [of R.C 2953.21] or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless both of the following apply:
(1) Either of the following applies:
Construing this statutory language, we have previously indicated that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a second or successive petition unless the two prongs of R.C. 2953.32(A) are satisfied.[5] Given that the satisfaction of the prongs of R.C. 2953.23 is jurisdictional, the trial court's decision with respect to the sufficiency of Beuke's allegations is fundamental to the instant appeal. Because we find no error in the trial court's determination, we uphold its dismissal of the petition.
The allegations set forth in Beuke's petition can be separated into several general categories. The first category is the material obtained from the FBI. For the purposes of this category of allegations, we assume, without deciding, that Beuke was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts in time to present them in the earlier proceedings. Thus, we assume for the sake of argument that the first prong of R.C. 2953.23(A) has been met.
The question remaining to be decided with respect to this category of claims, then, is whether Beuke set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that, but for the omission of this newly discovered evidence, no reasonable factfinder could have found him guilty or eligible for the death sentence.[6] We hold that the trial court correctly answered this question in the negative.
In his petition, Beuke alleged that the FBI file contained various pieces of evidence tending to contradict the prosecution's trial evidence. This FBI material included the following: the disclosure that a prosecution witness was paid for his testimony; the fact that the same prosecution witness had been investigated for child pornography and other crimes; inconsistencies in the ballistics evidence adduced at trial; indications that other persons were suspected of the crime for which Beuke was convicted; evidence that allegedly unreliable investigation methods were employed by the police in identifying suspects; inconsistencies in the physical descriptions given for the assailant by prosecution witnesses; and evidence that one of the victims of the offenses was not a model citizen as had been asserted by the prosecution. Beuke contends that this evidence, individually and cumulatively, satisfies the second prong of R.C. 2953.23(A).
We are not persuaded. We first emphasize that the standard for establishing jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.23 is proof by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the alleged errors, no reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty or eligible for the death penalty. This court has noted in the past that evidence in the nature of impeachment material is not sufficient to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction.[7]
In the case at bar, we cannot say that the evidence set forth in the petition was so persuasive that no reasonable factfinder could have found Beuke guilty or eligible for the death penalty. While the asserted evidence may have tended to impeach the state's witnesses and therefore to have been favorable to Beuke, it is not the type of "outcome altering" evidence contemplated by the statute.[8] Both this court and the Supreme Court of Ohio have expressly recognized the overwhelming evidence of guilt that was adduced at trial in the case at bar.[9] Given the strength of the state's case, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the newly asserted evidence was insufficient to call the jury's verdict and the trial court's sentence into question.
The next category of evidence submitted by Beuke is medical evidence tending to show that he suffered from various mental disorders. This evidence simply does not satisfy the first prong of R.C. 2953.23(A), requiring that the petitioner be "unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the facts" upon which the claim rests. The record indicates that a complete psychological evaluation was performed and that the results of the evaluation were given to the jury. Therefore, Beuke has failed to demonstrate that he was prevented from discovering the asserted evidence.
The final category of evidence in the petition is evidence that allegedly calls into question the inculpatory statement of Beuke introduced at trial. Beuke asserts that newly discovered documents in which the statement is not mentioned give rise to the inference that the police officer who testified as to the statement committed...
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