State v. Milne
| Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | SCWC-19-0000594 |
| Citation | 489 P.3d 433,149 Hawai‘i 329 |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Noguchi MILNE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee. |
William H. Jameson, Jr., for petitioner
Chad M. Kumagai (on the briefs), for respondent
In Count 1 of a complaint filed in the Family Court of the First Circuit ("family court"), the State of Hawai‘i ("the State") charged Noguchi Milne ("Milne") with abuse of family or household member, in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 709-906(1) and (5) (2014), against Complaining Witness 1 ("CW1").1 Count 2 charged Milne with third degree assault in violation of HRS § 707-712(1)(a) (2014) against Complaining Witness 2 ("CW2").2
The family court granted Milne's oral motion to dismiss Count 2, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that count. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") concluded the family court erred in dismissing Count 2 because the family court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the charge based on HRS § 571-14(b) (2014). The ICA ordered that Count 2 be remanded to the family court for further proceedings consistent with its memorandum opinion.
On certiorari, Milne concedes that the family court had concurrent jurisdiction over Count 2. Milne argues, however, that the family court did not dismiss Count 2 based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He maintains the family court had discretion to decline the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction over Count 2.
For the reasons explained below, we hold as follows: (1) the ICA was correct in ruling that the family court dismissed Count 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and erred by doing so, as HRS § 571-14(b) provided the family court with concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over Count 2; and (2) the family court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction over Count 2 despite the dismissal of Count 1 with prejudice, and it is for the family court to address Count 2 on remand.
A. Factual and procedural background
On June 18, 2019, Milne was charged in the family court via complaint for events allegedly occurring on June 16, 2019, as follows: (1) Count 1, with respect to CW1, his girlfriend, abuse of family or household members in violation of HRS § 709-906(1) and (5) ; and (2) Count 2, with respect to CW2, CW1's father, third degree assault in violation of HRS § 707-712(1)(a).
At a trial call on July 22, 2019, the State requested a continuance because the complaining witnesses were not present despite being subpoenaed. The family court3 orally granted the continuance over Milne's objection. Milne then orally moved to dismiss Count 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because although CW1 was Milne's girlfriend, CW2, CW1's father, did not live or reside in the same household as Milne. The State requested that the defense submit a written motion so it could appropriately respond, but the family court asked the State to "take a look at 571-14":
The family court then orally granted Milne's motion, stating:
THE COURT: All right. The court reads 571-14 as permissive and not mandatory as to section (b), and because the complaining witness in Count 2 is not a family or household member to Mr. Milne, the court is, based on the representations of counsel, going to be dismissing Count 2 without prejudice and the State would be free to refile Count 2 in District Court as to that complaining witness. All right?
The family court filed its written order dismissing Count 2 on July 26, 2019 ("dismissal order"), which stated in relevant part:
The State appealed the Count 2 dismissal order to the ICA on August 23, 2019. At a September 16, 2019 trial call, CW1 and two other civilian witnesses, who were subpoenaed, failed to appear in court. The State orally requested another continuance. Milne objected and orally moved to dismiss Count 1 with prejudice. The family court5 denied the request for a continuance and granted Milne's oral motion to dismiss Count 1 with prejudice.
Then, on November 22, 2019, the family court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law ("11/22/19 FOFs/COLs"). In its 11/22/19 FOFs/COLs, the family court maintained that even if it had jurisdiction over Count 2, the dismissal of Count 1 with prejudice rendered the State's appeal moot. It also opined that even if the State's appeal was successful, Count 2 should no longer be prosecuted in the family court, as it was not coupled with an offense over which the family court had exclusive, original jurisdiction. The family court also posited that the State's only option going forward was to proceed with Count 2 in the district court, as it had ordered in the dismissal order. It also maintained that any other outcome "would lead to the tortuous result of the Family Court being forced to proceed to trial on a single charge (Assault 3) over which it does not have exclusive, original jurisdiction – and between two parties who are not family or household members." The family court contended that the State's ongoing practice of using HRS § 571-14(b) to "bootstrap" additional cases involving non-family members threatened to transform the family court from a court of limited jurisdiction into one of general jurisdiction.6
On appeal to the ICA, in summary, the State argued that the family court erred as a matter of law by dismissing Count 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response, Milne conceded the family court had concurrent jurisdiction over Count 2, but also asserted it was only as long as Count 1 was pending. Milne also contended the family court's decision to decline jurisdiction should be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, citing to NB v. GA, 133 Hawai‘i 436, 329 P.3d 341 (App. 2014).7 Milne asserted the family court had actually properly exercised its discretion to dismiss Count 2.
In its October 30, 2020 amended memorandum opinion, the ICA vacated the dismissal order, holding the family court erred by dismissing Count 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Milne, mem. op. at 6, 8. The ICA noted Milne now appropriately conceded on appeal that the family court "had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over Count 2 as long as Count 1 was pending." Milne, mem. op. at 5. The ICA explained that under the plain language of HRS § 571-14(b), the family court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over violations of specific offenses, including HRS § 707-712 (third degree assault), when multiple offenses are charged in a complaint or indictment and at least one offense is, inter alia, a violation of HRS § 709-906 (). Id. The ICA reasoned that even if there was an ambiguity as to whether HRS § 571-14(b) limits charges of multiple offenses to the same complaining witness, its legislative history reflected otherwise. Id.; see Milne, mem. op. at 5-6 ; S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2649, in 1998 Senate Journal, at 1071 ( ). The ICA stated Act 64 of 1998, which added subsection (b) to HRS § 571-14, also showed the legislature intended to provide for concurrent jurisdiction, even when the multiple charged offenses involved different complaining witnesses. Milne, mem. op. at 5-6.8
The ICA noted Milne made speculative arguments on appeal as to why the family court allegedly decided not to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction, based on his assertion of different scenarios that could occur and...
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... ... THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN N.A. WATANABE, Judge of the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit, State of Hawai'i, Respondent Judge, and LORRAINE MULL, as Trustee of the Lorraine S. Mull Revocable Trust; and FRANCES R. WHITE, as Co-Trustee of the ... 2, 2022 hearing, does not require the production of work ... product. See State v. Milne, 149 Hawai'i 329, ... 335, 489 P.3d 433, 439 (2021) ("[A] judge's written ... order generally controls over its oral statements.") ... ...