State v. Mikels

• Decision Date: 05 April 1938
• Docket Number: 44162.
• Citation: 278 N.W. 924,224 Iowa 1121
• Parties: STATE v. MIKELS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

278 N.W. 924

224 Iowa 1121

STATE v. MIKELS.

No. 44162.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 5, 1938

Appeal from District Court, Appanoose County; George W. Dashiell Judge.

Defendant by indictment was accused of the crime of arson. From a judgment of conviction, he has appealed.

Reversed.

T. A Goodson, of Bloomfield, and Simmons & Johnston, of Centerville, for appellant.

John Mitchell, Atty. Gen., Buell McCash, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and E. P. Powers, Co. Atty., of Centerville, for the State.

RICHARDS Justice.

The indictment accused defendant of arson committed as follows " The said Sigle Mikels on or about the 11th day of September, A. D. 1936, in the County of Appanoose and State of Iowa, wilfully and maliciously burned the barn of F. C. Edwards, contrary to the provisions of Section 12991-b2 of the Code of Iowa 1935." Defendant entered a plea of not guilty. There was a trial and a verdict returned finding defendant guilty as charged. From the judgment rendered thereon defendant has appealed.

One of the instructions requested by defendant was the following: " No. 1. You are instructed that in this case the state relies wholly upon circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a series of other facts than the fact in issue which, by experience, have been found so associated with that fact that, in relation of cause and effect, they lead to a certain and satisfactory conclusion; such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences, establishing a connection between the known and proved facts and the fact sought to be proved."

The giving of this instruction was refused, and the following quoted instruction No. 7 1/2 was given relative to the subject matter of the requested instruction:

" The facts essential to establish and prove the guilt of the defendant, or any of such facts, may be shown by either direct or circumstantial evidence.

Direct evidence is testimony and evidence of witnesses who have seen or heard the things or facts about which they testify.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence of collateral facts and circumstances upon the proof of which the main fact sought to be established may be inferred.

To warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, each fact in the chain of circumstances necessary to be established to prove the guilt of the accused must be proven by competent evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt, and all the facts and circumstances necessary to prove guilt must be connected with each other, and with the main fact sought to be proved; and all the circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature, leading to a satisfactory conclusion, and producing a moral certainty that the crime charged was committed, and that the party charged committed it. In such case, circumstantial evidence may be as satisfactory as direct evidence in the proof of the crime charged, and against the person charged."

" But if the facts and circumstances proven can be reconciled upon the theory of innocence, as well as upon the theory of guilt, then the person charged is entitled to have the construction placed upon them favorable to his innocence. It is not sufficient that the facts and circumstances coincide with, or render probable, the guilt of the defendant, but they must exclude any other reasonable hypothesis."

Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to give said requested instruction No. 1, because, says defendant, the evidence introduced being entirely circumstantial, the defendant was entitled to an instruction so advising the jury. Defendant also assigns as additional error the giving of instruction 7 1/2, because (a) the reference therein to direct evidence led the jury to believe that the state's evidence was not entirely circumstantial, and (b) under the court's definition of direct evidence all the testimony offered would be considered by the jury as direct evidence.

One of the instructions given the jury was, in effect, that the essential elements of the indictment were: (1) That on or about September 11, 1936, in Appanoose county, Iowa, a barn belonging to F. C. Edwards was willfully and maliciously burned; and (2) that said barn was burned by defendant. The evidence introduced to establish these essential elements as laid down in the instructions may be summarized as follows Testimony that at about 8:45 or 9 o'clock p. m. on the date mentioned a barn on the farm of F. C. Edwards was consumed by fire; testimony of witnesses that, some hours after discovery of the fire and also during the early hours of the following morning, they saw shoe tracks near the barn and at intermediate points between the barn and defendant's place of residence located 1 1/4 miles from the barn; testimony that defendant's shoes fitted into these tracks and that the tracks indicated that the person making them turned outward the forward end of the shoes, and testimony that such was defendant's manner of walking; testimony of a witness that a short time before the fire was discovered he saw in the darkness a person about 40 feet from the barn, a flash of lightning enabling the witness to see this man though the flash did not enable the witness to tell anything about the man's face; that following the flash it was dark; the witness testified the man so seen was defendant. This witness testified that he had no communication or contact with the man he claims he saw and that he returned to the house and went to bed, without further attention to this man and...