State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 15 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 2812,2812
• Citation: 110 Ariz. 597,522 P.2d 23
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William Lavern MILLER, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 23

522 P.2d 23

110 Ariz. 597

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William Lavern MILLER, Appellant.

No. 2812.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

May 15, 1974.

Rehearing Denied June 18, 1974.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Michael C. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

John M. Neis, Pima County Public Defender, Ed P. Bolding, Former Pima County Public Defender, Frederick S. Klein, Lindsay Brew, Asst. Public Defenders, Tuscon, for appellant.

LOCKWOOD, Justice:

Appellant, William L. Miller, appeal from a judgment of guilt for the crime of second degree murder entered by the court sitting without a jury. Appellant was sentenced to the Arizona State Prison for a term of not less than thirty nor more than fifty years.

The relevant facts taken from the record reveal that on Saturday, December 2, 1972, Ann Marie Ivins died as a result of blows to her body. The decedent was the two year old daughter of the woman with whom the appellant lived. On that date the police questioned the appellant who had been taking care of the decedent while her mother was hospitalized. He stated that the decedent had fallen off a swing set. On the following day the appellant related his story a second time. That time the appellant was given his Miranda warnings prior to being questioned and his story was tape recorded.

Appellant was again questioned by officers on December 7, 1972. He was asked to explain the numerous bruises on the body on December 7, 1972. He was asked to the appellant's care. The investigating officers then contacted the County Attorney's Office and the decision to arrest the appellant on an open charge of murder was made. One-half hour later at approximately 2:20 p.m. the appellant was arrested.

Appellant was then taken to the police station in the car of the investigating officers. On the way to the station he was given his Miranda warnings. The trip to the station took approximately fifteen to minutes. After being fingerprinted and photographed at the station, the appellant was interrogated. Approximately one hour later the appellant admitted that he had hit the decedent with his fists. The entire interrogation was secretly monitored and recorded without his knowledge. At 3:45 p.m. the police made a tape recording of his statement with his permission. Prior to taking his statement the police once again advised him of his rights. These warnings appear at the beginning of the taped statement.

In his appeal the appellant challenges the admission of his confession over his objection on the grounds that he had not been properly advised of his rights as required by Miranda. It is his contention that the police should have renewed the Miranda warnings before interrogating him at the station house because of the changes in circumstances between the time he was first arrested and the start of the interrogation.

This court had repeatedly held that once a defendant has been fully and fairly appraised of his rights, there is no requirement that the warnings be repeated each time the questioning is commenced. State v. Dixon, 107 Ariz. 415, 489 P.2d 225 (1971); State v. Quinones, 105 Ariz. 380, 465 P.2d 360 (1970); State v. Jennings, 104 Ariz. 6, 448 P.2d 62 (1968). Here the appellant had been properly advised of his rights on two occasions: first when he was questioned four days before he was arrested, and next on the way to the police station after he was arrested. There is nothing in the record which supports the appellant's claim that the circumstances had changed between the time of arrest and interrogation which would require the renewal of the warnings.

Appellant's next contention is that even if he were properly given the Miranda warnings, the confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted into evidence. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the Supreme Court discussed the criteria by which the voluntariness of a confession should be judged. The Court said:

'In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224; his lack of education, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975; or his low intelligence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895; the length of detention, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, supra; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192; and the use of physical punishent such as the deprivation of food or sleep, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (footnote omitted). In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of...