State v. Mitchell, 19725

• Decision Date: 09 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 19725,19725
• Citation: 261 S.C. 452,200 S.E.2d 448
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Larry Ronald MITCHELL, Appellant.

Page 448

200 S.E.2d 448

261 S.C. 452

The STATE, Respondent, v. Larry Ronald MITCHELL, Appellant.

No. 19725.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Nov. 9, 1973.

Thomas F. Allgood and George B. Snelling, Jr., Allgood & Childs, Langley, for appellant.

Sol. C. LaVaun Fox, Aiken, Atty. Gen., Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen., Emmet H. Clair and Robert M. Ariail, Columbia, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice:

A jury rejected appellant's plea of insanity and convicted him of the murder of his wife, resulting in the imposition of a life sentence. He contends in this appeal that a directed verdict of not guilty should have been granted because the evidence conclusively established his plea of insanity; and, alternatively, that a new trial should be granted because of (1) alleged prejudicial statements and questions by the trial judge and (2) erroneous instructions to the jury as to the burden of proof on the issue of insanity.

The contention that appellant was entitled, as a matter of law, to an acquittal because his plea of insanity had been conclusively established was made for the first time as a ground for a motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. Since the question was not raised during trial by motion for a directed verdict, as required by Rule 76 of the Circuit Court, it is not available as a ground of appeal. However, assuming that the question was properly raised, there was ample evidence to require the submission of the issue of insanity to the jury for determination, as the following examination of the record demonstrates.

After a night of drinking and visiting beer joints with two companions, appellant, on October 8, 1971, shortly before 8 a.m., shot and killed his estranged wife with a 30-30 refle as she was walking from a parking area to enter her place of employment; and also shot his wife's stepmother who had carried the wife to work. One of his companions of the night was driving the car from which appellant stepped to commit the crime. Shortly thereafter appellant told an acquaintance that he had shot two people and requested that he call the police. The officers came immediately, arrested him, and placed him in jail.

About 3:45 on the afternoon of his arrest, approximately eight hours after commission of the crime, appellant was carried before the clerk of court to determine the need to appoint counsel to represent him. While there he was asked concerning his employment, income, ownership of property, indebtedness, family status, and his birth date and age. He answered all questions asked, signed his name, stated that he was unable to employ an attorney, and asked that one be appointed for him.

Appellant remained in the Aiken County jail until November 15, 1971, when he was admitted to the State Hospital, under a court order, for psychiatric evaluation and treatment, as prescribed by Section 32--969 of the 1962 Code of Laws. While in the Aiken County jail, he was visited by relatives, and was visited by doctors routinely in connection with a kidney transplant operation which had been performed upon him in August 1968 by doctors in Augusta, Georgia. At the time of the crime, appellant was still taking medication required by the kidney transplant, consisting of predizone (a synthetic type of cortizone) and immuran.

After his admission to the State Hospital, the doctors concluded that appellant was insane and retained him at that institution until October 10, 1972 when he was released as being sane and able to assist in his defense.

A psychiatrist from the State Hospital staff testified that appellant was insane when admitted to that institution on November 15, 1971 and had been insane for sometime prior thereto. In summarizing his opinion as to the mental condition of appellant when he first saw him, the psychiatrist stated:

'He has the feeling that people are talking about him; he's quite delusional, has delusions of persecution, that people are plotting against him, and he appears to have had acute schizophrenic mental illness as a result of the toxic state produced by the drugs, predizone and immuran, which he's taking in connection with his kidney transplant.'

It was the opinion of the psychiatrist that appellant was suffering from mental illness at the time of the crime and did not know right from wrong.

It is inferable that appellant had consumed a considerable amount of alcoholic beverages prior to the crime. With reference to the dangers from consuming alcoholic beverages while taking the drugs, predizone and immuran, the psychiatrist stated that any person who consumed beer and whiskey, while taking those drugs, is 'in trouble.' Appellant testified that the doctor who performed the kidney transplant cautioned him against drinking whiskey. Since his release from the State Hospital, as sane, on November 15, 1972, appellant has continued to take the same drugs but, apparently, with no resulting insanity.

Appellant contends that the testimony of the psychiatrist, as to the mental condition of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime, was conclusive on the issue of insanity. The fact that the opinion of the psychiatrist was not countered by expert evidence to the contrary did not entitle appellant to a directed verdict. The record contains a detailed account of appellant's actions, conduct, and appearance prior and subsequent to the shooting, from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that he was sane when he killed his wife. The weight to be accorded the opinion of the psychiatrist was for the jury to determine in the light of all of the attendant facts and circumstances in evidence.

The remaining questions concern charges that the trial judge made statements to counsel and conducted an examination of some of the witnesses to the prejudice of appellant. It is contended that such actions of the trial judge injected irrelevant and prejudicial matters into the case. The first of these concerns questions asked on the issue of insanity.

The psychiatrist testified that the mental condition of appellant was triggered by the taking of drugs prescribed and necessary to keep appellant's body from rejecting the kidney transplant. He also testified that appellant was sane at the time of trial, having recovered during his stay in the State Hospital; and that he would have to continue to take the prescribed drugs. With reference to the continued use of these drugs, the trial judge questioned the psychiatrist as follows:

'Q. But did I understand you to say that part of the situation you found him in . . . was attributable to the medicine he was taking to prevent his body from rejecting the transplant?

'A. That's right.

'Q. And he's still taking those?

'A. If he doesn't take them, he'll die.

'Q. And if he continues taking them, then he'll get back into the situation he was in when you first saw him?

'A. He might. That's possible, yes, sir. I wouldn't say he will, but he might . . ..

'Q. But it's nothing which he has any control over, is it?

'A. No, sir.'

Appellant contends that the testimony relative to his possible future mental condition was irrelevant and, under the circumstances, highly prejudicial. The testimony was neither irrelevant nor prejudicial. It related to the effect of the drugs upon appellant's mental condition. The probability of the recurrence of insanity from the continued use of the drugs was relevant in determining whether their use had affected appellant's mind at the time he shot his wife; and the objection to the testimony was properly overruled.

The trial judge also elicited testimony from the stepmother of the deceased that appellant had shot her in the back immediately after shooting the deceased. It is contended that such testimony was irrelevant...