State v. Mills
| Decision Date | 25 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 33340.,33340. |
| Citation | 221 W.Va. 283,654 S.E.2d 605 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Appellee, v. William MILLS, Jr., Appellant. |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "An appellate court . . . should interfere with a trial court's discretionary ruling on a juror's qualification to serve because of bias only when it is left with a clear and definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable faithfully and impartially to apply the law." Syllabus point 6, in part, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996).
2. Syllabus point 4, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996).
3. "Actual bias can be shown either by a juror's own admission of bias or by proof of specific facts which show the juror has such prejudice or connection with the parties at trial that bias is presumed." Syllabus point 5, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996).
4. Syllabus point 6, in part, State v. Beckett, 172 W.Va. 817, 310 S.E.2d 883 (1983).
E. Taylor George, Kanawha County Public Defender Office, Charleston, WV, for appellant.
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, R. Christopher Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for appellee.
This is a criminal appeal by William Mills, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Mills") from an order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County convicting and sentencing him for the crime of delivery of a controlled substance.1 In this appeal, Mr. Mills contends that the circuit court committed error in refusing to strike a prospective juror for cause. After careful consideration of the briefs, record and oral arguments, we affirm.
On October 27, 2005, two Kanawha County Metro Drug Unit2 police officers were conducting an undercover drug operation in Charleston, West Virginia. The two officers involved, C.A. Greene and J.J. Dotson, were driving an unmarked car on the West Side when they were flagged down by a man in a wheelchair. After the officers stopped their unmarked car, the man in the wheelchair informed them that another man, Mr. Mills, wanted to see them. Mr. Mills, who was sitting on a nearby porch, walked to the car and asked the officers what they wanted. Officer Greene responded that they were looking for a "twenty," which is street slang for $20 worth of crack cocaine. After Officer Greene showed Mr. Mills a marked $20 bill,3 Mr. Mills produced a bag of crack cocaine. Mr. Mills gave the crack cocaine to Officer Greene, who in turn gave Mr. Mills the $20 bill.
Once the drug purchase was made, Officer Dotson drove about fifty yards and stopped the car. Thereafter, the officers contacted police surveillance units that were in the area and gave a description and location of Mr. Mills. Within minutes of being contacted, the police surveillance officers apprehended Mr. Mills.
After Mr. Mills' arrest, a grand jury indicted him on one count of delivering a controlled substance. A one-day jury trial was held on August 7, 2006. During the jury selection, Mr. Mills moved the trial court to strike a juror, Theodore Douglas, for cause. The trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. This appeal followed.
In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether the trial court committed error in refusing to strike a prospective juror for cause. This Court "review[s] the trial court's decision on [striking a juror] under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Wade, 200 W.Va. 637, 654, 490 S.E.2d 724, 741 (1997). See also State v. Hulbert, 209 W.Va. 217, 220, 544 S.E.2d 919, 922 (2001) (). We have also held that "[a]n appellate court . . . should interfere with a trial court's discretionary ruling on a juror's qualification to serve because of bias only when it is left with a clear and definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable faithfully and impartially to apply the law." Syl. pt. 6, in part, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996). Finally, "the defendant bears the burden of showing that [a] prospective juror[ ][was] actually biased or otherwise disqualified and that the trial court abused its discretion or committed manifest error when it failed to excuse [the juror] for cause." State v. Phillips, 194 W.Va. 569, 589-90, 461 S.E.2d 75, 95-96 (1995).
The only issue presented by this appeal involves Mr. Mills' assertion that the trial court should have struck a prospective juror for cause. We have long held that:
The right to a trial by an impartial, objective jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution. A meaningful and effective voir dire of the jury panel is necessary to effectuate that fundamental right.
Syl. pt. 4, State v. Peacher, 167 W.Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981). Our cases have indicated that:
The relevant test for determining whether a juror is biased is whether the juror had such a fixed opinion that he or she could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. Even though a juror swears that he or she could set aside any opinion he or she might hold and decide the case on the evidence, a juror's protestation of impartiality should not be credited if the other facts in the record indicate to the contrary.
Syl. pt. 4, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996). We have also pointed out that "[a]ctual bias can be shown either by a juror's own admission of bias or by proof of specific facts which show the juror has such prejudice or connection with the parties at trial that bias is presumed." Syl. pt. 5, Miller, id.
Mr. Mills contends that the juror in question, Theodore Douglas, should have been struck for cause on the grounds that: (1) Mr. Douglas was employed as a medic for the Kanawha County Emergency Medical Services and, as such, regularly came in contact with police officers and (2) Mr. Douglas and a potential witness for the State, police officer D. Armstrong, both worked as volunteer firefighters with the Pinch Volunteer Fire Department. During jury voir dire, the following exchange occurred between Mr. Douglas, the trial judge and defense counsel:
The Court: Alright, this gentleman back there, you are?
Juror Douglas: Theodore Douglas. I know Van [sic] Armstrong.
The Court: And how do you know him?
Juror Douglas: I'm on the Fire Department of Pinch with him.
The Court: Is that going to have any impact on your ability to be fair and impartial?
Juror Douglas: No, sir.
The Court: Are you going to be able to judge his testimony the same as any other witness who testifies?
Juror Douglas: Yes sir.
Juror Douglas: Yes.
Defense Counsel: And you are a fire fighter at Pinch.
Juror Douglas: The Pinch Volunteer Fire Department.
Defense Counsel: And you work as an EMS for?
Juror Douglas: Kanawha County, and I work in Clendenin.
Defense Counsel: How long have you been involved as an EMS?
Juror Douglas: About a year and a half.
Defense Counsel: Are the police involved in a majority of your calls?
Juror Douglas: About every one of them, yes.
Defense Counsel: And do you feel that you have a relationship with law enforcement?
Juror Douglas: I don't know.
Juror Douglas: No.
Defense Counsel: I don't think I have any further questions.
At the conclusion of questioning Mr. Douglas, defense counsel moved to strike him for cause. In denying the motion, the trial court stated that Mr. Douglas "was absolutely crystal clear in all of his answers that he would be fair and impartial and would not be swayed[.]" Defense counsel subsequently used a peremptory strike to remove Mr. Douglas from the jury panel.4
Mr. Mills does not contend that Mr. Douglas was disqualified on common law5 or statutory grounds.6 However, Mr. Mills contends that several of our cases support finding that Mr. Douglas was disqualified. One of the cases relied upon by Mr. Mills is our decision in State v. Beckett, 172 W.Va. 817, 310 S.E.2d 883 (1983). In Syllabus point 6 of Beckett we held, in part, as follows:
A prospective juror's . . . social relationship with an employee of a law enforcement agency does not operate as a per se disqualification for cause in a criminal case unless the law enforcement official is actively involved in the prosecution of the case. After establishing that such a relationship exists, a party has a right to obtain individual voir dire of the challenged juror to determine possible prejudice or bias arising from...
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...no indication from the record that Juror Selbe and the prosecutor were more than mere acquaintances. In the recent case of State v. Mills, 654 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va.2007), the question was whether a juror should have been struck for cause on the ground, inter alia, that a juror and a police offi......