State v. Mills
Decision Date | 18 April 2000 |
Citation | 57 Conn. App. 356,748 A.2d 891 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | (Conn.App. 2000) STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. DANIEL MILLS (AC 18460) IN THE APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT |
James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Mary Reidy, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Lavery, Spear and Daly, Js.1
OPINION
The defendant, Daniel Mills, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§§§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (4), attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§§§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a) (4), attempt to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§§§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-123 (a) (3) and inciting injury to a person in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-179a. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied (1) his motion to suppress identification testimony that was based on a claimed violation of the defendant's right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and (2) his motion for a new trial that was based on the court's allegedly improper dismissal of a juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On May 10, 1996, the victim, Daniel Penn, was walking home at about 2 a.m. when he was approached by two young men. The young men stood on either side of him, and one of them put a gun to his head and said, "Give me what you got."
Although the lighting was somewhat dim because tree branches obscured the streetlight above, Penn was able to get a good look at both men. Penn described the gunman, who had put on a ski mask as he approached Penn, as being about five feet, eleven inches tall, skinny, and wearing a black jacket, black pants, white sneakers and a mask. The other man, identified later as the defendant, was shorter than Penn, with short hair, light brown skin and a small mustache. This second man was wearing a black leather jacket and brown designer boots.
Penn used the distraction of an oncoming car to flee. As Penn fled, yelling loudly, the gunman dropped to one knee, aimed his weapon at Penn and said, "Why don't we just pop him?" The defendant said twice, "Shoot him." Penn reached his home and the police were contacted.
Joseph Foti, a uniformed officer with the New Haven police department, met Penn and radioed in a description of the two men. Penn and Foti then went to an area where a suspect was being held. Penn viewed the suspect, who was flanked by officers and was brightly illuminated, and concluded that he was definitely not one of the two men, as he was too big, too tall and his boots were different.
Foti drove to another location where a second suspect, the defendant, was being detained. Even before Foti stopped the car, Penn viewed the well-lighted suspect and twice said, "That's him." Penn concluded that it was the shorter assailant because of his brown boots, leather jacket and the peculiar nature of his "squinty" eyes, something that Penn stated he would "never forget." Foti asked Penn if he was absolutely positive it was the same man. Penn stated that he had no doubt that it was the same person, as he remembered the defendant's face and other characteristics. The defendant was arrested as a result of the identification, and a trial commenced on February 18, 1998. In addition to identifying the defendant that night, Penn identified the defendant at trial from a group of seven black men, all dressed similarly to the defendant.
At the end of closing arguments, but before the court had charged the jury, a juror spoke with the court and expressed concern that the lawyers apparently agreed that the contested issue was identification of the defendant. The juror, a psychologist in private practice, had completed his doctoral dissertation some twenty years ago on the effects of misleading information on eyewitness testimony and memory. This information was not revealed to counsel at voir dire.
The court asked the juror if he felt that in reaching a verdict he might draw on his studies or special qualifications in this area. The juror confided that he was unsure whether he could refrain from revealing his specialized knowledge during deliberations. The court expressed concern that the juror's specialized knowledge was beyond that of an ordinary juror and, if discussed in deliberations, might influence the jury as a type of expert testimony not of record. The court then dismissed the juror from service.
The defendant contends that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress Penn's identification of the one-on-one show-up procedure because it violated his fourteenth amendment right to due process.2 We disagree.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Owens, 38 Conn. App. 801, 804, 663 A.2d 1094, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 912, 665 A.2d 609 (1995).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Austin, 244 Conn. 226, 246-47, 710 A.2d 732 (1998).
A one-on-one show-up does place upon the identification process an inherent level of suggestiveness and susceptibility to misidentification. State v. Middleton, 170 Conn. 601, 607-608, 368 A.2d 66 (1976). Show-ups, however, and procedures like them "tend under some circumstances to ensure accurate identifications and the benefit of promptness not only aids reliability but permits a quick release of an innocent party if there is no positive identification, allowing the police to resume the investigation with only a minimum of delay." State v. Sims, 12 Conn. App. 239, 242, 530 A.2d 1069, cert. denied, 206 Conn. 801, 535 A.2d 1315 (1987). The show-up identification used here involved the defendant standing with police on either side of him, with streetlights and car lights illuminating him. This scenario does retain an element of suggestiveness, but is not in itself so unduly suggestive such that it was improper. See State v. Wooten, supra, 227 Conn. 686 ( ); compare State v. Askew, 55 Conn. App. 34, 40 and n.5, 739 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 918, 740 A.2d 866 (1999).
Furthermore, the identification was reliable on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Reddick, 224 Conn. 445, 465, 619 A.2d 453 (1993) ( ). The reliability of an identification procedure is considered under various factors, such as (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680, 683-84, 504 A.2d 1372 (1986).
In the present case, Penn had ample opportunity to view the defendant. Although the light available was dim, Penn was able to see the defendant clearly from very close range. See, e.g., State v. Small, 1 Conn. App. 584, 588-89, 474 A.2d 460 (1984) ( ). Shortly after the incident, Penn provided an accurate description of the defendant to the police before any identification took place. As Foti recalled, Penn described "a light skinned black male, approximately five [feet], seven [inches], wearing a black jacket, blue jeans and light brown boots." This information was articulated, as perceived by the officer, "very...
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