State v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 20 June 2000 |
| Citation | 20 S.W.3d 546 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randy Mitchell, Appellant WD56872 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Pettis County Circuit Court, Hon. Donald Lloyd Barnes
Opinion Summary: Defendant-Appellant, Randy Mitchell, was convicted after a bench trial of manufacturing a controlled substance. This conviction was based on evidence seized during a search of his residence on July 8, 1998. He was also convicted of attempting to manufacture a controlled substance. This conviction was based on evidence seized during a subsequent search of his motel room on July 13, 1998. He was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent terms of 12 years imprisonment for each count.
Mr. Mitchell argues that the evidence obtained during the July 8, 1998 search should have been suppressed because the affidavit on which the search warrant for his residence was based failed: (1) to disclose the basis of a confidential informant's knowledge, (2) to specifically indicate how the informant had been reliable in the past, and (3) to indicate that the informant had a prior criminal record. In addition, he claims that, even if the affidavit and warrant were valid, some of the items seized by the police exceeded the scope of evidence permitted to be seized by the warrant. With regard to the July 13, 1998 search, Mr. Mitchell challenges the right of police to have entered his motel room at the request of the motel's cleaning crew, and the subsequent use of the observations made during that entry in an affidavit on which the warrant to search the motel room was based.
Affirmed.
Division Two holds: As to Defendant's claims regarding the July 8, 1998 search, we first find that the failure to recite the specific source of an informant's basis of knowledge, by itself, does not render an affidavit inadequate to support a search warrant. Instead, probable cause is established by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Viewed in that light, we find the information provided by the informant was sufficiently corroborated by other sources, and therefore, there was a substantial basis for believing the informant's statements even without further details about how the informant obtained the information. Similarly, the affidavit in support of the July 8, 1998 warrant did not need to set out, as Defendant claims, the specifics of how the informant had been reliable in the past. We find it is sufficient that, as was done here, the affidavit contain a general statement that the informant has been reliable in the past. We also find that absent allegations that information regarding the informant's criminal history had been deliberately suppressed in order to mislead the magistrate, the fact that this information was not included in the affidavit does not constitute a material omission sufficient to defeat the search warrant. Moreover, the affidavit in this case included information that the informant knew about various drug buys and cooks by Defendant from which a reasonable magistrate could infer that such knowledge is seldom innocently acquired. Finally, we find that the items seized did not exceed the scope of evidence permitted to be seized by the warrant. While it is clear that some of the items seized can be personal items with personal uses, that can also have a nexus with criminal behavior, and were seized on that basis, in plain view.
As to Defendant's claims regarding the July 13, 1998 search, we find that he failed to meet his burden to show that he held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room at the time the officer walked into it, at the cleaning crew's request, without a warrant, and thus did not have standing to raise the issue. Here, Defendant's privacy right to the motel room terminated when his rental period ended. The court below could have found on the evidence that this occurred at the motel's check-out time of 11:00 a.m. Although Defendant informed the motel that he would be checking out late because he had overslept, there is no indication in the record that he obtained the motel's permission to stay past 11:00 a.m., or that he asked to stay until any particular time of day. Even if the motel did permit a limited extension of the check-out time, the evidence shows that the motel terminated that extension when it sent its cleaning crew to clean the room, and asked the police, not Mr. Mitchell, for permission to do so. It thereby reasserted its control over the room and terminated Mr. Mitchell's expectation of privacy in the room. In addition, the fact Defendant was stopped and arrested after exiting his room at 11:20 a.m., thus preventing him from extending his rental period, does not change the fact that this is still considered a voluntary relinquishment of his privacy interest in the room which entitled the motel's personnel to enter and to permit the police to do so also as it was Defendant's actions that caused the stop and arrest. Thus, without a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, Defendant has no standing to claim that his rights under the Fourth Amendment precluded the admission of evidence obtained by the officer when he entered the motel room without a warrant. Finally, even if he still had an expectation of privacy in the room, the evidence was sufficient to support the warrant without consideration of the drug-related items the officer saw in plain view in the room.
Defendant-Appellant, Randy Mitchell, was convicted after a bench trial of manufacturing a controlled substance. This conviction was based on evidence seized during a search of his residence on July 8, 1998. He was also convicted of attempting to manufacture a controlled substance. This conviction was based on evidence seized during a subsequent search of his motel room on July 13, 1998. He was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent terms of 12 years imprisonment for each count.
Mr. Mitchell argues that the evidence obtained during the July 8, 1998 search should have been suppressed because the affidavit on which the search warrant for his residence was based failed: (1) to disclose the basis of a confidential informant's knowledge, (2) to specifically indicate how the informant had been reliable in the past, and (3) to indicate that the informant had a prior criminal record. In addition, he claims that, even if the affidavit and warrant were valid, the items seized by police exceeded the scope of evidence permitted to be seized by the warrant. With regard to the July 13, 1998 search, Mr. Mitchell challenges the right of police to have entered his motel room at the request of the motel's cleaning crew, and the subsequent use of the observations made during that entry in the affidavit on which the warrant to search the motel room was based. Because we find none of these claims have merit, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following evidence was adduced at trial: Sometime in 1997, Deputy Timothy Carr of the Pettis County Sheriff's Office began receiv-ing information indicating Defendant's involvement in the manufacture and distribution of meth--am-phetamine. This information came to Deputy Carr from various sources.
First, Sheriff Gary Starke of Pettis County communicated to Deputy Carr information received from Informant A in December 1996, that Defendant lived on a farm north of town and operated a painting business as a front to mask his illegal drug activity. Inform-ant A also claimed that Defendant often moved the location of the business to avoid detection, took the meth-am-phetamine he produced to Kansas City to exchange it for cocaine, and supplied meth-amphetamine to others known by the police to be involved in the production and sale of con-trolled substances.
Second, from late in 1997 to early in 1998, Trooper T.J. Stevens, a narcotics investigator with the Missouri Highway Patrol, received information from another person, Informant B, which he forwarded to Deputy Carr. Informant B stated that Defendant stored materials neces-sary for the manufacture of methamphetamine in a garage located on Lafayette Street between 13th and 14th Streets in Sedalia.
Third, another person, Informant C, told the police that Defendant had recently returned from a trip "up east" where he purchased a large amount of goods used in methamphetamine manufacturing. Additionally, Informant C stated that Defendant had produced the illegal drugs at various locations, including in a camper being pulled on the highway and in the garage on Lafayette Street mentioned above. After Sheriff Starke passed on this information to him, Deputy Carr was able to verify some of the information about Defendant. Deputy Carr also located the garage on 13th Street at the place described by Informants B and C, and noticed a trailer parked behind the building.
In February 1998, an unnamed member of Defendant's family called Deputy Carr, expressing concern regarding Defendant's drug use, his wife's drug use, and the environment in which their children were living. This person believed Defendant was manufacturing metham-phetamine and storing material involved in that activity in a utility room off of his kitchen. The family member said the room was locked and Defendant did not allow anyone else to enter it. Finally, the same family member told Deputy Carr that one of Defendant's children had been attacked by a Rottweiler that Defendant kept in his home to protect his drug activities. A report filed with the Department of Family Services (DFS) on February 28, 1998, and obtained by Sheriff Starke, confirmed the reports of this family member regarding the attacks on Defendant's child. It showed that the child was bitten in the face by a Rottweiler at about the time indicated, but...
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