State v. Minton

• Decision Date: 13 June 1893
• Citation: 22 S.W. 808,116 Mo. 605
• Parties: STATE v. MINTON et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

22 S.W. 808

116 Mo. 605

STATE v. MINTON et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 13, 1893.

CRIMINAL LAW — APPEAL — FORGERY — FICTITIOUS PERSON — EVIDENCE — CONSPIRACY — INDICTMENT — PROOF OF HANDWRITING.

1. On appeal in a criminal case the supreme court will not interfere with a verdict unless there is a total failure of evidence, or unless the evidence is so weak as to justify the inference that the verdict is the result of passion, prejudice, or partiality.

2. On a prosecution against two defendants for executing false and forged deeds in the name of a fictitious person, conveying lands to which neither they nor such fictitious person had any title, where the evidence shows that both defendants were engaged in a common enterprise, selling and trading lands in the name of such fictitious person, and enjoying the proceeds arising from such transactions, proof of the statements of either defendant, made during the existence of the conspiracy, are admissible as against the other; but, after the conspiracy has ended, statements or admissions made by one, not in the presence of the other, are inadmissible against such other.

3. Deeds other than the one described in the indictment, also executed by defendants in the name of the fictitious person, are admissible in evidence to show a guilty intent, though they may also show defendants guilty of other crimes than the one charged.

4. It is error to permit the jury to compare the signature of the fictitious person, as it appeared in the deed described in the indictment, with the same signature to other deeds, not in the record of the case, and not admitted to be the handwriting of either of the defendants.

5. A witness who has testified that he is familiar with the handwriting of one of the defendants may state his opinion as to whether the signature of the fictitious person to the deed described in the indictment is the handwriting of such defendant.

6. Under Rev. St. 1889, § 3653, which declares it to be a forgery to falsely make any instrument by which any right of action or property shall be, or purport to be, conveyed or created, to which shall be "affixed" a fictitious name, or the name or pretended name of any person not in existence, the indictment must allege that a fictitious name or pretended signature of a person not in existence was affixed to the instrument, unless the instrument is set forth according to its tenor, showing the fact to be that the name of the fictitious person was affixed thereto; and an indictment is bad which merely alleges that defendant unlawfully and feloniously made and forged a deed purporting to be the act of a fictitious person.

Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county; James M. Sandusky, Judge.

William E. Minton and George W. Seasholts were convicted of forging a deed in the name of a fictitious person, and they appeal. Reversed.

Huston & Parrish, for appellants. R. F. Walker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BURGESS, J.

At the March term, 1891, of the criminal court of Buchanan county, Robert F. Zook, William E. Minton, and George W. Seasholts were indicted for making and forging a false and forged deed purporting to be the act of one Youngberger, a fictitious person, to convey certain land in Stone county, Mo., to one Rachel Cross. The indictment is in two counts. On a trial, Zook was acquitted. Afterwards a change of venue was awarded the defendants Minton and Seasholts, to the circuit court of Clinton county, where on trial had at the January term, 1892, of said circuit court of Clinton county, defendants were acquitted on the second count, and found guilty on the first count, in the indictment, and the punishment of each one fixed at 10 years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. The count of the indictment under which defendants were convicted, leaving out the formal parts, is as follows: "* * * did unlawfully and feloniously and falsely make and forge a certain false and forged deed, purporting to be the act of one William T. Youngberger, a fictitious person, by which a right and interest in certain real property, which in said deed purports to lie and be situate in the county of Stone, state of Missouri, and which in said deed was described as follows, to wit, all the east one-half of the northeast quarter of section number eighteen, township number twenty-three, range number twenty-four, containing eighty acres, more or less, purported to be conveyed and transferred to one Rachel Cross, with intent then and there and thereby to defraud, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Missouri." After conviction, defendants filed their motion for new trial, and in arrest, which being overruled, they appealed to this court.

The first contention on part of defendants is that there is no evidence to support the verdict. This court has so often decided that it will not interfere with a verdict unless it is evident that it is the result of passion, prejudice, or partiality on the part of the jurors that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities on that point. State v. Nelson, 98 Mo. 414, 11 S. W. Rep. 997, and authorities cited; State v. Howell, 100 Mo. 628, 14 S. W. Rep. 4; State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S. W. Rep. 260. We are not prepared to say that there is a total failure of evidence, or that it is so weak as to justify the inference that the verdict is the result of passion, prejudice, or partiality. In fact the evidence leaves room for little doubt, if any, of their guilt.

The action of the trial court in admitting evidence as to other transactions with other parties, and in admitting in evidence other deeds than the one described in the indictment, and in admitting proof of the declarations of the defendants with reference thereto, is assigned for error. There was sufficient foundation laid to justify the admission and statements of the defendants, as against either or both, while their relations existed as partners in dealing in real estate, and the sale of lands, and the execution of deeds therefor, as charged in the indictment. The evidence tends strongly to show that they were engaged in one common enterprise, selling and trading lands in the county of Stone, in the name of Youngberger, enjoying the proceeds and profits arising from such transactions, and that while thus engaged they entered into a conspiracy to defraud, by selling lands to which they nor Youngberger, in whose name the conveyances were made, so far as the evidence tends to show, had no right or title. Alonzo Cross, a witness for the state, testified that he made the trade for the land described in the indictment with the defendant Seasholts, and that Seasholts told him that the title thereto...