State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 April 1909
• Citation: 117 S.W. 1173,219 Mo. 156
• Parties: STATE v. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

117 S.W. 1173

219 Mo. 156

STATE v. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April 13, 1909.

1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 176) — ISSUES AND EVIDENCE — TIME OF OFFENSE.

One charged with violation of law on a certain day may be convicted on proof that he committed the act on any day within the period of limitation prescribed for prosecution.

2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 369)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES.

Where defendant is charged with the violation of law on a certain day and the evidence shows a violation on that day, the prosecution cannot then show a similar act on other days.

3. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 369)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES.

In the prosecution of a railroad company under Laws 1907, p. 180, for failure to run a passenger train over a certain portion of its road on a certain day, where the evidence clearly identified the train operated by defendant with the day specified, it was error to admit evidence of the kind of trains defendant ran over that road and their delay in arrival and departure on other days.

4. STATUTES (§ 192)—CONSTRUCTION—MEANING OF WORDS.

Rev. St. 1899, § 4160 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 2252), requires courts in construing statutes to interpret "words and phrases in their ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import." Held, that the words "passenger train" and "regular passenger train" have no technical meaning in law, and are therefore to be construed in their ordinary sense.

5. STATUTES (§ 208)—CONSTRUCTION—WORDS OF DOUBTFUL MEANING.

Words in a statute of doubtful meaning are to be interpreted by their context and in view of the purposes of the Legislature.

6. RAILROADS (§ 227)—OPERATION—STATUTORY REGULATION—"TRAIN"—"PASSENGER TRAIN"—"REGULAR."

The word "train," as used in reference to railroad traffic, means all kinds of trains, freight trains, passenger train, mail train, construction train, etc., and the character of the train is designated by another word. In the term "passenger train" the word "passenger" is used as an adjective to qualify the noun "train." The two words "passenger train" combine to form the name of the thing to which it is applied. Neither word used alone would designate the object intended, but together they constitute the name. The word "regular" is designated to express the character of the train to which it is attributed. It signifies that it is a regular train, whether freight or passenger (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 6, p. 5227).

7. RAILROADS (§ 227)—OPERATION—"REGULAR" TRAIN.

The word "regular," when used to designate a railroad train, applies to the operation of the train whether it be a freight train or a passenger train, but if it has its designated place on the published schedule, and if it ordinarily arrives and leaves as designated in that place, it is a regular train. Thus there may be two passenger trains, one regular and the other irregular, one that is scheduled on the timetable and the other not; yet the irregular train is as much a passenger train as the regular one.

8. RAILROADS (§ 227) — OPERATION — "PASSENGER TRAIN" — "REGULAR PASSENGER TRAIN."

The term "passenger train" includes all passenger trains, regular and irregular, not only trains that move every day on scheduled time, but excursion trains, special trains, extra trains, etc.; whereas, the term "regular passenger train" means a passenger train on the regular published schedule (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 7, p. 6038).

9. RAILROADS (§ 227) — OPERATION — STATUTORY REGULATION — "PASSENGER TRAIN."

A railroad train composed of an engine and tender, two or more freight cars, combined baggage mail and passenger car, and a passenger coach, is a "passenger train" within Laws 1907, p. 180, requiring railroad carriers to run at least one passenger train over its road each way every day.

10. RAILROADS (§ 227)—"LOCAL FREIGHT."

The term "local freight" means a train of freight cars receiving and delivering goods within a limited distance, and carrying at the rear end a caboose for the accommodation of the train crew, and, incidentally, a few passengers.

In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Benton County; C. A. Denton, Judge.

The Missouri Pacific Railway Company was convicted of violation of law with respect to the operation of its passenger trains, and appeals. Reversed.

C. D. Corwin, Roy D. Williams, and Sam B. Jeffries, for appellant. Elliott W. Major, Atty. Gen., W. S. Jackson, and C. C. Barrett, for the State.

VALLIANT, C. J.

Defendant was convicted and fined $100 as if for failure to obey the requirement of an act of the General Assembly approved March 19, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 180), entitled "An act to compel all railroad corporations or persons operating a railroad or part of a railroad in this state to run at least one passenger train over said railroad each way every day, and fixing penalties for violation thereof." The first section of that act is as follows: "Section 1. That all persons, copartnerships, companies or corporations operating any railroad or part of a railroad in this state shall, unless hindered by wrecks or providential hindrance, run at least one regular passenger train each way every day over all lines, or part of a line, of railroad so operated by such person, copartnership, company or corporation in this state, which train shall stop at all regular stations along the line of such railroad for the purpose of receiving and discharging passengers." Section 2 prescribes the penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $500 for each violation. The information charges that defendant owned and operated a railroad extending from Sedalia to Warsaw, connecting at Sedalia with its main line; that on February 14, 1908, there being no wreck or providential hindrance, defendant did "fail and refuse to operate a regular passenger train each way over" that railroad. Defendant filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it charged no offense against the law because the act of the General Assembly above mentioned on which the information was based was unconstitutional in several particulars, specifying in the motion certain clauses in the state and in the federal Constitution which defendant thought were violated. The same points were also presented in the motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. It was the constitutional question that brought the appeal to this court, but, unless we find in the record evidence sufficient to sustain the court's finding of guilty as charged in the information, we will have to decide the case before we reach the constitutional question.

The information charged the defendant with failure to run a regular passenger train each way on the 14th February, 1908. One indicted for committing an act in violation of law on a certain day may be convicted if it be proven that he committed the act specified in the indictment on any day within the period of limitation prescribed for prosecution of the act; but, if he is indicted for committing a certain act on a certain day and the state's proof is to the effect that he did the act specified on the day specified, the state would have no right to go back over the period of the statute of limitations, and prove that he did similar acts on other days. The day specified in the indictment, if it be within the statutory period, is ordinarily not a vital point to be proven, but the act which it is charged the defendant committed is vital, and, where that act is identified by the state's proof, it is the act on which the state must rely for conviction, and, unless the facts proven are sufficient to constitute the criminal act charged, the state cannot go back or forward over the statutory period, and prove other facts that have no connection with the particular act for which the defendant is indicted in order to supply what may be lacking to render the particular act specified a violation of the law.

The evidence in this case wandered farther than it should. The defendant was charged with having failed to run a regular passenger train both ways on this road on the 14th February, 1908, in violation of the statute, and, to sustain that charge, the state proved that on the 14th February, 1908, the defendant ran both ways on the road a train composed of an engine, tender, two or more freight cars, a combined baggage, mail and passenger car, and a passenger coach, and that no other train was run on that day. That proof was a complete identification of the act specified in the information and a complete identification of the day specified on which it was committed. Therefore there was no occasion to go over a period of six months, as the state was allow-to do, to prove what kind of trains defendant ran on other days during that period and the delay in the arrival and departure of some of those trains. It was shown in evidence for the state that there was a schedule for the arrival and departure of the trains, and there was no evidence that this train on this day did not arrive and depart on the schedule time. Defendant was called into court to answer for its conduct in running that train, not to answer why another train six months before was delayed. Here, then, we have a train equipped with an ordinary passenger coach and also a car divided into compartments, designed to carry baggage in one compartment, mails in another, and passengers in another, and the train running on a published schedule as to time, but, in addition to those cars, the train contained two or more freight cars,...