State v Mitchell, 99-0660
| Decision Date | 20 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | 99-0660 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN NELL MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant./ 99-0660 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA Filed |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, David E. Schoenthaler (trial), Mark Cleve (motion), Judges.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon two jury verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3 (1997) (Trial 1) and one count of indecent contact with a child in violation of section 709.12 (Trial 2). He contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes. The defendant, in a document which he has filed in addition to the brief filed by his court-appointed counsel, makes numerous claims and arguments all but one of which are different than and in addition to the claim of error raised by court-appointed counsel. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, Dennis D. Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, and John Nell Mitchell, pro se, Anamosa, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Michael J. Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Defendant John Mitchell appeals his convictions, following jury trial, of three counts of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, contending evidence of sexual acts with children other than the victim was admitted in violation of Iowa Rules of Evidence 404(b). We affirm.
Mitchell was charged in a single trial information with three counts of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, which referenced A.E., who was twelve years of age at trial, as the victim (Counts I-III); and three counts of Indecent Contact with a Child, with S.F., who was nine years of age at trial, and her sister K.F., who was fourteen years of age at trial, referenced as victims in Counts IV and V respectively, and a fourth victim, S.B., referenced as the victim in Count VI. Counts I-III were alleged to have occurred between January and September 1997, when A.E. would have been ten and eleven years of age; Counts IV and V were alleged to have occurred in the fall of 1997, when S.F. and K.F. would have been eight and thirteen years of age respectively; and Count VI was alleged to have occurred in "the calendar year 1996." Mitchell filed a motion to sever Counts I-III from Counts IV-VI. The court initially denied the motion, but on reconsideration, severed the trials as follows: Counts I-III remained joined (Trial 1), Counts IV and V were severed for a separate trial (Trial 2), and Count VI was severed for a third trial (Trial 3). Mitchell then filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude in Trial 1 the testimony of the two victims whose complaints were to be tried in Trial 2. The court deferred ruling until those victims' testimony was offered, and ultimately allowed the testimony, now challenged on appeal. Following jury trial, Mitchell was found guilty of all three counts in Trial 1. Following Trial 2 to the jury, Mitchell was found not guilty of Count IV and guilty of Count V. Count VI was dismissed. Mitchell requested court-appointed counsel for appeal. The trial court appointed the State Appellate Defender, who represents Mitchell on appeal, filed a brief, and orally argued the appeal. The issue raised in that brief and pursued in oral argument relates solely to Trial 1. The following evidence was presented to the jury during Trial 1. Between January and September 1997, the victim, A.E., who at the time was a ten-year-old girl, lived with her mother and her mother's boyfriend, Mitchell. During this time period, A.E. testified Mitchell touched her on her breasts once or twice while her clothes were on, and between her legs while her clothes were on a few times as well. A.E. then testified as time passed, Mitchell started going underneath her clothing, at first using his hand to touch her bare breasts and vagina, and eventually touching her vagina with his penis and inserting his penis "about three times." A.E. stated she was mad at Mitchell because he was her mother's boyfriend, but was not fabricating her testimony so she could live with her father.
Dr. Ozaki examined A.E. on June 17, 1997. She observed no physical trauma to her vaginal area and that A.E.'s hymen was normal. A.E. testified she was "pretty sure" Mitchell's touching of her came before the exam with Dr. Ozaki.
Dr. Hartmann also examined A.E., about three weeks before Dr. Ozaki did. He testified he observed minor scratches in A.E.'s vaginal area that could have healed in a matter of days. Although he did not believe A.E.'s hymen was intact, he deferred to Dr. Ozaki's expertise in the matter. During Dr. Hartmann's examination of A.E., he asked her if she had been sexually active, and she replied in the negative.
During trial the court overruled Mitchell's motion in limine, and the two sisters whose complaints were to be tried in Trial 2 testified as to physical contact he had with them. K.F., a friend of A.E.'s, testified that on one occasion, while A.E.'s mother was in the kitchen and they were in another room, Mitchell touched her clothed breasts. S.F. testified that one time Mitchell put his hands on her breasts, both over her clothing and underneath her clothing, while she was staying overnight at Mitchell's apartment and sleeping in the same bed as him. S.F.'s testimony was very brief. Although K.F.'s testimony lasted somewhat longer, the two girls' combined testimony as to the alleged acts took no more than three pages of trial transcript.
Mitchell denied the alleged incidents occurred. He claims the trial court erred in admitting K.F. and S.F.'s testimony.
Our scope of review is for correction of errors of law. Iowa R. App. P. 4. Our standard of review in analyzing challenges to the admission of evidence of prior bad acts is for abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa 1997); State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1988). The trial court must exercise its sound discretion and apply the same two-step analysis we will apply here in deciding whether to admit such evidence. Brown, 569 N.W.2d at 116. We will reverse the trial court's decision only upon a showing that the court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1997). "Even if an abuse of discretion is found, reversal is required only when the abuse is prejudicial." State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 1999).
The issue here is controlled by Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The list of admissible "other purposes" in this rule is not exclusive. Brown, 569 N.W.2d at 116.
The key is whether the challenged evidence is relevant and material to some legitimate issue other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts. If the evidence meets this litmus test, it is prima facie admissible, notwithstanding its tendency to demonstrate the accused's bad character.
Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229 (quoting State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1986) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
In determining whether the challenged evidence is admissible, the trial court must employ a two-step analysis. Id. It must first decide whether the evidence is relevant for a purpose other than to show that the defendant acted in conformity with his or her propensity to commit the wrongful act. Brown, 569 N.W.2d at 116. There is a presupposition that relevant evidence is admissible. Iowa R. Evid. 402; State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1997). If the evidence is relevant for a legitimate purpose, we move to the second step and decide whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Iowa R. Evid. 403; Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229. "An affirmation finding in this balancing process precludes admissibility of even relevant evidence." Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231; See also Iowa R. Evid. 403.
It is worth noting in regard to this two-part test that several federal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 as doing away with the first prong of the test. Federal Rule 414 provides in relevant part:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
See also Fed.R.Evid. 415 (). U.S. v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The practical effect of the new rules is to put evidence of uncharged offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases on the same footing as other types of relevant evidence that are not subject to a special exclusionary rule. The presumption is in favor of admission. The underlying legislative judgment is that the evidence admissible pursuant to the rules is typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is normally not outweighed by any risk of prejudice or other adverse effects.
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