State v. Minear, 2010–P–0025.

• Decision Date: 30 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2010–P–0025.,2010–P–0025.
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,v.MINEAR, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

191 Ohio App.3d 774

947 N.E.2d 751

2010 -Ohio- 6577

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,

v.MINEAR, Appellee.

No. 2010–P–0025.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Portage County.

Decided Dec. 30, 2010.

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.Timothy J. Hart, Kent, for appellee.CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, Judge.

[Ohio App.3d 776] {¶ 1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, granting appellee Jeffrey B. Minear's motion to suppress. At issue is whether such exigent circumstances existed that the police were authorized to enter his home without a search warrant. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

{¶ 2} On October 5, 2009, appellee was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), in violation of R.C. 4511.191(A)(1)(a) and (h); speeding, in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A); and failure to stop after an accident, in violation of R.C. 4549.02. The charges arose from a hit-skip crash in [Ohio App.3d 777] which appellee rear-ended another vehicle and left the scene before police arrived.

{¶ 3} Appellee pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress evidence. The court subsequently held a suppression hearing. Patrolman Jon Hurley and Sergeant Troy Beaver of the Streetsboro Police Department testified for the state. Appellee did not testify or present any evidence in opposition. The officers' testimony was therefore undisputed.

{¶ 4} Officer Hurley testified that on October 2, 2009, at approximately 4:30 p.m., he was dispatched to the exit ramp off Interstate 480 at Frost Road on a call of a traffic crash.

{¶ 5} On arrival, he spoke to a Mr. Geib, who reported that while he was driving on the exit ramp, a gray Volkswagen struck his vehicle from behind. Geib's vehicle had sustained damage to the right rear bumper as a result of the impact. He said that the driver of the Volkswagen had exited his vehicle and appeared to have been drinking alcohol. He briefly showed Geib his driver's license, but then left the scene before Geib could get the driver's information and before the police arrived. However, Geib took down the driver's license-plate number.

{¶ 6} Geib gave Hurley a description of the driver and his vehicle, and told the officer that the man had said he lived just down the road. Geib also provided the officer with the man's license-plate number. The information provided by dispatch from the license plate, including the description of the vehicle and its registered owner, matched the information provided by Geib. The other driver was identified as appellee. His address was listed as the Woodland Apartments, 833 Frost Road, Apartment 502, which, as appellee had told Geib, was just down the road from the crash scene.

{¶ 7} Hurley proceeded to investigate. He went to appellee's apartment complex to question him concerning his involvement. He also called dispatch and requested that Sergeant Troy Beaver respond to provide assistance.

{¶ 8} Hurley located appellee's Volkswagen in the parking lot. He saw that the front left bumper had sustained damage that was consistent with Geib's report. Appellee's vehicle had sustained damage that was more serious than that sustained by Geib's vehicle. Hurley said that he believed appellee's vehicle had sustained a greater impact, increasing the likelihood that he had been injured in the crash.

{¶ 9} Sergeant Beaver testified that he met Hurley in the parking lot. Hurley advised him of the status of the investigation and pointed out the damage to appellee's vehicle. The officers then approached appellee's apartment and knocked on the door. They knocked and pounded for several minutes with no [Ohio App.3d 778] response. Beaver testified that they were concerned that something might have been wrong with appellee because the crash had just occurred, and although they believed he was in his apartment, he was not answering the door. As a result, Beaver asked dispatch to call the manager and ask him to respond so they could check on appellee's welfare.

{¶ 10} Hurley testified that he then began to knock on the windows on both sides of the front door. As he was knocking on the left window, he saw a male body lying motionless, face down, inside the apartment between the living room and the hallway. While they were pounding on the windows, the body did not move. Hurley could not tell whether the man was unconscious or injured. The officers had knocked on the door and windows for ten minutes before Hurley saw the body.

{¶ 11} Hurley said to Beaver, “There's a body there. * * * They're not * * * moving. We need to get in.” Hurley said that as soon as he saw the body lying on the floor, he told Beaver about it, called the information in to dispatch; and requested that emergency medical personnel be dispatched to the scene.

{¶ 12} Beaver testified that he saw the lower half of a body lying face down in the living room. He said there was no indication that the man was simply asleep. He said, “[T]he person was unresponsive * * *. We knocked loud enough and long enough and hard enough where a person simply sleeping would have been alert, and clearly they were lying face down and, in my opinion, in duress and in need of attention * * *.”

{¶ 13} Although the manager had not yet arrived at the scene, Beaver told Hurley to knock down the door, and he did so. Hurley said the officers then entered the apartment to check on the man's welfare. They tried to get a response from him by saying, “Hey, hey man,” grabbing his shoulder and leg, and shaking him. Finally, after about one minute, the man, later identified as appellee, awoke. He appeared intoxicated. A strong odor of alcohol emanated from his person. His speech was slurred. He had bloodshot eyes. He had urinated on himself.

{¶ 14} Appellee kept saying, “What are you doing in my house?” The officers said that his car had been involved in a crash, he was not answering the door, and they were here to check on him. Appellee said that he had not been involved in a crash. A few minutes later, emergency medical personnel arrived. The paramedics walked appellee to the couch. He was unsteady and stumbling. Appellee's subsequent breathalyzer-test result was .222, nearly three times the legal limit.

{¶ 15} Following the hearing, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to suppress. In support of its ruling, the trial court made the following finding: [Ohio App.3d 779] “The Court on these circumstances and facts finds no exigent facts or circumstances that would justify such an entry. There was no evidence of injury or emergency which would be necessary to protect an injured occupant.” The state appeals the trial court's ruling, asserting the following for its sole assignment of error:

{¶ 16} “A de novo review of the law on exigent circumstances and the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement using factual findings that are supported by competent and credible evidence in the record demonstrates that the trial court erroneously granted Minear's motion to suppress.”

{¶ 17} The state argues that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to suppress because the evidence supported a finding of exigent circumstances, making a search warrant unnecessary, based on the officers' reasonable belief that a man inside appellee's apartment was in need of emergency aid.

{¶ 18} “On review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court determines whether the trial court's findings are supported by some competent, credible evidence.” Bainbridge v. Kaseda, 11th Dist. No. 2007–G–2797, 2008-Ohio-2136, 2008 WL 1934491, at ¶ 20. When the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent, credible evidence, the appellate court is required to accept the trial court's factual findings as true. Id. The reviewing court then determines, without deference to the trial court, whether the applicable legal standard has been met. Id .; State v. Jackson, 11th Dist. No. 2003–A–2005, 2004-Ohio-2920, 2004 WL 1238392, at ¶ 12.

{¶ 19} Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual findings only if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1. We review determinations of facts only for clear error. State v. Gillard (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 552, 679 N.E.2d 276. “ ‘A finding is “clearly erroneous” when * * * the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” State v. Prigmore, 5th Dist. No. 2005–CA–00115, 2005-Ohio-6952, 2005 WL 3547949, at ¶ 15, quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948), 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746.

{¶ 20} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution require police to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause prior to conducting a search unless the search falls within an exception to this requirement. Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; see also State v. Totten (Feb. 15, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 00AP–535, 2001 WL 125153.

{¶ 21} “Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,’ [Ohio App.3d 780] Agnello v. Untied States [(1925)], 269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, for the Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer * * * be interposed between the citizen and the police * * *.’ Wong Sun v. United States [(1963)], 371 U.S. 471, 481–482, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ United States v. Jeffers [(1951)], 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59, and that searches...