State v. Mirquet

• Decision Date: 30 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 920066-CA,920066-CA
• Citation: 844 P.2d 995
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joseph C. MIRQUET, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 995

844 P.2d 995

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joseph C. MIRQUET, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 920066-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Dec. 30, 1992.

R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for appellee.

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, JJ.

OPINION

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

The State of Utah appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The trial court granted the motion based on the State's failure to provide the constitutional protections required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We affirm.

FACTS

On November 25, 1989, defendant was driving south on Interstate 15 in his 1978 Cadillac. Officer Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol was operating a radar speed check near Nephi. He clocked defendant's speed at 76 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone. Officer Mangelson pulled defendant over, obtained his license and registration, asked him to enter the patrol car to see the speed recorded on the radar unit, and proceeded to write him a speeding ticket.

While defendant was in the patrol car, Officer Mangelson detected the odor of burnt marijuana. Officer Mangelson testified that he said to defendant "It's obvious to me that you've been smoking marijuana. Do you care to go get the marijuana for me, or do you want me to find it?" Officer Mangelson later testified he said "It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana. You know, there's no question in my mind, Would you like to go to the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?" In response, defendant went to his car and returned to the patrol vehicle with a cigarette package containing two rolled "joints." Officer Mangelson then searched defendant's car. In the car's main compartment, he found a film canister with a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, and a vial that held cocaine. Officer Mangelson then searched the trunk and found a cardboard box with four or five ounces of marijuana vacuum packed in bags.

Defendant was subsequently charged with two felonies, possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of the vehicle. The trial court found defendant was in custody at the time he was told to retrieve the marijuana and, consequently, entitled to Miranda protections. Accordingly, the court ordered the incriminating evidence suppressed.

The State filed an interlocutory appeal which we granted. In this first appeal, we vacated the order of suppression and remanded the case for re-consideration in light of Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), and our intervening decision, State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.1990).

On remand, the trial court determined "the officer accused the defendant of smoking marijuana," "a reasonable person would probably not feel free to leave under the circumstances," and therefore concluded "the officer's post custodial statements amounted to an illegal interrogation." Consequently, the court again suppressed the evidence.

Arguing the trial court on remand applied the wrong legal standard in concluding defendant was in custody and, therefore, entitled to Miranda warnings, the State again appeals. The State also argues that even if there was a Miranda violation any derivative physical evidence should be admissible unless it was recovered through the use of actual coercion.

I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

The State asserts the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining defendant was in custody for the purposes of Miranda. We review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Stewart v. State ex rel. Deland, 830 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah App.1992). Parsing the language of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the State claims the trial judge decided defendant was in custody because the court concluded a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave if in defendant's situation. The State argues the result might be different if the trial court had applied the proper standard--that defendant had a reasonable belief his freedom of action was curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest. See State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987).

As a matter of federal law, an individual's right to the protections afforded in Miranda are triggered the moment the individual is subject to "custodial interrogation." The United States Supreme Court defines custodial interrogation as

"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). The Court expanded on this definition in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977) (per curiam). "Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' " Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. Later, in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517 (1983) (per curiam), the Court stated that "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with formal arrest." Id. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520.

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Utah App.1990). The question of custody is judged by an objective standard. "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

Utah courts have refined the analysis of when a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. The Utah Supreme Court, in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), adopted the widely held rule that a "temporary detention for the purpose of investigating alleged traffic violations" is not a custodial interrogation. Id. at 1170. The court also stated that it is "at the point the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Id. In Carner, the court articulated four factors to consider in determining whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda. "They are: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation." ID. AT 1171. ¹

In State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), the supreme court identified another consideration that should be weighed when assessing the question of custody--the presence of a "coercive or compulsive strategy on the officer's part" in conducting the interrogation. Id. at 391. Because of the reasonable man standard articulated in Berkemer, coercive intent should be considered as part of the form of interrogation factor. In other words, it is the manifestation of the coercive strategy that matters, not the unarticulated or unobserved intent of the officer. Cf. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151.

This court further developed the Miranda custody analysis in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.1990). In addition to the four factors set forth in Carner and developed in Kelly, we recognized a fifth factor: "whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and willingly." Id. at 1105. In Sampson, we concentrated on the fourth factor--the form of interrogation. We concluded that Utah courts place "a great deal of emphasis on the form of the questioning" in assessing whether the defendant is in custody. Id. If questioning is "merely investigatory, courts have not found custody." Id. (citing Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391). However, the moment the questioning becomes accusatory "custody is likely and Miranda warnings become necessary." Id. (citing Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170; Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391). The court identified the change from investigatory to accusatory questioning as happening when the " 'police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has committed it.' " Id. 808 P.2d at 1106 (quoting Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171).

Our review of the case law convinces us, as contended by the State, the proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest." East, 743 P.2d at 1212. However, we do not believe the trial court departed from that standard in this case. We are persuaded the trial court applied the correct legal standard. Our previous remand contained specific directions to determine the custody issue under the standard advanced by the State. We directed the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling in light of Berkemer. That case holds it "settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.' " Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)). Furthermore, where, as here, the evidence is essentially undisputed and the undisputed facts support a determination that defendant was in custody, the mere failure to recite the precise words of the custody standard does not demand a remand for more specific findings. See, e.g., Flying Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1989) (holding remand unnecessary where undisputed facts allow appellate court to "fairly and properly resolve the case on the record"); State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254 at 259 n. 8 (Utah App.1992) (reversing trial court's ruling of indigency based on undisputed facts in the record); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771...