State v. Miles
| Decision Date | 30 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. SC95490.,SC95490. |
| Citation | 775 So.2d 950 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Michael Randy MILES, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner.
Barry W. Beroset and Ross A. Keene of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola, Florida, for Respondent.
We have for review State v. Miles, 732 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), wherein the court certified the following question to be of great public importance:
WHERE THE STATE LAYS THE THREE-PRONGED PREDICATE FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN ROBERTSON V. STATE, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla.1992), THEREBY ESTABLISHING THE SCIENTIFIC RELIABILITY OF THE BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS, IS THE STATE ENTITLED TO THE LEGISLATIVELY CREATED PRESUMPTIONS OF IMPAIRMENT?
Id. at 353. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the negative.
Miles was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in the death of a passenger of another vehicle. Without Miles' consent, the law enforcement officers at the scene required him to submit to a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1995). He was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol/manslaughter (DUI/manslaughter), vehicular homicide, DUI causing personal injury, and DUI causing property damage. Miles filed a motion to suppress or in the alternative a motion in limine to exclude the blood alcohol test results based on the alleged insufficiency of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) regulations governing the testing of his blood sample. Miles claimed that rule 11D-8.012 of the Florida Administrative Code did not adequately provide for the proper preservation of blood samples drawn pursuant to the implied consent law.
On August 20 and 26, 1997, the trial court held hearings on the issue of the inadequacy of rule 11D-8.012 as it relates to preservation of samples. During the hearings it was established without dispute that the blood alcohol content of a blood sample may be affected by the sample's exposure to heat or by the presence of certain bacteria in the sample. Thus, the evidence presented established that a sample should be kept refrigerated. An FDLE expert testified that it was not necessary to provide guidelines on this issue because handling procedures were universally known and followed. However, a defense expert disagreed, and pointed out that the present rule fails to provide for proper preservation, does not even require the use of a preservative, and simply mentions the need for an anticoagulant without specifying the necessary amount. The court denied the motion to suppress, but ruled that because of the statute's failure to provide for preservation and the deficiency of the rule in protecting the integrity of the process, the State would not be entitled to the presumption of impairment provided for pursuant to section 316.1934(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995).1 The court recognized that section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), authorizes that the FDLE approve "satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the department." The court noted that the statute provides that testing of blood samples must be done according to methods approved by the FDLE and by an individual possessing the necessary permit. However, the court found the FDLE rule fails to provide for the collection, storage, or transportation of samples drawn pursuant to the statute. In its ruling, the trial court focused on the undisputed importance of the process of maintaining the sample in the condition necessary to ensure a reliable analysis and reading of the blood alcohol content of a sample. Given that the preservation, storage, and transit of a sample between the draw date and the date of analysis is critical to establishing a reliable analysis, the court concluded that the rule does not comply with the core policies of the statute as stated in State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla.1980).
On appeal, the First District affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the inadequacy of the rule to provide for the preservation of the sample. See Miles, 732 So.2d at 353
. However, the First District held that the legislatively created presumptions will be applicable upon admissibility of the sample according to the dictates of Robertson, and thus certified the aforementioned question. See id.
To address the problem of drunk driving on Florida roads, the Legislature enacted what is known as the implied consent law. See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla. Stat. (1995). The implied consent law provides, inter alia, that one who operates a motor vehicle in the State of Florida is deemed to have consented to submit to the appropriate test to determine blood alcohol content, upon his or her arrest for an offense allegedly committed while driving under the influence of alcohol or a prohibited substance. See id. Furthermore, under the statutory scheme for driving under the influence, the State is entitled to certain presumptions of impairment upon the establishment of a given alcoholic blood content of the defendant. See § 316.1934(2), Fla. Stat. (1995).2 The Legislature delegated to the FDLE the task of formulating and approving the process in which a person's blood is analyzed in determining its alcoholic content. Hence, section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides:
A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose. The Department of Law Enforcement may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the department. Any insubstantial differences between approved methods or techniques and actual testing procedures, or any insubstantial defects concerning the permit issued by the department, in any individual case, shall not render the test or test results invalid.
Id.; cf. § 316.1932(1)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1995) ().
The constitutionality of the implied consent law and the associated presumptions were comprehensively addressed by this Court in State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla.1980). In Bender, four defendants who were issued traffic citations filed motions challenging the constitutionality of the implied consent law and seeking to suppress the results of blood tests. See id. at 698. The trial court agreed and ruled that the delegation of authority by the Legislature to the responsible state agencies, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV), was unconstitutional in that it did not provide sufficient guidelines and standards. See id. Additionally, the trial court ruled the defendants' due process and equal protection rights were violated because the agencies failed to "incorporate the procedures and methods of the manufacturers [of the testing equipment] for the maintenance and operation of the breathalyzers." Id.
However, upon review, this Court found the pertinent sections of the implied consent law delegating the approval of testing methods to executive agencies to be constitutional. See id. We held that the failure of the administrative agency to attach to the rule and file with the Secretary of State the manufacturers' procedures for maintenance and operation did not violate due process where the rules were in fact in accordance with the manufacturers' procedures. See Bender, 382 So.2d at 700
. Although we found the delegation of authority to enact rules constitutional, we did not address the adequacy of the administrative rules in Bender. Nevertheless, we noted the underlying purpose of the implied consent law:
The purpose of those portions of sections 322.261 and 322.262[3] which direct law enforcement to use only approved techniques and methods is to ensure reliable scientific evidence for use in future court proceedings and to protect the health of those persons being tested, who by this statute have given their implied consent to these tests.
Id. at 699 (emphasis added). We concluded that compliance with the statutory mandate for reliable procedures and administrative rules is essential. See id. Accordingly, we held that "[n]one of the statutory presumptions can apply in the absence of compliance with the administrative rules." Id. at 700. In essence, we held that there was a clear trade-off in conditioning the grant of presumptions on the integrity of the testing process.
Initially, we conclude that the First District did not err in approving the finding of the trial court that rule 11D-8.012 does not comply with Bender and therefore may not give rise to the statutory presumptions associated with the implied consent law.4 Pursuant to the legislative mandate of the implied consent law, the FDLE has promulgated a set of rules relating to testing methods, procedures, and issuance of permits to blood alcohol analysts. With regard to the labeling and sampling of blood samples, the FDLE rule provides:
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