State v. Middleton
Decision Date | 26 March 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 479,479 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MIDDLETON, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
John G. Gosling, Vinton County, Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Leonard F. Holzapfel, Wellston, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Vinton County Common Pleas Court. The jury found Jeffrey L. Middleton, defendant below and appellant herein, guilty of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12, an aggravated third degree felony, and guilty of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25, a first degree misdemeanor.
Appellant assigns the following error:
"The trial court erred in ruling that a spouse can be guilty of burglary at the spouse's marital residence."
On December 19, 1991, the grand jury indicted appellant on one count of burglary with a physical harm specification, and one count of domestic violence. The burglary count alleged appellant trespassed in the residence of Judy Middleton on or about December 11, 1991. The domestic violence count alleged appellant committed domestic violence against Judy Middleton on the same date. The indictment did not specify any relationship between appellant and Judy Middleton.
On April 22, 1992, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the burglary count. Appellant, noting the victim is his wife, argued that R.C. 3103.04 prevents a finding that he trespassed in her home, an essential element of the crime of burglary. Appellant cited State v. Herder (1979), 65 Ohio App.2d 70, 19 O.O.3d 47, 415 N.E.2d 1000, for the proposition that a spouse cannot be found guilty of trespassing in the dwelling of the other spouse. In Herder, 65 Ohio App.2d at 75-76, 19 O.O.3d at 51, 415 N.E.2d at 1004, the court held in pertinent part:
"In light of the clear policy expression set forth in R.C. 3103.04, one spouse cannot be criminally liable for trespass in the dwelling of the other."
We note appellee did not file a written response to appellant's motion to dismiss.
On April 29, 1992, the court held a hearing on the motion. The parties presented no evidence at the hearing. The prosecutor, however, stated that: (1) the parties were married at the time of the crime; and (2) no court order prevented appellant from entering his wife's home at the time of the alleged crimes. The prosecutor stated in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant's attorney agreed with the prosecutor's statement of the facts. Later during the hearing, the prosecutor referred to Judy Middleton as appellant's wife.
The trial court appeared to accept the prosecutor's statement of facts, but did not dismiss the action. The trial court ruled that the R.C. 3103.04 provision that neither spouse can be excluded from the dwelling of the other spouse does not apply to bar a prosecution of one spouse for burglary committed in the residence of the other spouse. The court reasoned that trespass is only one element of burglary. The court also reasoned that R.C. 3103.04 appears not among the criminal statutes, but rather appears among the domestic relations statutes. The court stated in pertinent part:
After the court announced its decision denying appellant's motion to dismiss, the court recessed the hearing. After the recess, the parties announced they had reached a plea agreement whereby appellant would plead no contest to burglary and plead guilty to domestic violence in exchange for the prosecutor's offer to dismiss the physical harm specification. The prosecutor explained the plea agreement in pertinent part as follows:
"The State has a full understanding with a plea of No Contest would be made with a--I believe a stipulation of the facts, withholding the Defendant's intent to file an appeal relative to the privileged issue, which was subject to the defense filing of a Motion to Dismiss the immediate--in the immediate past, and the Court's subsequent ruling, overruling the Motion to Dismiss having the expectations there would be an appeal taken on those issues."
The court informed appellant that his no contest plea on the burglary count would be an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment. The prosecutor specifically mentioned that appellant was admitting the facts in the indictment "to the point where" appellant claims the law states a spouse cannot be found guilty of trespassing into the other spouse's dwelling.
The court accepted the plea agreement and found appellant guilty on both counts. The court sentenced appellant to one year on the burglary count and six months on the domestic violence count.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
We note Crim.R. 12(H) permitted appellant to plead no contest on the burglary count and, at the same time, preserve his right to appeal the trial court's decision on his motion to dismiss the burglary count. Crim.R. 12(H) provides:
"The plea of no contest does not preclude a defendant from asserting upon appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in ruling on a pretrial motion, including a pretrial motion to suppress evidence." Appellant's no contest plea admitted the facts stated in the indictment. 1 Appellant's motion to dismiss, however, did not contest the truth of those facts, but rather stated that R.C. 3103.04 gave him a privilege to enter the home of his wife.
I
In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by ruling that a spouse can be found guilty of burglary committed at the other spouse's residence. In particular, appellant argues the crime of burglary includes the element of trespass, 2 and argues R.C. 3103.04 states one spouse cannot be excluded from the other spouse's dwelling. We agree with appellant.
R.C. 3103.04 provides in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Herder (1979), 65 Ohio App.2d 70, 19 O.O.3d 47, 415 N.E.2d 1000, the court held that the R.C. 3103.04 ban against exclusion of one spouse from the dwelling of the other spouse prevents a finding of criminal trespass against the first spouse. The court wrote:
"In light of the clear policy expression set forth in R.C. 3103.04, one spouse cannot be criminally liable for trespass in the dwelling of the other. * * * " Emphasis added.) Id., 65 Ohio App.2d at 75-76, 19 O.O.3d at 50-51, 415 N.E.2d at 1003-1004. In State v. Herrin (1982), 6 Ohio App.3d 68, 6 OBR 535, 453 N.E.2d 1104, the court followed Herder, but found it and R.C. 3103.04 inapplicable. The Herrin court noted that a court order restricted Herrin from entering his wife's dwelling. The R.C. 3103.04 privilege does not apply where a court order restricts the access of one spouse to the dwelling...
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O'Neal v. Bagley
...categorically held “ ‘one spouse cannot be criminally liable for trespass in the dwelling of the other.’ ” State v. Middleton, 85 Ohio App.3d 403, 619 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (1993) (quoting State v. Herder, 65 Ohio App.2d 70, 415 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (1979)). Both invoked the unqualified nature of ......
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O'Neal v. Bagley
...categorically held “ ‘one spouse cannot be criminally liable for trespass in the dwelling of the other.’ ” State v. Middleton, 85 Ohio App.3d 403, 619 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (1993) (quoting State v. Herder, 65 Ohio App.2d 70, 415 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (1979)). Both invoked the unqualified nature of ......
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... ... 3103.04 was intended to address property ownership rights of married persons, matters of a civil nature. Privileges of a husband and wife with respect to the property of the other were not meant to be enforced criminally and do not affect criminal liabilities. See State v. Middleton (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 403, 406, 619 N.E.2d 1113, 1115. Because we find that the General Assembly never intended for R.C. 3103.04 to apply in criminal contexts, we must turn to the Criminal Code to address this issue ... The crime of burglary, with which defendant was charged, ... ...
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