State v. Moe
| Decision Date | 30 August 1933 |
| Docket Number | 24484. |
| Citation | 174 Wash. 303,24 P.2d 638 |
| Parties | STATE v. MOE et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Skagit County; George A. Joiner, Judge.
Iver Moe and others were convicted of grand larceny and riot, and they appeal.
Reversed as to defendant Stanley Anderson, and affirmed as to others and remanded, with directions.
Lawrence Seltzer, of Seattle, and Irvin Goodman of Portland, Or., for appellants.
John W Brisky and Thos. K. Chambers, both of Mount Vernon, for the State.
The defendants were convicted of the crimes of grand larceny and riot, charged in a single information filed by the prosecuting attorney of Skagit county. From judgments and sentences entered on the verdicts, they appeal.
Appellants submit twelve assignments of error, which, for purposes of discussion, may be grouped under five heads: (1) Insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict on either charge; (2) error inexcluding evidence of economic conditions at and Before the time the offenses charged occurred; (3) error in forcing appellants to trial without giving them sufficient opportunity to prepare their defenses; (4) misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument to the jury and (5) denial of motion for new trial interposed on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
1. In the afternoon of September 3, 1932, a large number of unemployed people, among whom were the appellants, gathered together and marched to the Red Cross commissary in the city of Anacortes. Their purpose was to make a demonstration in support of a demand for a greater allowance of flour than had theretofore been made by the relief committee. Not finding the chairman of the committee at the commissary, they dispatched a messenger for him. On being informed that the chairman could not leave his place or business, they then marched to his office.
All of the appellants were present during these movements, and they were present in the office of the chairman when the written demand was presented. The appellant Anderson, in fact, presented the demand, and seems to have been the principal spokesman for the people at the meeting in the chairman's office. The chairman advised them that it was impossible to comply with the demand, whereupon some one asked if that was final. Being informed that it was, several persons in the crowd said, in substance: 'Very well, we'll get it.' Up to this point the assemblage had been peaceable and lawful.
The crowd then left the chairman's office, and a large number of them (variously estimated from forty to seventy-five) proceeded to the Skaggs store, which they entered. Many of them helped themselves to groceries, which they took away without paying for them. The appellants were in the store during all of the time the groceries were being taken. The evidence is conflicting as to the extent and character of their participation in the raid, with the exception of appellant Anderson. There is no evidence that he participated by word or deed in what was done in the store. He took no groceries; he threatened no one by word or gesture; he was merely a passive bystander. An officer came on the scene while the riot was in progress. He ordered the rioters to disperse. Some one in the crowd said they did not have to; whereupon he repeated the order. The crowd then dispersed without his having called on those present to assist in suppressing the riot.
There are cases which seem to hold that one present at a riot, who does not participate in suppressing it, is presumptively a rioter. But the rule in those cases rests upon the theory that, after the riot act is read by a magistrate and the rioters are ordered to disperse, or an officer has called upon those present to assist in suppressing the riot, no one can maintain the status of innocent bystander. If one thereafter remains at the scene of the riot and lends no aid in suppressing it, he will himself be deemed a rioter; but up to that time one can be held guilty of riot only by his own act or deed. His conduct does not have to be turbulent nor his language violent to constitute him a rioter. But some word or gesture indicating at least a willingness to assist the rioters must be manifested Before one can be held to be a rioter. Mere presence at the scene of the riot is not sufficient. 8 R. C. L. 331; 54 C.J. 835; 2 Brill's Cyclopedia of Criminal Law, § 1020; Reg. v. Atkinson, 11 Cox C. C. 330; State v. McBride, 19 Mo. 239; Pennsylvania v. Craig, Add. (Pa.) 190. The rule is tersely stated in 54 C.J. 835: 'Persons merely present at a riot who neither do nor say anything in the furtherance of the offense are not rioters.'
Measured by these standards, we find no evidence in the record that justifies the conviction of Anderson on either court.
The situation is different, however, as to Moe, Trafton, and Wollertz. There is ample positive evidence of their active participation in the offenses. The evidence is conflicting, but we can concern ourselves only as to whether there was sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury on both counts. In considering the evidence, it must be borne in mind that, when several people are engaged in perpetrating a crime, each is responsible for the acts of the others done in furtherance of the common purpose. So, as here, where a larceny is committed by a number of people by force and violence, all who participate are chargeable with the offenses of larceny and riot. This, even though some take the property without outward manifestations of force and violence, and others manifest force and violence, but take no property.
Measured by these rules, we find evidence that Wollertz left the store carrying groceries for which he did not pay. We find evidence that Moe and Trafton, by threat of physical violence, compelled the manager of the store to unlock and open the door, which he had closed and locked after the rioters entered. This evidence of larceny by Wollertz and of force and violence threatened by Moe and Trafton was sufficient to take the case to the jury on both counts as to all of them.
Contention is made that there was not sufficient evidence that the value of the groceries taken was in excess of $25. This contention is addressed rather to the weight and credibility of the...
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People v. Turner
...to otherwise criminal conduct. (See 720 ILCS Ann. 5/7-13, Committee Comments--1961, at 400 (Smith-Hurd 1993); State v. Moe (1933), 174 Wash. 303, 307, 24 P.2d 638, 640 ("[E]conomic necessity is frequently invoked in mitigation of punishment, but has never been recognized as a defense"); Rex......
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...held that a defendant's "conduct does not have to be turbulent nor his language violent to constitute him a rioter." State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638, 639 (1933). Instead, to be convicted, a defendant must only give "some word or gesture indicating at least a willingness to assist t......
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...on a theory presented for the first time on appeal. See Peterson v. Neal, 48 Wash.2d 192, 194, 292 P.2d 358 (1956); State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 308--09, 24 P.2d 638 (1933). The state finally seeks to reverse the dismissal on the ground the record does not show defendant was prejudiced by t......
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...breached the public peace by 'force or violence' as an element of the crime of riot. This argument was laid to rest in State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1933). We hold that where larceny was committed by a number of people by force and violence, all participants were properly charge......
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Job's plight revisited: the necessity defense and the Endangered Species Act. .
...on public interest). (202) Liner, supra note 48, at 1340. (203) DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 288. (204) Id. at 289. See State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 639-40 (Wash. 1933) (rejecting an economic necessity defense raised by impoverished defendants accused of stealing groceries from local (205) See......
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Property outlaws.
...486 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ("Economic necessity is no justification for a positive criminal offense."); State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) ("Economic necessity has never been accepted as a defense to a criminal charge."); see also Martin, supra note 319, at 1588 (st......
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§ 22.02 General Rules
...939.47 (2015) ("[p]ressure of natural physical forces").[41] This is a matter of controversy. See § 22.04, infra.[42] E.g., State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) ("Economic necessity has never been accepted as a defense to a criminal...
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§22.02 GENERAL RULES
...(2015) ("[p]ressure of natural physical forces").[41] . This is a matter of controversy. See § 22.04, infra.[42] . E.g., State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) ("Economic necessity has never been accepted as a defense to a criminal charge"). ...