State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 08 December 1910
• Citation: 111 P. 1053,61 Wash. 125
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. MILLER.

111 P. 1053

61 Wash. 125

STATE v. MILLER.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 8, 1910

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam Judge.

Peter Miller was convicted of burglary, and he appeals. Reversed.

Joseph M. Glasgow, for appellant.

George F. Vanderveer and Everett C. Ellis, for the State.

DUNBAR J.

The prosecuting attorney of King county filed in the superior court of the state of Washington for said county an information, charging the defendant and one Willis Taylor, an accomplice, with the crime of burglary in the first degree. The defendant was arrested on the 22d day of June, 1909, and this information was not presented until the 10th day of August, 1909. In the meantime he was confined in the jail in the city of Seattle. A plea of not guilty was entered, the case was brought on for trial on the 29th day of October following, and on the 2d day of November the jury returned a verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree. Throughout the trial of this case, the defendant conducted his own defense and appeared as his own counsel. Application for a new trial and motion in arrest of judgment were made and denied, judgment was announced, and appeal followed.

This conviction was obtained largely upon the alleged confessions of appellant and his accomplice, Taylor. At least, the confessions sworn to by the witnesses were an element in the case, and we must assume that such testimony may have been controlling in the minds of the jurors. The admission of this testimony is one of the errors assigned; it being the contention of the appellant, who appears here by counsel that the testimony shows that these confessions were obtained by duress, and were not the character of confession which is specified in the law as the basis of conviction. We think this contention must be sustained. The trial was a long one and evidently exceedingly trying and vexatious to the trial court, who exhibited great patience and liberality towards the appellant throughout the trial. The record conclusively shows that the appellant possessed some little smattering of legal knowledge, and was exceedingly egotistical and vain over its acquirement; but this does not affect the main question of whether the confessions were obtained by cruel treatment, threats, and persuasion. According to the testimony of the appellant, the prosecuting attorney had threatened him with prosecution for divers and sundry crimes which would work cumulative sentences, in addition to other harsh treatment which it was claimed the appellant received at the hands of the prosecuting attorney. It was conceded by the prosecuting attorney that he had visited this appellant more than once at his cell, and once in company with the captain of the detectives and with the prosecuting attorney of Spokane county. All the charges of cruelty were indignantly denied by the prosecuting attorney but, in answer to a question propounded by the appellant if he had had such a talk with him, he did say this: 'Under the laws of this state, you could be charged with all these burglaries, and your sentence would be tacked one on the other. I did tell him that. I suppose that was a sort of an implied threat. Otherwise I never said a word in any threatening manner.' The prosecuting attorney was there for a purpose. The evident purpose was to obtain a confession from this appellant, and we think, under his own admission that the threat which he made, or the implied threat, as he terms it, was sufficient to render the confession made a confession obtained by duress. The appellant was confessedly a bright man and would understand, and it was no doubt intended that he should understand, that these cumulative sentences would follow if he did not confess. This is all that need be said so far as the testimony of the prosecuting attorney is concerned.

The appellant also testified that he was thrown into what he calls the 'dark hole' in the jail; that he was maltreated, beaten with a bludgeon by the captain of the detective force, Tennant, and threatened with the most appalling punishments if he did not confess what he knew about this alleged burglary. The details of this alleged punishment and threats are too horrible and disgusting to set forth here. The only question is as to the truth of the statements made. These allegations of threats and of barbarous treatment were denied by Capt. Tennant; he claiming that he never had struck or abused the appellant, excepting once when the appellant attempted to assault him. Capt. Tennant denied that he had ever put the appellant into the black hole or black cell; but it is conceded that appellant was confined in the black hole, and that he was there with the knowledge of Capt. Tennant. While Tennant probably did not put him there, as naturally he would not, appellant was evidently ordered there by him, or, if not by him, by some one in authority at the jail. It is not alleged or claimed anywhere that it was necessary to put appellant in this iron cell for the purpose of preventing an escape. The whole testimony shows conclusively that it was done for the purpose of extracting a confession from him. The same may be said of the treatment accorded the boy Willis Taylor.

The effect of solitary confinement on the mind of a person charged with crime may be imagined. It is a well-known psychological fact that men and women have frequently confessed to crimes which they did not commit. They have done it sometimes to escape present punishment which had become torture to them; sometimes through other motives; and the object of putting the inmates of this jail in this dark cell in solitary confinement is easily understood. To show the custom prevailing at that jail, many witnesses were...