State v. Mines.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1893 |
| Parties | State v. Mines. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Section 20, c. 35, Code 1808 abolished the common-law rule, that no time runs against the State, and made the State's right subject to statutes of limitations the same as individual rights.
The clause in section 19, c. 55, Acts 1875, ''there shall be no limitation to proceedings on judgments on behalf of the State or any claim due the State, did not wholly repeal section 20, c. 35, Code 1868, but only limited its operation by taking out of it judgments and money claims of the state; and when said clause was itself repealed by Act March 12, 1881, c. 13, such judgments and claims were again brought under section 20, c. 35, and made subject to statutes of limitations.
A subsequent statute revising the whole subject-matter of a former one and evidently intended as a substitute for it, though it contains no express words to that effect, must on principles of law as well as in reason and common sense operate a repeal of the former law. Herron v. Carson, 26 W. Va. 62.
When a statute, which repealed a common-law rule is itself repealed, the common-law rule revives. So by common-law, when a statute, which repealed a former statute, is itself repealed, the former statute revives; but this rule of the common-law is changed by section 10, c. 13, of the Code.-Under that statute repeal by implication is the same as express repeal.
A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to construe them as prospective in operation in every instance, except where the intent that they shall act retrospectively is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, or such intent is necessarily implied from the language of the statute, which would be inoperative otherwise than retrospectively. In doubt, it should he resolved against, rather than in favor of, retrospective operation. Stewart v. Vandervorf, 34 W. Va. 524 (12 S. E. Rep 736.)
Statutes of limitations are no exceptions to the rule that statutes are prima facie to be given only prospective operation.
When a statute is amended and re-enacted with the words, so as to read as follows, or words of like effect, those parts of the re-enactment embraced in the former law are not considered as repealed and re-enacted, but as law all along continuously from their original enactment; but the new parts are considered as law for the first time from the commencement of the amended act.
s. Limitation of Actions Construction of Statutes.
Section 20, c. 35, Code, amended and re-enacted by chapter 18, Acts 1882, is retroactive upon judgments rendered in favor of the state before its re-enactment.
9. Constitutional Law Construction of Statutes.
Section 20, c. 35, Code is not invalid and void because chapter 18, Acts 1882, re-enacting it, is repugnant to the constitution, (article VI. § 30.
10. Constitutional Law.
When the principal object of an act of the legislature is expressed in the title, and the act embraces, along with such princi-
\ pal object other incidental or auxiliary objects germane to the principal object, the act is not repugnant to section 30,-art VI. of the constitution, and is valid as to such principal and auxiliary or hicidental object.
11. Constitutional Law.
Generally under said section the language of the title should be construed in its most comprehensive and liberal sense favorable to the validity of the act, so as to bring the contents of the act within the title; and only where it is very manifest that the contents of the act are not within the title should the act or any part of it be deemed invalid.
Okey Johnson for plaintiff in error.
I. Statutes of limitation do not embrace the state unless expressly designated. 6 Pet. 666; 13 Wall 92; Com. 18 Wall. 57; 28 W. Va. 304; 2 W. Va 441.
II. Statutes should be construed as prospective in every instance, except when the intent that they shall operate retrospectively is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, or such intent is necessarily implied, from the language of the statute which would be inoperative otherwise than retrospectively. 34 W. Va. 524; 3 Craneh 399; 15 How. 421: 24 How. 242; 17 Wall. 596; 3 Eng. & Am. Ene. L. 758; 3 Call 279; 10 Gratt. 585; 83 Va.204; 14 Graft 24; 65 Am. Dec. 545; 82 Am. Dec. 696; 96 Am. Dec, 613; 50 Am. Dec. 389; 7 Conn. 558; 33 Me..333; 39 "N. J. L. 555; 57 Perm. St. 209; 45 Tex. 345.
III. The same stringent rule applies with even greater force to Statutes of limitation. 80 Me. 50; 14 Gratt. 24; 50 Am.
Dec. 389: 117 I11. 79; 37 Vt, 599; 22 Ind. 310; 4 Munf. 104; 24 W. Va. 327; 23 Miss. 269; Id. 319; 24 Miss. 377; 15 How. 421.
IV. Section 20 is unconstitutional because it embraces the general object of limitation to all suits of the State, which object is not expressed in the title. 4 La. An. 297; 41 Ala. 9; 14 Mich. 497; 21 Mich. 236; 1 Neb, 182; 47 Mo. 29; 46 Mo. 288; 15 L. R. A. 847; 8 W. Va. 74; Cool. Con. Lim. 172; 8 W. Va. 612; 79 Ky. 13; 35 N. Y. 449; 101 N. Y. 294.
V. Section 20 unconstitutional, if treated as amendment, as it
violates Sec. 30 Art. VI, of the Constitution. Cooley Con. Lim. 184; 87 Tenn. 124; 98 Ind. 521; 58 Mo. 66; 8 W. Va. 74; 36 W. Va. 782.
Ewing, Melvin & Riley and J. W. Ewing for defendants in error.
judgment without scire facias. Code, eh. 139, sec. 10.
date of judgment, none having previously issued thereon. Code, ch. 139, sec 10.
III. The common-law rule is reversed and statutes of limitation do apply to the state. Code, ch. 35, sec. 20; Busw. Li m. and Adv. Poss. 150; 19 W. Va 223.
IV. To avoid the statute, the party must show himself to be within its exceptions. 13 Pet. 45.
V. Statute is retroactive. Busw. Lim. and Ad. Poss. 19, sec.
14, and note an page 20; 81 N. Y. 143. Especially when sufficient time is allowed after passage of state to execute judgment. Buswell cited, see. 230 and note 1 and sec. 14; 34 W. Va. 524; 24 W. Va 327-339; 13 Pet 45; 18 W. Va. 522.
John Bassell for defendants in error cited: Acts 1875 p. 118; Acts 1882 p. 22; Code (1849) e, 186, s. 12, 13; 20 W. Va. 487; 24 W. Va. 327; Code (1869) c. 139, s. 10, 11; 13 Pet. 64; 6Kan. 311; 33 N J.L. 350; 107 U. S. 147.
This is a writ of error taken by the State to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Ohio county quashing an execution in favor of the State. Was the judgment barred by the statute of limitations, when the execution issued? is the question of the case.
The judgment was rendered in October, 1877; a second execution was returnable to January rules, 1879; and the next one the one involved here issued 19th November, 1891. The State contends that its judgment is protected by the maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi, no time runs against the king.
Section 20, c. 35, of the Code of 1868, provided that every statute of limitations, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the State, but as to claims heretofore accrued the time shall be computed as commencing when this chapter takes effect. This abolishsd the common-law rule that no time runs against the State.
A difficult question here arises whether this provision of the Code applies to this judgment. If so, then it is barred by sections 10 and 11, c. 139, of the Code.
In chapter 55, § 19, Acts 1875, is found the provision: There shall be no limitation to proceedings on judgments on behalf of the State or any claim due the State." The act containing this clause is not a re-enactment of chapter 35, but an independent act relating to the collection of taxes. It does not expressly repeal the section of the Code of 1868 above cpioted. That is left standing; but, as there is a repugnancy between the two provisions, and the act of 1875 repeals so much of all acts as conflicts with it, we shall say that it is a partial repeal by clear implication of section 20, c. 35, of the Code of 1868 that is so far as that section would operate to bar judgments in favor of the State and claims due the State; that is, as I think, claims for money demands. But beyond this it did not repeal the said provision of the Code of 1868 making the State subject to every statute of limitations; but that provision would operate against the State in respect to other rights; for instance, her right to lands or torts done to her property. It would be more accurate to say that the act of 1875 operated to make exceptions to section 20 of chapter 35 than to call it a repeal. And that the act of 1875 takes out of section 20 only judgments and debt claims is plain from the fact that the clause is found in an act entitled An act providing for the collection of taxes; and, as applicable to debt demands, it would be covered by the title; but, extended to all causes of action in favor of the State, it would be ungermane to the principal object of the title and void. Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74.
Afterwards by act of March 12, 1881 (Acts 1881, c. 13) the legislature amended and re-enacted chapter 30 of the Code, in relation to the collection of taxes; and although it related to the same object as the act of 1875, it left out that clause of the act of 1875 which declared that no statute of limitations should apply to judgments or claims due the state, and thus repealed it.
Some question might be raised whether the acts of 1881 did so repeal that clause on the theory, that the act of 1875 was not a re-enactment of chapter 30 of the Code but an original act, so to speak; whereas the act of 1881 is a reenactment of chapter 30 of the Code; and that, as the act of 1881 is silent as to the subject of limitations, and so contains...
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Cent. Trust Co. v. Hall
...a retroactive operation." Rogers v. Lynch, 44 W. Va. 94. Other West Virginia cases have recognized and applied this principle. State v. Mines, 38 W. Va. 125; Harrison v. Harman, 76 W. Va. 412; Overton v. Heckathorn, 81 W. Va. 640. The proposition is fundamental. "It is a sound rule of const......