State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 30 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 20196,20196
• Citation: 266 S.C. 409,223 S.E.2d 774
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Earl J. MILLER et al., of whom Earl J. Miller and Sampson Conway are, Appellants.

Page 774

223 S.E.2d 774

266 S.C. 409

The STATE, Respondent, v. Earl J. MILLER et al., of whom Earl J. Miller and Sampson

Conway are, Appellants.

No. 20196.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 30, 1976.

Palmer Freeman, Jr., Fort Mill, for appellant Sampson Conway.

W. Clarkson McDow, Jr., Rock Hill, for appellant Earl J. Miller.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Joseph R. Barker and Staff Attys. Robert N. Wells, Jr., and Perry M. Buckner, Columbia and Sol. Mike S. Jolly, Union, for respondent.

LEWIS, Chief Justice:

Appellants Earl Miller and Sampson (Samson) Conway, with a codefendant Tommy Miller, were convicted for the armed robbery of the Family Dollar Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina and were each sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five (25) years. Only Earl Miller and Conway have appealed. Three questions are stated as the basis for the appeal, to-wit:

(1) Was reversible error committed by the admission of testimony concerning a statement made by the codefendant, Tommy Lee Miller;

(2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying appellants' motions for a severance; and

(3) Was it error to permit into evidence a shotgun found in the automobile occupied by appellants at the time of their arrest?

Appellants were indicted and jointly tried with the codefendant Tommy Miller. Neither the appellants nor their codefendant testified or offered testimony in their behalf. During the trial a detective was permitted to testify, over objection, concerning alleged admissions made by the codefendant Tommy Miller in which appellants were implicated. The trial judge subsequently instructed the jury that the alleged statement of the codefendant could only be considered against him and not against appellants. Appellants contend that the admission of the out-of-court statement of the codefendant where, as here, the codefendant did not testify, violated their constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them, relying upon the decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476.

In Bruton, it was held that where a confession by a codefendant who did not testify, was admitted in evidence at a joint trial, a defendant was denied his constitutional right of confrontation, even though the jury was instructed that the codefendant's confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. This ruling was based upon the 'substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt.'

Subsequently, however, the United States Supreme Court held, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340, that a violation of the Bruton rule did not automatically require reversal of a conviction. The court, in so holding, recognized that 'in some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error.' Schneble v. Florida, supra, 405 U.S. at 430, 92 S.Ct. at 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d at 344.

In determining whether any admission of the codefendant in this case was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, the probable impact of the admissions on the minds of an average jury must be determined and, 'unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required.' Schneble v. Florida, supra, 405 U.S. at 432, 92 S.Ct. at 1060, 31 L.Ed.2d at 345.

For the purpose of this decision, we assume that the admission of the statement in question constituted a violation of Bruton.

The evidence shows that appellants entered the Family Dollar Store in Rock Hill on January 30, 1975. They were positively identified at trial by the manager of the store and a clerk. These witnesses testified as to the dress of each appellant, one described as wearing a toboggan. The testimony shows that appellants approached the check-out counter with a set or bottle of 'Old Spice' cologne which the manager 'rang up' on the cash register for a price of $2.32. At that point, appellant Conway pointed a pistol at the manager and demanded all of the money...