State v. Miller
| Decision Date | 20 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. COA16-424,COA16-424 |
| Citation | 251 N.C.App. 297,795 S.E.2d 374 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Juan Antonia MILLER, Defendant. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John G. Batherson, for the State.
Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant.
Police ordered Juan Antonia Miller (defendant) out of a vehicle during a traffic stop and searched him, finding a small bag of cocaine in his pocket. The cocaine, defendant argues, was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure and the trial court committed plain error by failing to exclude it from evidence at trial. Upon plain error review, we hold that (1) the officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop; (2) assuming the seizure was lawful, defendant's consent was not valid; and (3) admitting the evidence at trial prejudiced defendant and seriously affects the integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
On the evening of 18 March 2014, Officer H.B. Harris was patrolling "problem areas" with the Vice and Tactical Narcotics Team of the Greensboro Police Department. He observed a vehicle turn left from Darden Road onto Holden Road and position itself in front of his unmarked patrol car. Officer Harris followed the car to Interstate 85 and decided to run its license plate through the DMV database. The search indicated that a "hold" had been placed on the tag because the owner had not paid the insurance premiums.
Officer Harris, who was wearing a body-mounted camera, pulled the vehicle over and approached the passenger-side window. The owner of the vehicle, Derick Sutton, was in the passenger's seat; defendant was in the driver's seat. Officer Harris asked defendant for his driver's license before informing the two occupants that he had stopped them for speeding and a potential tag violation. When he learned that Sutton was the registered owner of the vehicle, Officer Harris inquired about the status of his insurance. Sutton handed Officer Harris an insurance card to show that he had recently purchased car insurance. At Officer Harris's request, Sutton also produced his driver's license and told the officer that they were "coming from a friend's house on Randleman Road." Officer Harris testified that this "piqued his interest" because he "knew ... they did not get on the interstate from Randleman Road, and Holden Road is a little distance away from Randleman Road." He then ordered Sutton to step out of the vehicle.
As Sutton complied, Officer Harris asked Sutton if he had any weapons or drugs on him. Sutton said he did not, and was then motioned to stand with another officer who had arrived on the scene. Officer Harris proceeded toward the driver's side and asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. As defendant complied, Officer Harris asked defendant if he had any weapons or drugs on him. Defendant also said he did not. According to Officer Harris's testimony, he then asked defendant, "Do you mind if I check?" to which defendant responded, "No," and placed his hands on the trunk of the vehicle. Officer Harris searched defendant and found a plastic corner-bag of cocaine in his left pocket.
The footage from the body camera was published to the jury at trial and, at the jury's request, once more during deliberations. Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine and sentenced to an active term of six to seventeen months of imprisonment. He gave notice of appeal in open court.
Defendant argues on appeal that Officer Harris unlawfully extended the traffic stop and evidence of the cocaine should have been excluded as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. Defendant filed no motion to suppress and raised no objection to the evidence at trial but contends on appeal that the admission of the cocaine and Officer Harris's testimony thereof amounted to plain error. Alternatively, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress.
The State argues in response that plain error review is not appropriate because the issue is constitutional, rather than evidentiary, and defendant waived any challenge to the lawfulness of the seizure. See State v. Lawrence , 365 N.C. 506, 516, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) ; see also State v. Canty , 224 N.C.App. 514, 516, 736 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2012) , writ of supersedeas and disc. review denied , 366 N.C. 578, 739 S.E.2d 850 (2013). Had defendant raised the issue below, the State suggests, then the trial court would have scrutinized the facts and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop in greater detail. But because defendant remained silent at trial, the record is not sufficiently developed to reach a conclusion on the lawfulness of the seizure.
While we recognize the merit to the State's position,1 this Court has applied plain error review to similar evidentiary challenges involving unpreserved constitutional claims. See, e.g. , State v. Jones , 216 N.C.App. 225, 229–30, 715 S.E.2d 896, 900–01 (2011), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied , 365 N.C. 559, 723 S.E.2d 767 (2012); State v. Mohamed , 205 N.C.App. 470, 474–76, 696 S.E.2d 724, 729–30 (2010). In cases where we have declined to do so, our Supreme Court has remanded for plain error review. See, e.g. , State v. Bean , 227 N.C.App. 335, 336–37, 742 S.E.2d 600, 602, disc. review denied , 367 N.C. 211, 747 S.E.2d 542 (2013). Accordingly, we must examine the evidence that was before the trial court "to determine if it committed plain error by allowing the admission of the challenged [evidence]." Mohamed , 205 N.C.App. at 476, 696 S.E.2d at 730.
Plain error arises when the error is " ‘so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done.’ " State v. Odom , 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill , 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied , 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S.Ct. 381, 74 L.Ed.2d 513 (1982) ).
For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice—that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Lawrence , 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. "A traffic stop is a seizure ‘even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.’ " State v. Styles , 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ). As such, "[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ; see also Rodriguez v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) .
The Supreme Court explained in Rodriguez that "the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted). The stop may last no longer than is necessary to address the infraction. Id. "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Id. (citation omitted).
An officer's mission may include " ‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop.’ " Id. at 1615 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ). The Supreme Court has explicitly approved certain incidental inquiries, including "checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Id. (citations omitted). It has also held that an officer may order occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop to complete the mission safely. See id. . But see State v. Reed , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, ––––, 2016 WL 5030389 (Sept. 20, 2016) (No. COA1633) , temporary stay allowed , ––– N.C. ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2016 WL 5811350 (Oct. 5, 2016) (No. 365A16-1 ). Measures designed to "detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," on the other hand, "lack[ ] the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries" and are not part of the officer's mission. Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1615–16.
Before Rodriguez was decided, we held...
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